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Abstract
This study identifies the formation, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian 
parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant and unresolved problem for comparative 
political science research. It constructs a formal theory of agrarian party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution, assembles a set of electoral, census and agricultural economic data, specifies a set of statis­
tical models and estimates these models’ parameters at the Australian (Commonwealth) elections of 1922, 
1925 and 1928.
Its results are consistent with its principal hypothesis: the formation and electoral support, in the years 
immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties such as the Australian Country Party was 
a consequence of (1) maladjustments in primary producers’ output of agricultural and pastoral com­
modities and (2) the collapse, between 1921 and 1922, in the price of many agricultural and pastoral 
commodities below the average variable cost of production. The recovery of commodity prices after 
1922, together with producers’ adjustment of their average variable cost of commodity production, 
weakened the Country Party’s electoral support and thereby engendered its partial dissolution.
This study thus tentatively resolves this problem for research. It also contributes to a greater under­
standing of major and non-major political parties, party systems and voter alignments, and the relation­
ship between economic conditions and electoral behaviour.
iv
. . . when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something 
about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is o f a 
meagre and unsatisfactory kind.
Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures and Addresses, London, 1889, vol. l ,p .  73.
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1Part I
2Chapter 1
The Problem For Research
1.1. Political Parties, Voters and Elections
Political parties have long been among the most persistently and intensively analysed political 
phenomena -  indeed, they figured prominently in the first works of modem political science (von Beyme, 
1985p.l). Nonetheless, for many years studies of political parties lacked an "explicitly theoretical 
foundation" and did not provide a valid description of the functions of political parties (Crotty, 
1970p.269); (Daalder, 1983p. 10); (Duverger, 1954p.xiii); (Roberts, 1978p.419). Because "almost every­
thing called a party in any Western democratic nation [could] be so regarded" (Epstein, 1967p.9), 
analyses of political parties were notable neither for their collection of reliable and comparable data nor 
for their contribution to an understanding of the wider political system (McDonald, 1955); (Neumann, 
1956p.395~421).
In this respect, Sartori’s Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis is a landmark study 
(Sartori, 1976). Sartori clarifies many conceptual difficulties and thereby makes an important contribution 
to a theory of parties and party systems. Sartori argues that parties organise the legislature’s business and 
thereby facilitate responsible government (Sartori, 1976p.27). This term, broadly interpreted, conveys the 
notions of executive accountability to a legislature and collective responsibility for government decision­
making: in return for the constitutional authority to govern, the executive must submit its actions to 
legislative scrutiny and criticism (American Political Science Association, 1950); (Ranney, 1954). Parties 
structure opinion in the legislature, engender coherent debate and thus help to render the executive 
accountable for its actions (Pomper, 1971); (Pomper, 1980); (Everson, 1980); (Sorauf, 1980); (Sartori, 
1976p.l9); (Schattschneider, 1942p.208); (Beer, 1982).
At the same time, however, parties’ activities extend far beyond the confines of the legislature. A 
government responsible to Parliament becomes, with the extension of the suffrage, a government respon­
sive to voters. Accordingly, parties organise the mass electorate and thereby constitute a sine qua non of 
electoral democracy. Parties solicit and articulate the public’s wants and concerns, aggregate these 
preferences into policy alternatives and, if elected, undertake to implement them as policy measures. 
Parties structure communication between governors and the governed and thus facilitate responsive 
government. Sartori, for example, argues that "parties are the central intermediate and intermediary 
structures between society and government" (Sartori, 1976p.ix) and that they "forcefully convey to the 
authorities the demands of the public as a whole" (Sartori, 1976pp.65-66). Similarly, Key argues that 
"parties are the basic instruments for the translation of mass preferences into public policy" (Key, 
1964p.433); (Finer, 1949p.274-282); (Dahl, 1967p.243); (Neumann, 1956p.397); (Lipson, 1959); 
(Lipson, 1964); (Ranney and Kendall, 1956p.85); (Schattschneider, 1942p.35)].
The attention accorded to parties also has normative underpinnings. Political scientists’ professional
3commitment to parties, which takes the form of a strong consensus that parties are desirable and probably 
essential in democratic politics, has spurred party research (Epstein, 1983p. 127). Eldersveld, for ex­
ample, contends that "intellectually, we have become committed to the position in the twentieth century 
that parties are central to the [political] system" (Eldersveld, 1964p.20). Similarly, Pomper argues that 
"we must either acknowledge the mutual reliance of our parties and our democracy — or lose both" 
(Pomper, 1980p.5). Clearly, therefore, powerful inducements — both objective and normative -- en­
courage the analysis of political parties.
In modem democracies, parties and elections are inextricably intertwined. In consequence, so too is the 
study of parties, elections and voter behaviour (Harrop and Miller, 1987); (Budge and Farbe, 1977); 
(Budge, 1983); (Katz, 1980). As parties’ electoral activities have increased in importance relative to their 
activities in the legislature, the objective and normative justifications for the study of parties has been 
pitched more in electoral than in institutional terms. It is therefore not surprising that analysts of voter 
behaviour have uncovered most about the party-in-the-electorate (Epstein, 1983p. 140). Early studies 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948); (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954); (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
McPhee, 1954) analysed the individual’s decision to vote and his vote choice, and culminated with the 
construction of a causal configuration (the "funnel of causabty") of the antecedents underlying individual 
vote choice (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). One of these studies’ central findings relates 
directly to parties: party identification is a major determinant of voter behaviour (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller and Stokes, 1960p. 120-167); (Budge, Crewe and Farbe, 1976); (Butler and Stokes, 1974); (Crewe, 
Sarlvik and Alt, 1977); (Fiorina, 1976); (Jackson, 1975); (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983); (Shaffer, 1972); 
(Shaffer, 1976).
Subsequent work "shifts the terms of reference from the individual voter to the mass electorate and from 
the individual vote to the cobective electoral decision" (Campbell, Miller and Stokes, 1966p.ix). This 
research examines not only the behaviour of individual voters; it also seeks to illuminate the means by 
which voters’ collective decisions influence the party system (Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale, 1980); (Key, 
1966); (McAllister and Rose, 1984); (Müler, 1977); (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1979pp.47-73); (Niemi and 
Weisberg, 1976pp.299-332); (Rose and McAUister, 1986). These works relate data to theory in a sys­
tematic manner, incorporate advances in research methodology and analytic techniques, and thereby 
extend knowledge of voter and party behaviour. They demonstrate that analysis of the mass electorate can 
yield valuable insights into patterns of party competition. In sum, therefore,
the substantive findings produced by party research since World War II reflect both its strength as a 
rapidly maturing area of research, perhaps the most so in the discipline, and its weaknesses as an area of 
research in which a variety of questions remain unresolved. Hence, as is invariably true in fields of 
knowledge that are rapidly progressing, two somewhat contradictory statements apply. Our knowledge is 
substantially improved; yet puzzling questions of great importance still exist (Cooper and Maisel, 
1978p. 16); (Daalder, 1983pp.l-27).
Section 1.2 defines the terms "major" party and "non-major" party (also known as "minor" parties or 
"third" parties). It argues that the analysis of non-major parties, which is often considered to be un- 
remunerative or is dismissed out of hand by political scientists, is a relevant and important exercise. In 
particular, it argues that the normative and substantive reasons which make the analysis of major parties a 
relevant exercise also make the analysis of non-major parties a relevant exercise. Section 1.2 therefore 
argues an analysis of a non-major party might also contribute to a greater understanding of parties, voters 
and the party system. Section 1.3 argues that a particular type of non-major part)', the agrarian party, is a 
particularly suitable candidate for analysis.
41.2. Major Parties, Non-Major Parties, Minor Parties and Third Parties
Most comparative studies -  particularly cross-national comparative studies -  of political parties analyse 
"major" parties. They say little about "non-major" parties [see, for example, (Lane and Ersson, 1987); 
(Epstein, 1967); (Riggs, 1968); (Janda, 1970); (Day and Degenhardt, 1980); (von Beyme, 1985)]. 
Similarly, seminal works on voting ignore non-major parties [see, for example, (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet, 1948); (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954); (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960); (Campbell, Miller and Stokes, 1966); (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1979)]. They focus upon the 
voter’s choice between major parties, not upon his choice between major and non-major parties. In 
consequence, little research -  and almost no explicitly theoretical research -  has been directed towards 
non-major parties:1
there has been no shortage of historical accounts of non-major party activity. The problem, though, is that 
scholars have generally examined one non-major party movement at a time. As a result, we are left with a 
different explanation (or sometimes more than one explanation) for each non-major party. There is no 
theory of non-major party voting that can be applied across instances or can be used to predict when the 
two-party system is likely to deteriorate and non-major parties flourish (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 
1984p.5) [see, however, (Pinard, 1975); (Mazmanian, 1974); (Hauss and Rayside, 1978); (Studlar and 
McAllister, 1987)].
Normative preconceptions, as well as analytical expedience, may justify this practice. The paucity of 
attention accorded to non-major parties may be a partial consequence of the normative prescriptions 
inherent in many analyses of political parties. The two-party system is widely accepted as an ideal in 
works that stress parties’ activities in the legislature. Where two parties structure the vote, clear winners 
commanding majority support emerge from elections and resultant (single-party) governments cannot 
evade responsibility for their actions. Conversely, where power is dispersed among party coalitions, 
stable government becomes more problematic (Riker, 1962) and party responsibility becomes more 
difficult to assign (Key, 1950); (Key, 1964p.334); (Epstein, 1983pp.l39-140). Dodd summarises the 
perception that a two-party system is conducive to stability, that a multi-party system is conducive to 
instability -  and therefore that a two-party system is preferable to a multi-party system (i.e., a party 
system without non-major parties):
governments in multi-party parliaments must be minority cabinets, coalition cabinets, or both; by their 
very nature, minority cabinets and coalition cabinets are quite transient; [as a result], multi-party systems 
are undesirable since they produce transient governments" (Dodd, 1976p.l0).
The paucity of attention directed at non-major parties is also a consequence of the ambiguity associated 
with the terms "major," "non-major," "minor" and "third" party. The major parties in most party systems 
are easily -  indeed, intuitively -  identifiable: major parties possess a substantial and stable partisan 
following, receive the vast majority of ballots cast at elections, win elections and form governments. As a 
rule, therefore, a political party is a major party if it contests most constituencies and holds one of the two 
largest blocs of seats in the parliament (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984p.9). According to this 
definition, each party system has two -  and no party system has more than two -  major parties; all other 
parties are non-major parties:
If [following (Sartori, 1976p.65)] a political party is defined as any group seeking to elect government 
office-holders under a given label, then a [non-major] party is simply a political party which offers 
candidates to challenge the nominees of the two major parties (Fisher, 1974p.6-7).
By definition, non-major parties have a small and sporadic following, receive a relatively small fraction
of the total votes cast at elections and elect few Members of Parliament.
The term non-major party encompasses two terms, "third party" and "minor party," which many studies 
use interchangeably (Mazmanian, 1974p. 1-6); (Ranney and Kendall, 1956p.422); (Rosenstone, Behr and 
Lazarus, 1984pp.9-12). No generally accepted set of criteria distinguish third parties from minor parties
5(Rose and Urwin, 1970p.290). Nonetheless, the terms refer to two specific entities: some non-major 
parties ("significant" non-major parties) influence patterns of voter and party behaviour at elections; other 
non-major parties ("insignificant" non-major parties) do not.
Party strength in the parliament and in the electorate is the most frequently cited criterion of non-major 
party significance. The parliamentary significance of a non-major party has two attributes. (1) A non- 
major party is a relevant parliamentary actor, no matter how small it is, "if it finds itself in a position to 
determine over time, or at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities" 
(Sartori, 1976p.l23). Conversely, a non-major party is irrelevant if "it is never needed or put to use for 
any feasible coalition majority" (Sartori, 1976p. 123); (Key, 1964pp.279-280); (McKean, 
1949pp.423-424); (Schattschneider, 1942pp.75-83). (2) A non-major party is a relevant parliamentary 
actor "whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of [major] party competition" (Sartori, 
1976p.l23). The parliamentary significance of a non-major party is thus not only a function of the 
percentage of seats it holds in the parliament. It is also a function of its relationship with the major 
parties.
Non-major parties’ electoral significance also has two attributes. (1) Electoral significance is assessed in 
terms of the number of votes won at elections. A non-major party is a significant entity at elections when 
its electoral support surpasses a particular numeric threshold. Chambers, for example, contends that the 
non-major parties in the United States which received a percentage of the total vote larger than the overall 
average for all non-major parties since 1828 (i.e., 5.2 percent of the total votes cast) are significant 
non-major parties (Chambers, 1968); (Rose and Urwin, 1970p.290). According to this criterion, three 
non-major parties have, in the twentieth century, been significant entities at American presidential elec­
tions (the "Bull Moose" party in 1912, the Progressive Party in 1924 and the American Independent Party 
in 1968).
Problems accompany the use of this criterion of significance. Most importantly, "the designation of any 
general numerical formula to separate non-major parties as important or unimportant is purely arbitrary. 
Chambers’s average of 5.2 percent, for example, omits such parties as the Liberal Republicans of 1872 or 
the Dixiecrats of 1948 -  parties which most analysts include in discussions of non-major parties" (Fisher, 
1974pp.30-31); (Mazmanian, 1974p.4). This criterion is also incomplete. Assessment of the significance 
of a non-major party must consider not only the number of votes and seats that it wins, but also its 
influence on voter behaviour and major party competition (Rose, 1974p.484); (Sartori, 1976p.l90, 
217-221).
(2) Non-major parties’ electoral significance encompasses far more than the capacity to attract votes: if 
it consists in a protest against the insufficiently-responsive leaders and policies of the major parties, the 
formation of a new (non-major) party may be a symptom of a partisan re-alignment (Burnham and 
Sprague, 1970); (Converse and Dupeux, 1962). Citizens do not often vote contrary to their party iden­
tification. Still less frequently do they change their party identification. In certain periods, however, a new 
issue or cleavage emerges; if it is sufficiently salient, this issue or cleavage may re-align voters’ loyalties 
to parties (Key, 1955); (Sellers, 1965); (Pomper, 1967); (Burnham, 1970). Under these conditions, voters 
may abandon an existing party and turn to a new party (Weisberg and Rusk, 1970); (Rusk and Weisberg, 
1972); (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt, 1977). To the extent that they influence patterns of electoral competition 
(i.e., force a change in major parties’ electoral appeals and a re-alignment in the pattern and distribution 
of partisan support in the electorate) non-major parties are significant entities at elections (Key, 
1964pp.278-81); (Alford, 1963pp.303-305); (Bone, 1965p.651); (Downs, 1957pp.l27-128); (Rossiter, 
1964p.l6).
6For these reasons, some non-major parties "must be regarded as integral elements of the two-party 
system" (Key, 1964p.279). Not only may they "break the two-party pattern of competition in a nation by 
winning or threatening to win enough offices to influence [but not directly control] the government" 
(Epstein, 1967p.64); they may also exert a "longrun influence on the composition, leadership and 
doctrines of the major parties" (Janda, 1970p.50) and serve as "safety valves" which stabilise the party 
system (Ranney and Kendall, 1956pp.455458, 505). Non-major parties with such attributes ("significant" 
non-major parties) may be termed "third parties."2 Non-major parties without such attributes 
("insignificant" non-major parties) may be labelled "minor parties." Clearly, therefore, "third parties" 
merit careful analysis.
The assessment of a non-major party’s electoral significance (i.e., the designation of a non-major party, 
in electoral terms, as a third party or a minor party) requires that the causes of its formation, the correlates 
of its electoral support and its impact upon the party system be investigated. If, for example, the for­
mation and electoral support of a non-major party represents no more than an indistinct and ephemeral 
protest, the possibility of realignment within the party system is negligible; conversely, if its support is 
attitudinally distinct, the potential for a fundamental realignment of voters and parties exists (Studlar and 
McAllister, 1987p.39). What, then, underlies the emergence of non-major parties? When is their for­
mation most likely to occur? What kinds of conflicts, which major parties cannot manage, structure these 
parties’ electoral support? Responses to such questions may, as much as studies of major parties, bear 
considerable relevance for an understanding of voters, major parties and party systems.
1.3. Agrarian, Farmer and Peasant Parties
Key classifies non-major parties in terms of longevity (Key, 1964pp.255,278-80). Doctrinal parties are 
distinguished by their permanence and by their emphasis on (usually socialist or Marxist) ideology. 
Transient parties arise suddenly (in response to conflicts which major parties are unable to contain) and 
quickly disintegrate. Doctrinal and transient parties play different roles in the party system. Ideological 
beliefs isolate doctrinal parties from the political mainstream. In consequence, these parties generally 
exert only a minimal influence upon voters and major parties. Doctrinal parties, in other words, are 
usually minor parties. Conversely, transient non-major parties may, under certain conditions, influence 
voter behaviour and major party competition. For this reason, some transient parties are third parties. 
Key’s insight thus suggests that analysis be directed at transient non-major parties.
Transient non-major parties are, in terms of programme and electoral support, frequently agrarian 
parties. Agrarian parties, however, have been the subject of almost no rigorous analysis:3
although few have investigated the [farmers’] revolts without being intrigued by their particularities [i.e., 
by agrarian parties’ abrupt formation and, in most instances, equally rapid dissolution], we know o f no case 
in which [these peculiarities] have been subjected to explanation (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960p.434).
This is in part because the conceptual and definitional difficulties that long hindered the analysis of major 
parties continue to afflict the study of non-major (and therefore agrarian) parties. In consequence, the 
agrarian party has no recognised definition. Indeed, only Urwin has attempted to operationalise the 
concept embodied in this term:
Agrarian parties can be regarded as those which demonstrably obtain the vast majority of their support 
from the countryside, specifically claim in their programmes and other pronouncements to represent 
agrarian interests, and/or simply include in their title some term as "agrarian," "peasant" or "farmer" 
(Urwin, 1980p.l65).
Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 list political parties in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America and
7Table 1-1: Agrarian Party Formation, Western Europe
Date of
Country Party Name Formation**
Denmark Farmers' Party 1924
Agrarian Party 1934
Finland Agrarian Union 
Finnish Smallholders'
1906
Party
Finnish Small Farmers'
1929
Party 1959
Rural Party 1962
France Agrarian Party 1928
Iceland Progressive Party 1916
Farmers' Party 1933
Farmers' Party 1933
Ireland Farmers' Party 
National Farmers and
1923
Ratepayer's League 1933
Party of the Soil 1938
Netherlands Farmers' League 1918
National Party of Farmers, 
Horticulturalists and
the Middle Class 1933
Norway Agrarian Party 1920
Sweden Farmers' Party 1921
Switzerland Farmers, Traders 
and Citizens
1920
** Refers to the first election at which the party 
presented candidates.
Source: Urwin (1980:167-168), McHale and Skowronski 
(1983:1233-1235).
Oceania which, according to Urwin’s definition, are agrarian parties.. These tables indicate that most 
(sixty-one percent) agrarian parties were formed between 1918 and 1925. Seventy-five percent of the 
Australian and New Zealand parties, sixty-four percent of the Canadian parties, fifty-nine percent of the 
European parties and fifty percent of the American parties were formed during these years. The table thus 
indicates that most agrarian parties on these continents arose concurrently.
In contrast, other parties which may be grouped on the basis of name, programme, electoral support and 
international association (i.e., religious, socialist and ethnic minority parties) did not arise concurrently. 
Figure 1-1 plots the proportion of agrarian, religious, socialist and ethnic minority parties in Europe, 
North America and Oceania which were formed at each ten-year interval between 1870 and 1970.4 It 
indicates that forty-nine percent of the agrarian parties were formed between 1920 and 1929 but that no 
more than twenty-two percent of the religious, socialist or ethnic minority parties were formed during any 
particular decade. Figure 1-1 thus confirms that agrarian party formation was concentrated in the years 
immediately following the First World War and that the extent of agrarian party formation in these years 
(relative to the formation of religious, socialist and ethnic minority parties) is remarkable.
No less remarkable than the concurrent formation of agrarian parties in Europe, North America and 
Oceania is the absence of any analysis of this phenomenon. More generally, despite the fact that durable 
alignments of parties and voters were forged in the years immediately following the First World War
8Table 1-2: Agrarian Parly Formation, Eastern Europe
Country Party Name Date of 
Formation
Albania Agrarian Democrat 1918
Austria Farmers' Union 1925
Bulgaria National Agrarian 
Union
1879
Agrarian Party 1931
Czechoslovakia German League
of Farmers 1920
Czech Agrarian Party 1918
Slovak National 
Republicans and 
Peasants
1918
Republican Party of 
Farmers and Peasants
1922
Smallholders 1923
Landlords' Party 1923
Agrarian Union 1917
Estonia Farmers Party 1921
Smallholders' Group 1923
Homesteaders Party 1923
Hungary Christian Smallholder 1923
Latvia Peasants' Union 1917
Smallholders 1925
Agrarian Party 
of the Landless
1920
Lithuania Peasant Union 1919
Farmers' Union 1920
Farmers' Party 1925
Poland Polish Peasant Party 1903
Ukrainian Peasant 1920
Piast 1913
Rumania Peasants' Party 1919
National Peasant 1926
Ploughmen's Front 1933
Yugoslavia Serb Agrarian 1918
Slovene Agrarian 1924
** Refers to the first election at which the party 
presented candidates.
Source: Urwin (1980), McHale and Skowronski 
(1983:1232-1235).
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967p.50); (Rose and Urwin, 1970), "very little attention has been paid to the 1920s 
and 1930s as a critical period for the formation and stabilisation (or its absence) of party systems" (Urwin, 
1973pp. 183-184). Accordingly, no discussion -- let alone explanation — of the simultaneous rise of 
agrarian parties on these three continents has been undertaken.5
Urwin’s definition (Urwin, 1980p.l65) highlights a specific point in time at which agrarian party 
formation was concentrated and thereby uncovers an unresolved problem for political science research. 
At the same time, however, this definition is ambiguous. When applied to Europe, North America and 
Oceania, it encompasses at least two fundamentally different types of political organisation. Indeed, 
Urwin acknowledges that "differences in the 1920s between the political systems of Western Europe, 
such as Britain, and some Eastern European countries, such as Rumania, were as great as those today
9T ab le 1-3: A grarian  Party Form ation,
A ustralia, C anada, N ew  Z ealand
and the U nited  States
C o u n t r y Party Name Date of 
Formation**
A u s t r a l i a  (Commonwealth)
C o untry Party 1922
Q u e e n s l a n d C o untry Party 1920
Ne w  South Wales Progressive Party 1919
V i c toria V ictorian Farmers' Union 1917
South A u stralia Progressive C o untry Party 1918
W e s t e r n  Austr a l i a  Co u n t r y  Party 1914
Tasmania C o untry Party 1920
Canada (Dominion)
Progressive Party 1921
Co-operative Commonwealth  
Federation
1935
Social Credit 1935
Ne w  Brun s w i c k Progressive Party 1920
Prince E d w a r d  I Progressive Party 1921
Nova Scotia U n i t e d  Farmers of Nova Scotia 1919
Quebec Fermiers Unis du Quebec 1919
Ontario U n i t e d  Farmers of Ontario 1919
M a n i t o b a U n i t e d  Farmers of Manitoba 1922
S a s k atchewan U n i t e d  Farmers of Canada, 1921
(Saskatchewan Section) 
Co-operative Commonwealth  
Federation
1932
Social Credit 1935
A l berta U n i t e d  Farmers of Alberta 1921
Social Credit 1935
Ne w  Ze a l a n d  (Dominion)
C o untry Party 1925
U n i t e d  States (Federal)
Greenback 187 6
Populist 1892
Farmer-Labor 1920
Progressive 1924
** Refers to the first election at which the party
p r e s e n t e d  c a n d i d a t e s .
S o u r c e s : Hughes (1974), Smith (1980), Rosenstone
et al (1984)
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between Western democratic systems and non-Westem countries. [For this reason], it is important to ask 
whether the concept of political party as used in the Western context is appropriate for a study of parties 
in Eastern Europe" (Urwin, 1973p.l86).
Are the "agrarian parties" of Europe, North America and Oceania sufficiently similar that they may be 
subjected to comparative analysis? The analysis undertaken in subsections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 suggests that 
they are not. These subsections classify rural political organisations along two dimensions. Insights 
contributed by Sartori (Sartori, 1976) differentiate agrarian parties from agrarian factions. Works in rural 
sociology distinguish the peasant from the farmer. The term "agrarian party" thus refers to a political 
organisation that is found only in a small (and readily comparable) number of countries. The analysis 
undertaken in these sections finds that only in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have 
unambiguously agrarian (farmers') parties appeared. The rural political organisations of Eastern Europe 
may be more precisely termed peasant factions, and the rural political organisations of Western Europe 
possess traits characteristic of both peasant parties and agrarian parties. An analysis of agrarian parties 
thus refers to an analysis of farmers’ parties in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.
1.3.1. Agrarian Parties and Agrarian Factions
Sartori distinguishes political parties from political factions (Sartori, 1976pp.3-29):6 Sartori applies the 
term "party" exclusively to political organisations in pluralistic (and hence democratic) polities. He 
applies the term "faction" to political organisations in non-democratic or pre-democratic polities, or in 
polities in which the legitimacy of constitutional arrangements is not widely accepted [see also 
(Huntington, 1968); (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966); (Almond and Verba, 1963)]. The formation of 
factions precedes the formation of parties, and under certain conditions parties may relapse into factions.
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Sartori argues that three types (or levels) of consensus exist within democracies (Sartori, 1987pp. 1-38); 
see also (Easton, 1965ch.l8); (Lijphart, 1968); (Neubauer, 1967). The existence of parties (as opposed to 
factions) is associated with the presence of these three levels of consensus. (1) Parties are found in 
polities where community level consensus (with respect to the principle of limited majority rule) exists. 
Such consensus is not an absolute pre-requisite to the existence of democracy (and parties) (Lipset, 1959); 
(McClosky, 1964); (Pye, 1971). Unless a political system can create this consensus, however, democracy 
and the party system will be fragile (Sani and Sartori, 1982); (Sartori, 1987pp.88-91):
The substantive point is, then, that no alteration in power is conceivable as a practical rule o f the game 
until the public and the private well-being are disconnected. Unless there is sufficient separation of the 
various spheres of life — religion, politics and wealth — and a sufficient protection for individuals as such, 
the stakes of political controversy are too high for politicians to surrender power according to the rules of a 
competitive party system (Sartori, 1976pp.l7, 131-201); (Almond and Verba, 1963).
Factional politics (not party politics) prevails where there is no community-level consensus.
(2) Parties can exist only when regime-level consensus (an acceptance of the state’s physical boundaries 
and constitutional arrangements -  particularly the rules that regulate the exercise of power and the 
resolution of conflict) exists. If this consensus is absent, political debate gravitates around fundamental 
questions which threaten the survival of the regime. Nie and Verba, for example, observe that "other 
cleavages may emerge and other problems may be successfully tackled as long as these central questions 
are not asked: the experience of several European countries suggests that once thay are raised, the party 
system will fail to function satisfactorily until they are resolved" (Nie and Verba, 1975p.533). It is for this 
reason that political parties took no part in Western European or American nation-building. They 
appeared only when consitutional rule had been fully accepted (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966); 
(Daalder, 1966); (Rokkan, 1966); (Rokkan, 1970); (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).
(3) Community-level and regime-level consensus restrict the scope of disagreement to questions (such 
as the programmes and the personnel of government) which are amenable to resolution in parliaments and 
at elections. Parties facilitate this type of consensus {policy-level consensus). Indeed, factions coalesce 
into parties in response to the need, concomitant with the democratisation of politics, to express and to 
implement policy-level consensus — i.e., to convey forcefully to authorities the demands of the public as a 
whole (Sartori, 1976p.27); (Dahl, 1967).
These three criteria differentiate the political organisations listed in Tables 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3. (1) With 
respect to community-level consensus, the principle of limited majority rule had, by 1918, been long 
affirmed and observed in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and most of Western 
Europe. In Eastern Europe, however, this constitutional principle failed to establish itself: between 1919 
and 1940 authoritarian or dictatorial regimes seized power in all Eastern European states (Janos, 1970); 
(Macartney and Palmer, 1962); (Seton-Watson, 1964); (Tipton and Aldrich, 1987pp.266-297).
(2) Regime-level consensus, firmly established in Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States, was, during the inter-war years, conspicuous by its absence in Eastern Europe. As a 
result, these countries’ political cleavages differed significantly. In the West, the widespread acceptance 
of constitutional arrangements removed "regime-level" questions from political discourse. Industrialisa­
tion and its consequences -- which were largely questions of economic growth and the distribution of its 
benefits — informed political debate in these countries, and mobilised economic (labour, business and 
agricultural) interests (Apter, 1965); (Bendix, 1964); (Daalder, 1966); (Eisenstadt, 1966); (Rokkan, 1970). 
In Eastern Europe, however, the imperfect establishment of national states, together with the incomplete 
acceptance of these states’ constitutional arrangements, left unresolved questions (religious, ethnic and 
linguistic) which pertained to the very nature of the national regimes. In consequence, political con-
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troversy in these countries frequently ended in secession and civil war (Deutsch, 1961); (Carsten, 1972); 
(Newman, 1970).
(3) Finally, the point in time at which political participation was diffused to large segments of society 
differentiates Eastern Europe from Western countries. Manhood suffrage was extended gradually in the 
West, and was an accomplished fact before 1914. In contrast, it arrived abruptly (in the immediate 
postwar years) in Eastern Europe (Carstairs, 1980); (Rokkan, 1970).
The Eastern European agrarian "parties" listed in Table 1-2 might for these three reasons be more 
accurately labelled agrarian cliques or factions. Until 1918 the parliamentary basis for political parties in 
Eastern Europe was almost wholly absent, and was only imperfectly present after that date. The societal 
pluralism required for party competition never established itself in the region. In consequence, the 
democratic political institutions which were established after 1918 could not sustain political parties. 
Societal conditions engendered political organisation along factional lines. It therefore comes as little 
surprise that the formation of most of Eastern Europe’s political organisations -- including agrarian 
political organisations -  dates from the years immediately following the First World War. The ap­
pearance of these factions -  including rural factions -  in Eastern Europe after 1918 was concomitant 
with the introduction of mass elections in the region (Urwin, 1980).
1.3.2. Peasants and Farmers
Urwin’s definition of the agrarian party (Urwin, 1980p. 165) does not emphasise the distinction between 
the agrarian party and the agrarian faction.7 Nor does it emphasise the distinction between peasants and 
farmers. These terms lack consistent and uncontested definitions (Berger, 1972); (Paige, 1975). Nonethe­
less, patterns of land ownership and the degree of exposure to market (economic) stimuli best differen­
tiate these concepts. The term farmer, generally speaking, refers to an independent (land-owning) cul­
tivator whose resource inputs and commodity output is, respectively, procured from and consigned to the 
market. In contrast, the term peasant refers to the subsistence cultivator with hereditary obligations (often 
of a vestigial feudal nature) to a rural patrimonial elite (Chayanov, 1966); (Franklin, 1969); (Nash, 1966); 
(Warriner, 1964).
In the years immediately following the First World War, most of Eastern Europe’s population was 
employed in agriculture. As a rule, production for domestic consumption prevailed over production for 
the market (Franklin, 1969). Control and ownership of land typically rested with an absentee aristocracy 
which derived the major portion of its income from obligations extracted from cultivators (Zagoroff, 
Vegh and Bilimovic, 1955). Cultivation in Eastern Europe, in short, was undertaken by peasants. In 
Western Europe, cultivation was more market-oriented and was undertaken, generally speaking, by land­
owning entrepreneurs (Gerschenkron, 1965); (Linz, 1976); (Tracy, 1964). Nonetheless, market forces had 
not completely penetrated agricultural production, and as a result a complex variety of "market" and 
"domestic subsistence" arrangements existed side by side (Urwin, 1980p.l4); (Linz, 1976).
In contrast to their complexity in Europe, agrarian social structures in Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States were models of simplicity. Conspicuous by their absence were the most notable 
features of the rural social structure in Europe: an established landed elite and peasantry (Denoon, 
1983p.37). Private ownership of land was established at an early juncture and agricultural production was 
oriented overwhelmingly towards the market (Fitzpatrick, 1969pp.71-102); (Dalziel, 1981); (Fowke, 
1946); (Fowke, 1957).
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The distinction between parties and factions and between farmers and peasants yields a more precise 
definition of the term "agrarian party". Institutional (constitutional) arrangements, together with patterns 
of land ownership and market relationships, distinguished the peasant factions of Eastern Europe from 
the peasant and farmers’ parties of Western Europe and the unambiguously farmers’ (agrarian) parties 
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Following (Sartori, 1976p.64) a farmers’ 
(agrarian) party may thus be defined as any political group whose appeals are directed primarily to farm 
owner-entrepreneurs, whose presence is restricted largely to districts in which farm owner-entrepreneurs 
are concentrated and whose electoral support is composed disproportionately of farm owner- 
entrepreneurs "that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public 
office".
The analysis undertaken in sections 1.1-1.3 thus identifies a relevant problem for comparative political 
science research. Section 1.1 noted that, as a consequence of its importance to responsible and responsive 
government, as well as to voter behaviour and elections, the political party merits continued and sustained 
analysis. Section 1.2 argued that, for precisely the same reasons, the non-major party also merits analysis. 
It also argued that knowledge of political parties will remain incomplete until a greater understanding of 
the reasons for its emergence, electoral support and dissolution (as well as of its impact on voter be­
haviour and major party competition) is obtained.
Section 1.3 noted that one type of non-major party, the agrarian party, has emerged only in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States. It also drew attention to the simultaneous formation, in the 
years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties in these countries and to the absence 
of any recognition of this striking phenomenon. An analysis of the formation, electoral support and 
dissolution, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand has thus not been undertaken. Accordingly, this study attempts to explain the 
formation, pattern of electoral support and partial dissolution of agrarian parties in these countries at this 
point in time.
Section 1.4 sets out the framework that guides this analysis. It argues that agricultural economic links 
with the United Kingdom clearly distinguish these three countries from other countries (including the 
United States); that in the 1920s this relationship underwent changes of an unprecedented nature, and 
therefore that an analysis of these economic changes might be able to account for the appearance and 
disappearance of agrarian parties in these three countries. Questions for empirical investigation that arise 
from this problem for research and analytical framework are set out in section 1.5. Section 1.6 sets out an 
empirical setting in which an investigation of these questions for research might begin.
1.4. The Comparative Framework: The British Dominions
The simultaneous formation of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand suggests that 
common stimuli may underlie electoral behaviour in rural districts. Systematic forces, in other words, 
seemed to engender the concurrent formation, in the years immediately following the First World War, of 
agrarian parties in these three countries.
For two reasons, few countries are more amenable to comparative analysis than Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand. Most obviously, they are former British possessions, constituted integral elements of the 
British Empire, attained legislative, executive and judicial autonomy under British guidance and tutelage 
and are populated largely by persons of British ancestry (Lipson, 1959); (Lipson, 1964); (Brady, 1947);
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(Corry, 1946); (Miller, 1966a). Economic arrangements also make these countries readily comparable. 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand are "regions of recent settlement" whose formation and character is a 
direct consequence of European (particularly British) settlement and investment in the nineteenth century. 
(Nurkse, 1954); (Denoon, 1983); (Denoon, 1979); (Fogarty, 1981); (Wynn, 1982); (Drummond, 1985); 
(McCarthy, 1973); (Hartz, 1964); (Woodward, 1977).
Settler societies share two principal attributes. (1) The distribution of factor endowments (resources 
employed in production) in such societies is skewed heavily in favour of land (natural resources), so that 
capital and labour are relatively scarce. Patterns of comparative advantage thus dictate that they specialise 
in the export of primary commodities. They also encourage the importation of the capital, labour and 
technology (Watkins, 1963); (Pomfret, 1981).
(2) Growing European demand for primary products provided the initial impetus for settler societies’ 
economic development. In particular, settler societies were profoundly influenced by the emergence, in 
the nineteenth century, of the United Kingdom as the world’s principal trading nation. Each undertook a 
massive commitment to export-led primary production targetted on the British market. With respect to 
trade in agricultural commodities, the United Kingdom was the world’s principal importer of foodstuffs 
from the mid-nineteenth century until well after the First World War (Court, 1954); (Nurkse, 1954); 
(Malenbaum, 1953); (Brown, 1965), and during these years Australia, Canada and New Zealand were 
important suppliers of agricultural commodities to Britain (United Kingdom, 1925); (United Kingdom, 
1929).
Table 1-4 quantifies this relationship. Included in the table are measures of each of the principal 
agricultural exports of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (relative to each country’s 
total exports of agricultural commodities), the proportion of each commodity exported from each country 
to Great Britain, and the proportion of each of these countries’ exports to total British import require­
ments. Distinctions emerge between the United States and the British Dominions and between each 
Dominion and the United Kingdom.
A first set of points distinguishes the United States from the British Dominions. During these years, the 
United States exported a wider range of rural commodities than did the British Dominions. Columns (2) 
and (5) indicate that America’s four most important rural commodities accounted for only one-half of its 
total rural exports, and that the Dominions’ principal rural commodities constituted three-fourths of their 
total rural exports. The United States was thus less reliant upon particular export commodities than were 
the Dominions.
American rural exports were also directed less exclusively towards the British market than were the 
Dominions’ rural exports. Only one-quarter to one-third of American rural exports (except tobacco) were 
consigned to the United Kingdom. In contrast, two-thirds or more of the Dominions’ exports were sent to 
Britain. Moreover, the relative importance of the British market for the United States declined slightly 
during the decade. This trend is most apparent for meat, is moderate in extent for cotton and relatively 
slight for wheat Tobacco is the only exception to this tendency. For the Dominions, however, Britain 
maintained its importance (or, indeed, grew in importance) as a destination for rural exports (Drummond, 
1972); (Drummond, 1974).
A second set of points underscores the British Dominions’ common traits (in terms of primary 
production). The years immediately following the First World War witnessed, in Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand, an increased concentration in the production of what Fogarty calls "superstaples" — com-
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Table 1-4: Rural Exports, Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and United States: Primary Export Commodities 
and the British Market, 1919-23, 1924-28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Australia
Wool ★ ★ * 20.47 60.45 33.68 52.60 32.93
Wheat 17.74 21.40 40.77 12.99 16.76 38.74
Butter 22.89 8.73 88.08 12.79 7.52 82.43
Meat 8.57 4.70 91.33 4.62 4.89 65.88
2. Canada
Grain
and Flour 23.97 63.33 56.44 26.61 63.82 64.62
All Grains 26.02 50.29 59.95 29.27 53.17 71.03
Wheat 13.35 45.48 57.90 33.44 46.91 72.28
Flour 19.56 11.00 46.44 20.76 9.47 31.36
Oats 28.23 2.67 62.93 23.46 1.82 48.48
Meat 7.68 5.39 79.95 4.30 3.99 73.29
Cheese 32.19 4.61 93.29 34.48 3.45 89.84
3. New Zealand
Wool *** 30.94 92.11 26.85 76.08 21.81
Meat 13.29 20.00 92.61 17.46 97.25 10.72
Butter 18.69 14.60 94.19 23.09 87.31 20.92
Cheese 47.60 13.10 98.91 13.56 99.26 49.15
4. United States
Cotton 65.08 22.76 29.10 48.77 37.44 21.68
Wheat 30.05 14.63 18.36 28.99 11.77 17.54
Meat 22.04 6.67 48.08 10.32 3.95 19.30
Tobacco 80.79 5.53 52.63 75.91 5.76 50.78
Figures cited refer to percentages of values 
(in constant [1913] Sterling) of commodities 
imported into the United Kingdom,
Where
(1) = Percentage of total British imports of the
commodity from the country in question,
(for the period 1919-1923).
(2) = Percentage of the country's total rural exports,
(1919-1923).
(3) = Percentage of the commodity exported to Britain,
(1919-1923).
(4) = (1), for the period 1924-1928.
(5) = (2), for the period 1924-1928.
(6) = (3), for the period 1924-1928.
*** Indicates that data not available.
Source: Australia (1920-1940); Canada (1920-1940);
New Zealand (1920-1940); United Kingdom 
(1923, 1928); United States (1920-1940).
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modities in whose production these countries were world leaders (Fogarty, 1985p.22). In Australia, for 
example, the export of wool and to some extent meat increased in importance relative to wheat and butter. 
In Canada the export of wheat increased in relative importance. New Zealand increased its concentration 
on the export of butter and cheese.
A third set of points distinguishes the United Kingdom from its Dominions. Figures in columns (1) and 
(6) indicate that Britain imported foodstuffs from a wide range of countries. Its reliance upon any 
particular country, including the three Empire countries, was thus relatively low. For the Dominions, 
however, the British agricultural connection was vital, and in many instances was increasing in impor­
tance. For each commodity, Britain’s purchases from a given country were considerably less than the 
extent of that country’s export of that commodity to Britain.
Generally speaking, economic conditions in the years immediately following the First World War have 
not received attention commensurate with that given to the war years or the Great Depression (Dowie, 
1975). Nonetheless, economic historians agree that primary production underwent momentous economic 
changes during the 1920s. Unprecedented economic problems emerged during these years, and the dif­
ficulties which were present in 1914 were exacerbated after the war. In particular, Svennilson charac­
terises this decade as a period of structural transition in the world economy (Svennilson, 1954). Most 
importantly, rates of economic growth declined appreciably from levels attained in the years 1896-1914 
(Aldcroft, 1977p.288). Further (and partly because the war disrupted trade patterns and monetary 
arrangements), world trade failed to regain its pre-war momentum (Kenwood, 1971). The years 1920-21 
witnessed a depression more extensive than any which preceded it and more severe (though not as 
prolonged) as the downturn of 1929-32 (Pilgrim, 1974). In this decade appeared new technologies that 
necessitated painful tranfers of resources from declining to expanding sectors (Landes, 1969). Finally, the 
1920s confirmed the economic decline of Western Europe (particularly the United Kingdom) relative to 
the United States, and, indeed, marked America’s rise to a position economic pre-eminence (Pollard, 
1973).
Since foodstuffs constituted nearly 40 percent of the volume of world trade during the 1920s (Aldcroft, 
1977p.219), problems of adjustment were particularly acute for exporters of agricultural and pastoral 
commodities. At the same time, primary producers’ terms of trade deteriorated precipitously. Contem­
porary observers interpreted price declines and accumulations of stocks as symptoms of overproduction 
[see, for example, (Neumark, 1934)]. More recent research questions the validity of the oversupply 
hypothesis and points to change in market demand for primary commodities as the factor most respon­
sible for agrarian distress in this decade [see, for example, (Lee, 1969); (Johnson, 1985)]. These changes 
were commodity-specific: a decline in population growth and changes in dietary patterns in consuming 
countries lowered the demand for staples such as wheat; conversely, these dietary changes increased the 
demand for fruits, vegetables and dairy products. Regardless of their cause, however, it is clear that 
unprecedented economic developments which first made themselves felt in the years immediately follow­
ing the First World War necessitated extensive adjustments of resource inputs and commodity outputs in 
agriculture (Schultz, 1945); (Schultz, 1953); (Heady, 1965).
Pressures for agricultural adjustment in response to these developments weighed most heavily upon 
countries whose primary commodities figured prominently in international trade and whose commercial 
links with Europe (particularly Great Britain) were extensive. Table 1-4 indicates that Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand conform closely to these criteria. The Dominions of the second British Empire thus 
constitute, in agricultural economic terms, a distinct group amenable to comparative analysis. The impor-
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tance of the British market for primary producers in Australia, Canada and New Zealand suggests that 
common features that may underlie patterns of agrarian politics in these countries. If similar agricultural 
and pastoral economic stimuli influenced rural districts in these countries, and if these stimuli can be 
related to the particularities of agrarian party formation, then the use of a framework that analyses these 
stimuli is warranted.8 Agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand might therefore be seen as 
local responses to more universal economic phenomena.
1.5. Questions For Empirical Investigation
Implicit in the problem for research and framework for comparative analysis set out in sections 1.1-1.4 
are two sets of research questions.
1. A first set of questions investigates the causes of agrarian party formation and dissolution:
• Why did agrarian parties form in the British Dominions in the years immediately 
following the First World War?
• Why has one agrarian party (the Australian Country' Party) maintained a continuous 
existence since its formation, while others (such as the Canadian Progressive Party 
and the New Zealand Country Party) quickly disappeared?
• Why have agrarian parties been particularly long-lived in particular states/provinces 
(such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, New South Wales and Victoria) and not in others 
(such as Tasmania, South Australia and Canada’s Maritime Provinces, Quebec and 
British Columbia)?
• To what extent can economic (as opposed to occupational, territorial or religious) 
variables account for emergence and dissolution of agrarian parties?
2. A second set of research questions investigates agrarian parties’ electoral support and 
specifies more precisely the relationship between economic stimuli and agrarian political 
behaviour:
• Given conditions conducive to agrarian party formation, who is most likely to vote 
for these parties?
• To what extent do economic (as opposed to occupational and religious) variables 
underlie agrarian parties’ electoral base?
1.6. The Empirical Focus
Sections 1.1-1.4 drew attention to the absence of, and to the benefits which might arise from, an 
analysis of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This study has a less ambitious but 
more manageable focus. It attempts to explain the formation, electoral support and partial dissolution of 
the Australian Country Party at the Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928.
For four reasons, the Australian Country Party merits analysis. (1) Longevity distinguishes the Country 
Party from agrarian parties in Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Western Europe. In these 
countries, agrarian parties (like most non-major parties) have not been long-lived. The New Zealand 
Country Party, the Canadian Progressive Party and the American agrarian parties quickly disintegrated. 
The Agrarian Parties of Norway, Sweden and Finland, as well as the Social Credit and Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation in Canada, gradually lost their agrarian raison d’etre (Elder and Gooderham, 
1978); (Young, 1969); (Zakuta, 1964). Only in Australia does an agrarian party continue to exist. The 
Australian Country Party, in other words, is the last remaining agrarian party in an advanced industrial 
democracy.9 Its longevity -  and hence its formation and electoral support -  demand explanation:
the Australian Country Party resembles much more the farmers’ movements of the New World than it 
does the peasant parties of the Old, but unlike the former it has survived as an independent political party.
Why it has been able to do so, and how long it can continue to do so, are perhaps the most important 
questions to ask about the party (Aitkin, 1980p.415); see also (Epstein, 1977p.l 1).
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(2) Legislative behaviour distinguishes the Country Party from agrarian parties in Canada, New 
Zealand, the United States and Western Europe. Australia is the only Western democracy in which a 
non-major party has entered into a permanent (electoral and parliamentary) coalition, while in govern­
ment and opposition, with a major party. This anomalous arrangement demands explanation (Duverger, 
1954p.294).
(3) The Country Party is at the centre of an ongoing debate in Australian political studies. In particular, 
the role and significance of the Country Party in the Australian party system has engendered considerable 
disagreement. Classification of the Australian party system as a two-party system or as a multi-party 
system has proved difficult largely because the role and significance of the Country Party in that system 
remain unresolved (Hughes, 1985p.35); (Coleman, 1963p. 13); (Starr, Richmond and Maddox, 
1978p.318). Many works argue that the Australian party system is essentially bi-partite (Blondel, 
1968pp.l84-185); (Crisp, 1965p.l92); (Graham, 1966p. 196); (Maddox, 1985p.257); (Overacker, 
1952p.237); (Webb, 1954p.86). Other works note the presence of important aspects of tri-partitism 
(Barbalet, 1975); (Duverger, 1954pp.218,235); (Jupp, 1964pp.8-11,23); (Lipson, 1953pp.338-339); 
(Miller, 1966bp.63); (Sartori, 1976p. 185). In addition, Davies posits a "two-and-one-half party system 
(Davies, 197lp. 127); Lipson concludes that the Australian party system is a "trio in form but a duo in 
function" (Lipson, 1959p. 17); (Lipson, 1964p.334), and Aitkin and Kahan identify a "stable four-party 
system" (Aitkin and Kahan, 1974p.444); see also (Aitkin, 1980p.415).
These distinctions are important. Central features of party politics in Australia become clear only when 
it is recognised that a two-party (or three-party) system exists (Barbalet, 1975p.3). The anomalous fea­
tures that the Country Party lends to the Australian party system have received extensive comment. The 
causes which underlie these features have elicited no sustained analysis. Hence,
whether or not one accords to the Country Party the status of a major [sic] national third party, there is no 
justification for the common practice of almost entirely ignoring it (Mayer, 1956pp.265-266). Research on 
it, especially on its role in the nineteen-twenties, would [therefore] be of special relevance (Mayer, 
1956p.266).
(4) More generally, Australia provides an ideal setting for an investigation of the relationship between 
economic stimuli and electoral behaviour — particularly the relationship between agricultural economic 
stimuli and electoral behaviour in rural districts. In linguistic, ethnic and cultural terms Australia is a 
relatively homogenous country. As a result, few non-economic cleavages attenuate the impact of material 
interests on political conflict. Indeed, Lord Bryce points out that "Australia is the country in which 
material interests have most successfully occupied the attention of the people and dominated their 
politics, [and thus] affords excellent opportunities for estimating the influence [exerted by] such interests" 
[quoted in (Kemp, 1978p. 12); see also (Lipson, 1959p.30)]. An analysis of the Australian Country Party 
might therefore contribute to a more complete understanding of the impact of economic stimuli on voter 
and party behaviour.
1.7. Summary
This chapter identifies the concurrent formation, in the years immediately following the First World 
War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant problem for comparative 
political science research. The chapters which follow attempt to resolve this problem. In particular, they 
attempt to explain the formation, electoral support and partial dissolution of the Australian Country Party 
in the years 1922-1928.
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This study’s limited empirical focus cannot conclusively resolve this larger problem for research. 
Nonetheless, its findings are consistent with its principal hypothesis: the formation and electoral support, 
in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand was the consequence of (1) resource maladjustments in agriculture and (2) the collapse, between 
1921 and 1922, in the price of many agricultural and pastoral commodities below the average variable 
cost of production. Conversely, successful adjustment to market conditions hindered agrarian party for­
mation, attenuated agrarian party electoral support and precipitated agrarian party dissolution.
The chapters which follow justify and elaborate this hypothesis. Chapter 2 assesses studies of 
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand agrarian parties. It concludes that, for methodological and sub­
stantive reasons, these studies cannot resolve the questions for empirical investigation formulated in 
section 1.5. At the same time, it suggests that an analysis of the economic antecedents of voter and party 
behaviour in rural areas (i.e., an econometric analysis of agrarian party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution) may resolve these questions.
Part II undertakes such an analysis (with particular reference to the Australian Country Party at the 
Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928). Chapter 3 provides the analysis with a methodologi­
cal and a theoretical base; Chapter 4 provides it with an empirical base; Chapters 5 and 6 confront these 
propositions and techniques with data. Part ID (Chapter 7) discusses the utility of this study’s methodol­
ogy and techniques and the significance of its findings for an understanding of the behaviour of major 
parties, non-major parties and voters.
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Chapter 2 
Previous Work
Chapter 1 identified the formation, electoral support and dissolution, in the years immediately following 
the First World War, of agrarian political parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant 
problem for comparative political science research. This chapter assesses major studies of agrarian parties 
in these countries. It argues that these studies do not resolve (indeed, that they do not address) the 
problem for research set out in Chapter 1: their scope is not comparative, their assertions are not consis­
tent with the findings of contemporary political science research, and, most importantly, methodological, 
conceptual and logical difficulties undermine their conclusions. This chapter therefore argues that the 
problem for research set out in Chapter 1 has not yet been resolved.
At the same time, this assessment re-inforces the contention that an analysis of the economic antece­
dents of party and voter behaviour in rural districts may resolve this problem for research — and may 
thereby contribute to a more complete understanding of major and non-major parties, voter behaviour and 
the party system. This chapter thus justifies an econometric analysis of the formation, electoral support 
and dissolution of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Section 2.1 examines previous 
works’ methodological base. Section 2.2 analyses the class and territorial, ideological and organisational 
interpretations of agrarian parties in these countries.
2.1. Methodology
Studies of political phenomena generally utilise one of two types of explanation (Dray, 1974pp.66-89); 
(Moon, 1982pp. 150-155). (1) Theoretical explanations assert that political behaviour does not vary ran­
domly or capriciously [see, for example, (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.8-37)]. Theories 
(general or abstract statements that relate observable events to one another) represent this uniformity 
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). Theoretical explanations thus account for empirical phenomena by relating 
them to inter-connected sets of general propositions (Pratt, 1978pp.69-77); (Papineau, 1978pp. 19-50); 
(Ryan, 1970pp.46-100); (Hempel, 1965); (Popper, 1957); (Nagel, 1961).
(2) "Intentionalist" (also known as "interpretive" or "historical") explanations do not utilise general or 
abstract statements (and thereby eschew theories). They explain phenomena by relating them to details 
specific to the case at hand (Butler, 1958p. 19); (Butler, 1955p.98); (Crick, 1959). Because events occur 
in different temporal and cultural contexts, and because unique personalities shape these events -- in 
short, because individual events are sui generis — generalisation and abstraction is impossible (Martin, 
1977); (Louch, 1966); (Winch, 1958); (Moon, 1982); (Carr, 1961).
Both models of explanation produce legitimate forms of knowledge (Dray, 1974pp.68-69); (Nicholson, 
1983pp.49-64; 183-204). Nonetheless, they differ in important respects (Appendix B analyses each in 
greater detail).
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The methodology of the most significant studies of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand (Aitkin, 1972); (Aitkin, 1980); (Ellis, 1958); (Ellis, 1963); (Graham, 1963); (Graham, 1964); 
(Graham, 1966); (Lipset, 1950); (Macpherson, 1953); (Morton, 1950) is far more "intentionalist" than 
"theoretical." With the partial exception of Graham (Graham, 1966pp. 1-28), each work analyses a single 
party within a single country. None subsumes these parties under a generalisation or set of generalisa­
tions: Verrall, Ward and Hay, for example, conclude that the Australian Country Party’s electoral support 
"can often only be satisfactorally explained in terms which are historically random and particular. The 
party attracted initial allegiance only because of specific historical circumstances peculiar to individual 
regions" (Verrall, Ward and Hay, 1985p.8); see also (Hughes, 1985p.53); (Cribb, 1979p.96); (Morton, 
1950p.xi). Each study, in short, considers its subject matter to be sui generis. It is at least in part for this 
reason that at present there exists no theory of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution 
in these countries.
These studies typically consider agrarian party formation to be a consequence of conscious and intended 
action, and describe (re-enact) agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution in terms recog­
nisable to (and used by) contemporary observers. For this reason, these studies do not investigate these 
parties’ less visible antecedents. Graham, for example, observes that because the farmer was "unable to 
comprehend the complex machinery of the economic system which appeared to be working against him, 
the farmer would focus on the symbols of his oppression [sic] — the railroads, the banks, the grain 
elevator companies -  and fight to break them. Indeed, the very intensity with which farmers focussed 
their hatred on the railroads, for example, blinded them to the other economic problems which they faced" 
(Graham, 1966p.l7); see also (Lipset, 1950pp.9,58). This observation applies as much to these studies of 
agrarian parties as to farmers in these countries.
These studies do not attempt to separate agrarian party leaders’ and journalists’ rhetoric and special- 
interest group pleading from their other motives. As a result, they do not challenge contemporary actors’ 
assertions and do not define the important but inherently ambiguous terms employed by these observers 
(e.g., "exploitation," "country-mindedness," "class" and "class consciousness" and "region").
These studies rely almost exclusively upon textual evidence — most notably upon impressionistic 
accounts in farm journals, contemporary newspapers and the agrarian party’s records [see in particular 
(Morton, 1950pp.300-310)]. With the partial exception of Lipset (Lipset, 1950), none uses quantitative 
evidence or bases its inferences upon statistical techniques. Moreover, none justifies the selection (or 
omission) of particular pieces of evidence or seems to be aware of the inferential difficulties that accom­
pany an uncritical use of such evidence. Generally speaking, these studies do not critically evaluate the 
evidence upon which their assertions are based. For this reason, Clubb’s criticism of intentionalist studies 
applies to these works: "when subjected to critical assessment [they] often appear biased, outmoded and 
untenable in the light of contemporary social science" (Clubb, 1977p.672).10
These studies’ methodological foundation, in short, is weak. This result is consistent with Moon’s 
observation that the interpretive explanation is an inadequate basis for political inquiry (Moon, 
1982p.l51). In methodological terms, therefore, these studies cannot resolve the problem for comparative 
research formulated in Chapter 1. This problem for research can be resolved only by going beyond the 
intentionalist model and constructing explanations that are essentially theoretical in form (see also the 
argument set out in Appendix B).
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2.2. Interpretation
Political sociology is a field of political science which analyses the impact of patterns of social 
stratification upon political behaviour (Sartori, 1969pp.69-70); (Janowitz, 1968pp.298-299). Studies of 
agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand are, in substantive terms, exercises in political 
sociology.11 These studies consider agrarian party formation to be a consequence of a class or a 
centre-periphery (i.e., a territorial) cleavage, and assert that the "exploitation" of primary producers (as 
either a class or a sectional entity, by rival classes or regions) engendered the formation of agrarian 
parties. They also contend that these parties’ fortunes are a function of a class or a sectional self- 
consciousness (ideology), the cohesion of party organisation and the ability of a leadership elite to 
mobilise support.
The agrarian party, in short, is considered to be a class, sectional or ideological phenomenon. Other 
(i.e., economic) antecedents of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution are analysed 
only to the extent that they bolster this conclusion.
These studies’ contentions are in important respects questionable. Popper argues that "intentionalist" 
studies are not, strictly speaking, refutable since the data which would be required in order to corroborate 
or reject their assertions do not exist (Popper, 1963). Nor are their assertions consistent with the results of 
contemporary political science research. Finally, conceptual shortcomings limit their utility and they are, 
in important respects, factually inaccurate. For substantive as well as methodological reasons, therefore, 
these interpretations cannot resolve the problem for research set out in Chapter 1. The assessment under­
taken in this section, however, indicates that an investigation of the role of economic conditions upon 
voter behaviour in rural districts may resolve this problem for research.
2.2.1. Class and Territorial Cleavages
Analysts agree that the agrarian party is a consequence of a social cleavage (a politically salient pattern 
of social stratification). Uncertainty exists, however, with respect to the type of cleavage that underlies 
agrarian party formation. One interpretation asserts that the agrarian party is a consequence of a class 
cleavage -  a conflict between an "exploited" class of farmers and their "class enemies" (business, 
railway, banking and manufacturing interests).
Lipset, for example, analyses "the conditions under which class-conscious protest movements arise, as 
well as the factors that account for their success and failure" (Lipset, 1950p.3). Lipset contends that "the 
history of [North] American political class consciousness is primarily a chronicle of agrarian upheaval" 
(Lipset, 1950p.3); that "the development of economic class consciousness on the [Canadian] Prairies 
dates from the first large-scale settlement at the turn of the century" (Lipset, 1950p.38); that "a common 
economic class situation led to heightened consciousness, sharpened class attitudes [and] agrarian class 
unity" (Lipset, 1950p.48) and that "the same factors that led Saskatchewan farmers to organise as a class 
for economic reform led to early support for direct political action [e.g., agrarian party formation]" 
(Lipset, 1950p.52).
Lipset thus concludes that
die period 1900-1930 witnessed the creation of a powerful organised, class-conscious agrarian movement 
in Saskatchewan. [Farmers] became convinced that they were exploited by "vested interests" [and] 
developed a hostile attitude to big business; as a result, a large proportion of farmers supported an agrarian 
socialist programme designed to eliminate private profit by government or co-operative action before an 
explicitly socialist party [the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation] had appeared on the scene (Lipset, 
1950p.71).
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Similarly,
the Saskatchewan CCF is a "class" party in the objective sense since it reflects the aspirations of a class 
created by constrained economic forces. The Depression made it the political voice of angry, exploited 
rural Saskatchewan (Lipset, 1950p.l53).
Conversely, Lipset asserts that "the Progressive Party leadership had never been converted to the neces­
sity of [creating] a class party" (Lipset, 1950p.58), and therefore that "the Progressive movement failed 
largely because it was more a product of immediate discontent than of long run crisis; it was not the 
expression of a self-conscious class demanding deep-rooted change" (Lipset, 1950p.60).
Where territorial (regional) sentiments command strong loyalties, the class cleavage may not be the 
most important political cleavage. To the extent that ethnic, religious, economic — and, indeed, class -  
homogeneity exists within a region, a territorial (e.g., a rural-urban) cleavage may supercede the class 
cleavage (Alford, 1963p.35); (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Accordingly, other studies argue that both class 
and territorial cleavages underlay agrarian party formation. In particular, these studies assert that the 
agrarian party represents the revolt of a "colonial" or otherwise "exploited" hinterland against a 
metropolitan, urban centre.
Macpherson is the most influential proponent of the class-and-territorial interpretation of the agrarian 
party (Macpherson, 1953); more generally, see (Hechter, 1975). Macpherson characterises self-employed, 
small-scale entrepreneurs who employ little or no labour (i.e., farmers and small businessmen) as a 
"petit-bourgeois" class. Because a majority of its population were farmers (and many others were small 
businessmen), Macpherson argues that society in the province of Alberta (and, by extension, in the 
neighbouring provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba) was essentially "petit-bourgeois" in outlook. 
Alberta possessed neither a classless nor a one-class social structure. Rather, before the Second World 
War it possessed "a relatively homogenous class composition" (Macpherson, 1953p. 10); see also 
(Graham, 1966pp. 14-15).
Further, Macpherson draws upon a very extensive and influential literature [see in particular (Fowke, 
1946); (Fowke, 1957); (Phillips, 1978)] in order to argue that the Prairie West in general and Alberta in 
particular was a "quasi-colonial" appendage of Canada’s Eastern provinces (i.e., Ontario and Quebec):
It has become a commonplace of Canadian economic history that the main economic policies o f the 
Dominion Government toward the Canadian West ever since Confederation, and even before, have been 
designed in the interests of Eastern [Canadian] capital (Macpherson, 1953p.6).
Thus,
The dominance, in the opening up and development of the prairies, of federal policies and the interests of 
Eastern capital, is sufficient evidence of the colonial nature of the Western economy in its formative years 
(Macpherson, 1953p.7).
Agrarian party formation is the consequence of the "exploitation" of this regionally-concentrated "petit- 
bourgeoisie." The sudden and overwhelming electoral victories of the United Farmers of Alberta (in 
1921) and Social Credit (in 1935) represented "the radicalism of a quasi-colonial society of independent 
producers in rebellion against Eastern imperialism" (Macpherson, 1953p.220).
Morton’s account of the Progressive Party relies upon similar arguments (Morton, 1950). Morton 
asserts that "the Western Provinces are a federal [i.e., a Dominion Government] creation; their basic 
social and political pattern had been shaped by old Canadian colonisation" (Morton, 1950p.5). As the 
their development accelerated, "sectional discord developed beneath the surface" (Morton, 1950p.6). 
Specifically, "the unequal incidence of the National Policy on the West engendered sectional disabilities 
and sharpened sectional tempers. Such handicaps were endurable in times of prosperity; but when such 
conditions no longer obtained, the West was left in such a weakened state that its only recourse lay in 
political action" (Morton, 1950p.6). As a result, Morton asserts that the early years of the twentieth
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century witnessed, in the Prairie West, the "development of a distinct section acutely aware of its 
particular interests and increasingly conscious of its weakness" (Morton, 1950p.8). For these reasons, 
Morton concludes that "the great agrarian revolt of 1921 in Canada [was] a class and sectional protest 
against the two-party system and the national policies associated with the traditional parties" (Morton, 
1950pp.xi,75,195).
Graham provides the seminal account of agrarian party formation in Australia and New Zealand 
(Graham, 1963); (Graham, 1966); see also (Ellis, 1958); (Ellis, 1963). Graham accepts the validity of 
class and sectional interpretations of agrarian party formation in North America. The appearance of 
agrarian movements in the United States between 1870 and 1914 was "essentially a protest movement of 
pioneering wheat farm communities against their exploitation by various sections of organised capital: the 
railway and elevator companies that fixed charges, the bankers who lent and then foreclosed" (Graham, 
1966p.4); see also (Verrall, Ward and Hay, 1985p.l7). Reviewing studies of Canadian agrarian parties, 
Graham asserts that "[in order to] succeed in politics, farmers needed to develop a feeling of class 
solidarity, an awareness of the true interests of their class, and a determination to use whatever political 
methods were best-suited for furthering those interests" (Graham, 1966p.l7).
Graham also contends that Australian agrarian parties are related to the agrarian parties of the Canadian 
Prairies and American mid-West (Graham, 1966p.l). For this reason, Graham applies North American 
interpretations of agrarian party formation to Australia. In particular, he asserts that "agrarian insecurity 
existed almost to the same extent in Australia [as in Canada], but was more frequently a product of small 
farmers’ experience of harsh treatment at the hands of pastoralists and bankers" (Graham, 1966pp.ll, 
27-28). Conversely, "nothing like [this] sense of injustice existed amongst New Zealand dairy farmers. In 
the period from 1890 to 1912 the Liberal Party took good account of small farmers’ demands; in later 
decades, first the Reform Party and then the National Party, despite their connections with urban interests, 
made it their careful business to cater for the farming electorate. New Zealand farmers have never lacked 
a political champion" (Graham, 1963p.l96). In consequence, New Zealand primary producers "[were] 
never a neglected group; nor [were] they ever forced, as were farmers in Australia, to form a sectional 
party to express their grievances" (Graham, 1963p. 175).
The "class" interpretation of agrarian party formation in Australia, Canada and New Zealand is seriously 
flawed. Most importantly, it is not refutable. The assertions of political sociologists notwithstanding, the 
extent to which farmers were class conscious actors, as well as the extent to which class consciousness 
influenced agrarian political behaviour, cannot be ascertained. The data required to validate these asser­
tions (sample survey data of rural voters’ subjective class consciousness in the period immediately 
following the First World War) do not exist. In their absence, these assertions remain unsubstantiated.
At the same time, the "class" interpretation seems to over-estimate farmers’ class homogeneity. Farmers 
have never fit unambiguously into any single class category. As a result, "to employ the phraseology of 
class politics unreservedly to the political preferences of farmers is to invite ambiguity" (Urwin, 
1980p.l31). To the extent that they expand the base of their operations, hire labour and buy machinery, 
farmers are "employers" and "capitalists" (Mooney, 1983); (Mumey, 1967); (Buttell and Newby, 1980); 
(Lawrence, 1980); (Nankivell, 1979). To the extent that they must supplement farm income by selling 
their own labour, farmers are "employees" (Patterson, 1971); (Steeves, 1972); (Sleeves, 1980). It is thus 
difficult and potentially misleading to apply class terminology to primary producers:
united petit-bourgeois action is rare, even when attention is restricted to the agrarian sector. In Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, the "vigorous consciousness of common interests" to which Macpherson (Macpherson, 
1953p.226) refers was not experienced by all farmers, and it is doubtful whether "agrarian class unity was
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emerging out of economic conflict" (Lipset, 1950p.69) to the extent that we can talk about united class 
action (Sinclair, 1977p.81).
With respect to primary producers’ subjective class identification, findings suggest that farmers identify 
not with a single class but with a range of classes -- or with no class at all:
when a large number of people occupy a similar [objective] class position it does not follow that they will 
be [subjectively] conscious of their class identification and act in terms of it. The petit-bourgeoisie has 
seldom done so. Indeed, different strata of the class have frequently been in conflict with each other. For a 
class to exist as an active force there must be a communal sentiment and an organization to bring people in 
similar circumstances together. This has rarely been the case in Western Canada (Sinclair, 1977p.80).
Because farm work combines manual and managerial labour, farmers’ subjective class identification
incorporates dissonant elements. As managers, farmers control their own labour (as well as the labour of
others); as manual labourers, farmers undertake arduous and hazardous tasks. This inconsistency of
objective class engenders inconsistency of subjective class identification. Farmers, in short, identify with
both the working and proprietory classes (Larson, Gillespie and Buttell, 1983).
These findings underscore the difficulty of applying class terminology to farmers. The "class" inter­
pretation of agrarian party formation is insufficiently cognizant of farmers’ diverse objective class 
categorisations and subjective class identifications. For these reasons, its conclusions are questionable:
the use of the concept of class is a function of conditions prevailing among sociologists as a group rather 
than of conditions characteristic of the society, or of science, and from [a] strictly scientific point of view  
we ought to revert to simpler concepts . . .  the concept of class has perhaps caused as much confusion as 
[clarity] (Rose, 1958p.69); more generally, see (Converse, 1964p.260); (Sartori, 1962pp.23-24); (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.404).
The "territorial" interpretation of agrarian party formation is also seriously flawed. It too is not 
refutable, suffers from conceptual shortcomings and is inconsistent with the results of contemporary 
political science research. Three conditions must be met in order to justify the claim that territorial 
cleavages are politically salient (Mathews, 1980). It is necessary to demonstrate that (1) regional divisions 
actually exist, that (2) these objective differences engender distinct regional loyalties and (3) that these 
loyalties influence political behaviour [see, for example, (Elkins and Simeon, 1980)].
With respect to Mathews’ first criterion, the discovery of regional differences does not explain regional 
differences:
We need lo be a good deal more systematic both in how we conceive of the phenomenon of "regionalism" 
and in how we describe its dimensions and effects. We must First recognise that in no sense is it an 
explanatory variable: by itself it doesn’t explain anything; nothing happens because of regionalism. If we 
find differences of any sort among regions, it remains for us to find out why they exist; "regionalism" is not 
an answer. In this sense regions are simply containers whose contents may or may not differ (Simeon, 
1979p.298); see also (Jaensch, 1983p.58); (Lipson, 1964p.325).
Political conflict, whatever its cause, is likely to acquire at least some territorial colouration — even
though it may bear little relation lo territorial concerns (Gibbins, 1980p.l59).
The absence of relevant data precludes an investigation of the presence of Mathews’ second and third 
criteria for politically salient territorial cleavage. It is reasonably certain, however, that the "exploitation" 
of the rural periphery by urban centres neither informed rural voters’ regional loyalties nor influenced 
their political behaviour. The claim that rural peripheries are "exploited" by urban centres is logically and 
conceptually untenable. Norrie considers regional economic discrimination to exist if economic distor­
tions are clearly initiated by government (or government institutions), and if the removal of these distor­
tions provides unambiguous benefit to the region (Norrie, 1976pp.211-212). Given these criteria, the 
economic grievances cited by the agrarian party literature stem from dissatisfaction with market resource 
allocation (i.e., the inevitable fate of small and isolated regions in a market economy) rather than from 
discriminatory government policies (Nome, 1974); (Nome, 1976); (Norrie, 1978).
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Studies of agrarian parties assert, without evidence, that tariffs have disproportionately harmful effects 
upon rural districts (Macpherson, 1953p.7). In particular, they assert that (1) tariffs retard rural economic 
development and diversification (and thereby encourage the concentration of manufacturing in major 
metropolitan centres), and that (2) tariffs transfer resources (labour and capital) from rural to urban 
regions, de-industrialise rural regions (and thereby benefit industrial centres at the expense of rural 
districts).
Nom e’s analysis of these assertions merits quotation at length:
[Argument (1)], of course, is patently false. The tariffs merely shifted the best (i.e. least cost) plant 
location for servicing the Canadian market from the developing industrial areas in the US to the best site in 
Canada behind the tariff wall. For a combination of historical, geographical and economic reasons, eastern 
Canada was the logical place for this industry. Granted the East may have been artificially industrialised by 
the tariff, but, if so, at the expense of the US rather than of western Canada. In the absence of the tariff the 
West would have had no more, and probably even less, manufacturing than she did experience (Norrie, 
1978p.23).
"The correct response to these assertions", in other words,
is that the industrial structure of the [Prairie] West derives from its geographical isolation, relative 
lateness of settlement and small and diffused population base. Profit-maximizing industries locate where 
the sum of materials acquisition, production and distribution costs is minimized. Since distribution costs are 
minimized by locating close to the major markets for the product there is a tendency for industry to 
agglomerate around already established population centres (Nome, 1976p.213).
With respect to the second assertion,
if one means by this that the very existence of tariffs leads to regional disparities in industrialization then 
it is true only to the extent that the tariff has induced more manufacturers to locate in Ontario and Quebec 
than might have in the absence of the tariff. But the claim is not true if by it is meant that the West has less 
industry because of the Canadian protective system (Nome, 1976pp.213-214); see also (Nom e, 
1974pp.460-461).
These studies also contend, without evidence, that (3) rural districts faced unnecessarily high transport 
costs [see, for example, (Lipset, 1950pp.4-10); (Morton, 1950p.7)]. Nome finds, however, that even 
when freight rates accurately reflect the cost of transporting goods, isolated (hinterland) regions in market 
economies absorb transport costs on both imports and exports (Nome, 1976p.214).
Accounts of agrarian party formation assert, without evidence, that (4) commercial banks transfer 
savings from the hinterland to urban centres (with the result that the hinterland’s development potential is 
reduced), and that they foreclose in times of economic adversity (thus imparting a discriminatory burden 
upon farmers). These actions reflect no more than the rational (profit-maximising) behaviour of firms. 
Lending institutions re-allocate resources from areas of low return to areas where risk-adjusted returns are 
greater (Nome, 1976p.215); for a similar argument applied to futures markets, see (Pashigian, 1988).
Nome thus concludes that agrarian grievances are actually demands for market intervention: "the real 
dissatisfaction is with the market economy rather than with discriminatory acts by the federal government 
or eastern-based companies. It is obvious that these types of proposals are actually demands to counteract 
decisions made in the market rather than to offset regionally discriminatory behaviour by private institu­
tions or the federal government" (Norrie, 1976p.216).
These shortcomings of "class" and "territorial" interpretations of agrarian parties have important con­
sequences. Most fundamentally, they indicate that an analysis of agrarian parties must make no assertions 
regarding objective class homogeneity, subjective class consciousness and regional (territorial) identity in 
rural districts. They also underscore the potential utility of investigating the effects of market relation­
ships on political behaviour in rural districts.
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2.2.2. Ideology
Very closely related to subjective regional identification in rural districts is the ideology of agrarianism. 
Ideologies are explicitly formulated systems of belief which exhibit a high degree of internal coherence 
(systematisation) and focus attention around one or a few central propositions (Shils, 1968pp.66-69); 
(Geertz, 1964pp.47-76); (Plamenatz, 1971p.l6). Nonetheless, ideologies are extremely nebulous 
phenomena: "[their] nature cannot be captured in definitions" (Scarbrough, 1984p.22); "no fewer than two 
dozen quite different definitions of the concept exist" (Putnam, 197lp.651), and, at the same time, "there 
exist no criteria for their comparison, evaluation or use" (Bennett, 1977pp.465-466).
It is not surprising, then, that beyond an acknowledged set of beliefs related to rural living, the ideology 
of agrarianism lacks a single (or simple) definition.12 Nor is it surprising that studies of agrarian parties 
leave the term undefined. Nonetheless, agrarianism has been cited as an important cause of agrarian party 
formation. Aitkin, for example, argues that "the New South Wales Country Party is built upon an 
ideology that grew out of the experiences of farmers and townsmen in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and which flourishes still" (Aitkin, 1972p.315). This ideology was well-established by 1910 
(Aitkin, 1972p.8), "provided the impetus for the Country Party’s thrust into Parliamentary politics" 
(Aitkin, 1972p.4), and changed only slightly between 1910 and 1960 (Aitkin, 1972p.l7); see also (Lucy, 
1985p.74). In short, "the Country Party supported an ideology, made it its own, and established it as a 
principal theme in Australian politics. [Without this ideology, the Country Party] might have collapsed" 
(Aitkin, 1972p.l); see also (Graham, 1966pp.39-40 and 139); (Jaensch, 1983pp.l77-179); (Emy, 
1974p.437).
Conversely, "early [North American] agrarian movements lacked staying power; no sooner had they 
made their initial impact in the political system than they would lose direction and go to pieces. Their 
failure was a reflection of doctrinal weakness. Their political and economic ideas were unsophisticated 
and unsystematic, with the result that their action was ill-directed" (Graham, 1966p.l7 and 296). 
Similarly, Lipset argues that "the lack of a long-term programme for social change accounted in part, for 
the failure of Populism [in the United States] to become a permanent radical protest movement" (Lipset, 
1950p.9) and Morton observes that the Canadian Progressive movement "failed to develop a sound basis 
in doctrine" (Morton, 1950p.268) and that it entered politics "with fundamental doctrinal questions still 
unresolved" (Morton, 1950p.95).
For five reasons, the "ideological" interpretation of agrarian party formation is seriously flawed. (1) 
Like the "class" and "territorial" interpretation, it is not refutable: the data required to validate or falsify 
its assertions (sample survey data which measure the ideological beliefs of rural voters in the years 
immediately following the First World War) do not exist. In the absence of appropriate data, these 
contentions remain unsubstantiated. (2) Even if suitable data were made available, a test of the 
"ideological" interpretation would confront severe operational difficulties. Because the definition and 
measurement (indeed, the existence) of ideology are disputed, some studies find far more ideological 
voting than others (Niemi and Weisberg, 1976pp.79-83); (Achen, 1975); (Petrocik, 1980); (Converse and 
Markus, 1979); (Abramson, 1983); (Field and Anderson, 1969); (Pierce, 1970); (Scarbrough, 1984).
(3) Analyses of the relationship between ideology and voter behaviour flatly contradict the assertions of 
the "ideological" interpretation of agrarian party formation. These studies find that voters make little use 
of -  indeed, often do not understand -  the simplest ideological terms; that they hold illogical, incon­
sistent (and hence unstructured) beliefs, and, in many cases, that they have no views (to say nothing of
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ideological views) whatever. Campbell et al, for example, investigate the extent to which voters use 
ideological concepts (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960pp. 188-216). They find that only 3.5 
percent of voters describe politics primarily in terms of ideological concepts, and that only 11.5 percent of 
voters show any evidence of ideological thinking. They conclude that "the concepts important to ideologi­
cal analysis are important only for that small segment of the population equipped to approach political 
decisions at a [conceptually] rarified level" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960pp. 192-193); 
see also (Converse, 1964); (Butler and Stokes, 1974); (Klingemann, 1979); (Kinder, 983b).
Moreover, the extent to which voters recognise even the simplest ideological concepts is limited. Most 
studies find that the comprehension of these terms is confined to a minority (approximately 25 percent) of 
voters (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960); (Converse, 1964); (Butler and Stokes, 1974); 
(Klingemann, 1979).
Converse considers the possibility that (a) voters cannot articulate the manner in which their beliefs are 
organised (despite the fact that these beliefs are ideologically-structured) and that (b) voters organise their 
beliefs in a manner different from political scientists’ perceptions (i.e., in terms other than a liberal- 
conservative continuum) (Converse, 1964). Accordingly, Converse investigates the extent to which a 
voter’s attitude with respect to one issue is related to his attitude on a related issue (the extent to which 
voters’ attitudes form an overall system of belief) [see also (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960pp. 192-193)]. Converse finds that, at a given point in time, voters’ attitudes are inconsistent and 
conform to no discernible pattern; over time, a voter’s response to an identical question varies greatly 
(particularly with respect to the most ideological questions), and in many instances is random in nature 
(Converse, 1964).
That other studies (Alt, 1983); (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983); (Robertson, 1984); (Harrop, 1979); 
(Scarbrough, 1984) show that there is some degree of structure to the electorate’s attitudes does not 
invalidate Converse’s principal empirical result -  that this structure is not strong enough to justify the 
conclusion that voters possess structured belief systems (Converse, 1964). In sum, therefore,
well-developed and structured ideologies, derived from basic principles and exercising a powerful 
constraint on individual voters’ attitudes, remain absent from the political thinking of the great masses of 
voters in Western democracies (Harrop and Miller, 1987pp.124-125).
(4) The conclusion that voters do not possess a structured system of belief need not apply to all voters. 
Evidence suggests, however, that it applies most unambiguously to farmers. Studies of the ideological 
base of farmers’ political attitudes uncover "a paucity of anything resembling ideological comprehension 
in rural areas" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.437); see also (Bone and Ranney, 
1963p.45); (Flanigan, 1972p.54); (Milbraith, 1965pp. 128-130); (Lewis-Beck, 1977p.555).
(5) Several studies investigate the extent to which farmers subscribe to the tenets of agrarianism (Craig 
and Phillips, 1983); (Flinn and Johnson, 1974); (Rohrer, 1969); (Carlson and McLeod, 1978); (Smith, 
1982). These studies indicate that most farmers in Australia and the United States subscribe to these 
tenets. Less clear, however, is the contention that the sum of these attributes constitutes an ideology. 
Rather, these diffuse elements make agrarianism "practically a general cultural phenomenon" (Buttell and 
Flinn, 1975). Even less clear is the relationship of agrarian attitudes to voter behaviour. For this reason, 
"any attempt to derive specific policy preferences or programmes from its tenets is not likely to be 
successful" (Singer and de Sousa, 1983p.304); see also (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960p.403); (Urwin, 1980pp.88-89).
Two conclusions emerge from the analysis undertaken in this section. The assertions of the
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"ideological" interpretation are not refutable and are therefore unsubstantiated. Because the bulk of 
empirical research contradicts its assertions, this interpretation is implausible.
2.2.3. Party Organisation
The formation, electoral support and dissolution of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand has been attributed to the efficacy of agrarian party organisation. The Australian literature in 
particular attributes agrarian party formation and electoral support to organisational acumen. Graham, for 
example, asserts that "the Country Party movement can be explained as an outcome of the progressive 
development of organisational, leadership and political techniques in the years after 1870" (Graham, 
1966p.94) and that "Country Parties were the latest in a series of political experiments dating back to the 
Land Leagues and Land Reform Associations" (Graham, 1966p. 139); (Verrall, Ward and Hay, 1985p.l8). 
Aitkin concludes that "organisation was vital in the party’s survival, and gave it a previously-lacking 
resilience" (Aitkin, 1972p.316). Conversely, "the real reason [for the demise of the Canadian Progressive 
Party] was its lack of organisation: the party boasted no firmly-grounded organisation, no well-informed 
rank-and-file" (Graham, 1966p.28,24, 295); (Morton, 1950p.l65).
These assertions are consistent with McAllister’s argument that "while exogenous factors create a 
political environment conducive to electoral mobilisation by minority nationalist groups [in the United 
Kingdom] there is also an important endogenous (organisational) variable: for successful electoral 
mobilisation to take place, the [non-major parties] themselves must adopt the structure and policies to 
facilitate [electoral mobilisation]" (McAllister, 1981 p.252). Hauss and Rayside, however, contest this 
argument:
We expected that one facilitating factor [of non-major party formation] — a party’s organisational base — 
would prove to be extremely important. We felt that a party that could draw on an existing network of 
support through unions or other interest groups or which could quickly put together such a network on its 
own would do extremely well. This has not proved to be the case. At least initial success is not dependent 
on organisational support (Hauss and Rayside, 1978p.52).
Nonetheless, McAllister correctly observes that "traditionally, political science has concentrated upon the 
exogenous factors conducive to electoral success; it has rarely examined the endogenous [internal and 
organisational] factors which result in electoral success" (McAllister, 198lp.237). Studies of agrarian 
parties must therefore analyse endogenous factors (such as agrarian party elites’ decision to nominate 
candidates in particular constituencies) as well as the exogenous factors which influence these candidates’ 
electoral support. A more complete understanding of agrarian party formation, survival and dissolution, in 
other words, requires an analysis of the party’s mass (electoral) and elite (organisational) base.13
2.2.4. The Volatile Economy
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand studies of agrarian parties devote relatively little attention to the 
economic antecedents of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution (or, more generally, 
to the economic antecedents of party and voter behaviour in rural areas). These studies consider the 
agrarian party to be a class, sectional or ideological phenomenon. Economic conditions may exacerbate 
these cleavages but need not be analysed in detail.14 At the same time, however, American studies 
identify economic conditions in their own right as an important antecedent of rural voter behaviour and as 
a catalyst of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. Campbell et al, for example, 
assert that "if one dominant character of farmers’ political behaviour is its variability, a second that has 
received much attention is its economic sensitivity" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.416); 
see also (Higgs, 1971pp. 102-103); (North, 1974pp. 134-136); (Parker, 1972p.407); (McGuire, 1981); 
(McGuire, 1982); (Lewis, 1982); (Mayhew, 1972); (Williams, 1981).15
30
Other studies suggest that the relationship between economic stimuli and electoral behaviour may be 
strongest among farmers and in rural districts. Rosenstone et al, for example, find that economic adver­
sity influences neither voter behaviour nor non-major party formation -  except among farmers and in 
rural districts (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984p.l65). For this reason,
the phrase "entrepreneurial radicalism," coined by (Hofstadter, 1955p.59) to describe the American 
experience, seems to be the most succinct description of the style of [agrarian] political behaviour which is 
almost solely concerned with economic satisfaction within a system of private ownership (Urwin, 
1980p.l58).
These studies consider the most visible agricultural economic indicator -  commodity price -  to be the 
major antecedent of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. These studies hypothesise 
that an abrupt decline in the price of a commodity decreases farm income and thereby (indirectly) 
engenders agrarian party formation [see in particular (McGuire, 1981); (McGuire, 1982); see also 
(Graham, 1966p.l3); (Morton, 1950p.6-37); (Lipset, 1950pp.25-29). Conversely, a recovery in the 
commodity’s price attenuates these cleavages and engenders agrarian party dissolution (Morton, 
1950p.266).
These studies also suggest that farmers respond to economic stimuli in an individualistic (but not 
idiosyncratic) manner, and that farmers "are fragmented into interests that are independent or even at 
times conflicting, based on special crop problems and the like" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960p.404); see also (Lipset, 1950pp.5-7); (Hicks, 1933). Moreover, "the status polarisation of the farm 
community as a function of both stable and short-term differences in economic fortunes illustrates with 
great clarity the folly of treating the "farm vote" as unitary. The farmer responds to his own economic 
situation, with little reference to the manner in which [other] farmers are faring" (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller and Stokes, 1960p.420).
These economic studies "advance our understanding of the economic determinants of agrarian protest" 
(McGuire, 198lp.848). At the same time, however, the hypotheses which underlie these studies are 
incomplete. They do not precisely specify the manner in which a change in the price of a particular 
commodity influences the income of a producer of that particular commodity [see, for example, (Percy, 
Nome and Johnston, 1982)]. Nor do they identify the other economic variables which influence primary 
producers’ income — and which thereby engender agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolu­
tion. Commodity price is an important — in the short term, perhaps the most important — determinant of a 
primary producer’s income. By no means, however, is it the sole determinant of his income. Also 
important are less visible indicators (such as the composition of inputs into agricultural production, the 
efficiency of resource use in agriculture, the composition of commodity output and consumers’ demand 
for these commodities) which, singly and in combination, determine primary producers’ incomes 
(Johnson, 1985); (Heady, 1965); (Schultz, 1945); (Schultz, 1953).
Two conclusions emerge from the analysis undertaken in this section. (1) Of all the studies assessed in 
this chapter, studies of agrarian parties’ economic antecedents [particularly (McGuire, 1981); (McGuire, 
1982); (Lewis, 1982)] are the only studies which rigorously (and successfully) confront refutable proposi­
tions with empirical data. Of all the studies assessed in this chapter, in other words, these economic 
studies are the most methodologically and substantively sound. An analysis of the problem for research 
set out in Chapter 1 should therefore attempt to emulate such studies.
(2) An understanding of the economic determinants of agrarian party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution requires that the effects of a more complete set of economic variables (particularly the 
composition of resource inputs, commodity output and the size and productivity of agricultural and
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pastoral holdings) be investigated. An analysis of the problem for research set out in Chapter 1 must 
therefore build upon and extend beyond these economic studies.
2.3. A New Look at an Unresolved Problem for Research
Two conclusions emerge from the assessment undertaken in this chapter. (1) The assertion that 
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand agrarian parties were a consequence of a class or a territorial 
identity, an ideological consciousness or organisational cohesion is, in several respects, questionable. 
These interpretations are not refutable and thus cannot resolve the problem for comparative research 
formulated in Chapter 1. The resolution of this problem for research requires, in terms of methodology, an 
explicitly theoretical (and clearly refutable) analysis (see also Appendix B).
(2) These assertions do not correspond with the results of contemporary political science research. The 
resolution of this problem thus requires, in substantive terms, that attention be directed away from notions 
of class, territory and ideology, and that it be focussed upon the impact of agricultural economic con­
ditions on rural party and voter behaviour. Primary producers must not be considered to be an 
homogenous group. Rather, they must be considered to be an atomised set of actors. Analysis must also 
be directed at the behaviour of both masses (voters) and elites (agrarian party leaders). Finally, a more 
complete set of economic variables (including the the composition of inputs into agricultural production, 
the efficiency of resource use in agriculture, the composition of commodity output and consumers’ 
demand for these commodities) must be incorporated into the analysis.
In short, the assessment undertaken in this chapter justifies an econometric analysis of the formation, 
electoral support and dissolution, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian 
parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Part II undertakes such an analysis (with particular 
reference to the Australian Country Party at the Commonwealth elections of 1922,1925 and 1928).
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Part II
Chapter 1 identified the formation and partial dissolution, in the years immediately following the First 
World War, of agrarian political parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant problem for 
research. Chapter 2 argued that existing (class, centre-periphery, ideological and organisational) inter­
pretations of agrarian parties in these countries do not resolve this problem for research, but that an 
analysis of the economic antecedents of rural electoral behaviour may do so. These chapters thus indicate 
that an analysis of the economic antecedents of voter and party behaviour in rural constituencies may 
contribute to a more complete understanding of voters, major and non-major parties and elections.
Part I, in other words, underscored the potential utility of an econometric analysis, focussed upon the 
years immediately following the First World War, of the formation, electoral support and dissolution of 
agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Econometrics is most frequently defined as the 
application of statistical techniques to the analysis of economic phenomena (Hendry, 1980); (Johnston, 
1984pp.l-6); (Kelejian and Oates, 1981pp.l-6); (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1985pp.xiii-xv); (Wonnacott 
and Wonnacott, 1979pp.3-5). In practice, an econometric analysis encompasses several distinct activities. 
Accordingly, so too must an econometric analysis of agrarian party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution.
First and foremost, such an analysis is an exercise in economic analysis: it utilises economic theory in 
order to resolve the problem for research identified in Chapter 1. It is also an exercise in mathematical 
analysis: it expresses theoretical relationships in mathematical terms in order to make them more amen­
able to empirical investigation. It is partly an exercise in empirical research: it collects appropriate data 
and relates theoretical variables to observable variables. Finally, it is partly an exercise in applied statis­
tics: it specifies appropriate statistical models and estimates behavioural relationships.
Part II undertakes such an analysis (with particular reference to the Australian Country Party at the 
Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928). Chapter 3 sets out an economic theory of agrarian 
party formation, electoral support and dissolution. Chapter 4 describes the (Australian) data and specifies 
the statistical models that are required in order to evaluate this theory’s hypotheses. Chapters 5 and 6 
confront this theory’s hypotheses with these data: Chapter 5 analyses the Country Party’s formation and
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partial dissolution at these elections; Chapter 6 analyses the Country Party’s electoral support at these 
elections.
ADDENDUM:
"* i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t  < 1 . 9 6 " ,  whi c h  
a p p e a r s  in t he  t a b l e s  in Ch a p t e r s  
5 and 6,  s h o u l d  read  
"* i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  1 . 9 6  < t  < 2 . 3 2 " .
34
Chapter 3 
Theory
Part I identified the formation, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian 
parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant and unresolved problem for comparative 
research. It also observed that non-major and agrarian parties have been the subject of almost no ex­
plicitly theoretical research. Section 3.1 constructs a formal theory of non-major party formation, elec­
toral support and dissolution. Section 3.2 extends this theory in order to account for the formation, 
electoral support and dissolution of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
3.1. A General Theory of Non-Major Party Formation, Electoral Support and 
Dissolution
Three studies advance explicit hypotheses with respect to non-major party formation and electoral 
support (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984); (Pinard, 1975); (Mazmanian, 1974).16 These and other 
studies (Asher, 1980p. 189); (Burnham, 1970); (Soares and Hamblin, 1967) advance three hypotheses. (1) 
The formation and electoral support of non-major parties is a consequence of voter dissatisfaction with 
major parties. Rosenstone et al, for example, hypothesise that "as the proportion of voters who are 
distanced from the major party candidates grows, not only does the number of people who abandon the 
major parties go up, but so does the probability that [non-major party] candidates will emerge with 
positions that meet the concerns of estranged voters" (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984p.l27). Con­
sequently, partisan loyalty (party identification) to a major party inhibits non-major party formation and 
electoral support:
the stronger a citizen’s attachment to a major party, the more apt he is to interpret events in ways 
consistent with the outlook of this party and therefore the more difficult it will be for him to cast a 
non-major party ballot. By the same token, the more loyal a voter is to the [two-party] political system, the 
more likely she will continue to look exclusively to the major parties for solutions. Conversely, non-major 
party voting should be easier for a citizen who has a weak attachment to [a major party and the two-party 
system (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984p.l44).
(2) These and other studies hypothesise that an issue(s) which is ignored, obfuscated or mismanaged by 
the major parties -  particularly an economic issue(s) whose salience attains crisis proportions -  causes 
non-major party formation and electoral support (Page and Brody, 1972); (Converse, Rusk and Wolfe, 
1969p.225); (Hesseltine, 1962p.l3); (Greer, 1949p.l87); (Schmidt, 1960p.242); (Heberle, 1970); (Key, 
1964p.255-278). Mazmanian, for example, argues that "the leading pre-condition [for non-major party 
formation] is severe political crisis" (Mazmanian, 1974p.27), that "no significant [non-major] party has 
appeared at a time other than one of crisis" (Mazmanian, 1974p.71) and in particular that "the depression 
stage of the economic cycle has often been described as the crucial cause of [non-major party formation]" 
(Mazmanian, 1974p. 137); (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984pp. 134-138).
(3) Mazmanian suggests that non-major party formation is associated with low voter turnout at elec-
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Lions: "although [non-major] parties may activate some voters, the overall level of voter participation 
across the nation declines when they appear" (Mazmanian, 1974p.77); see also (Riker and Ordeshook, 
1968). In isolation (and under most circumstances), voter dissatisfaction with major parties need produce 
no more than passive abstention from electoral competition. Highly salient issues transform this passive 
abstention into active electoral protest (Mazmanian, 1974pp.77-78). For this reason, a negative relation­
ship is hypothesised to exist between non-major party formation and voter participation at elections.
3.1.1. Initial Conditions
The ultimate goal of a positive science is to develop theories which yield valid and meaningful (i.e., not 
truistic or tautological) predictions about phenomena that have not yet been observed (Blaug, 1986); 
(Davis, 1969); (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp.l-15); (Nicholson, 1983). Positive economics, for ex­
ample, consists in "a body of tentatively accepted generalisations about economic phenomena that can be 
used to predict the consequences of changes in circumstances" (Friedman, 1953p.39); see also (Lipsey, 
1966pp. 1-21). A meaningful scientific theory typically asserts that certain things cause (and that all other 
things do not cause) a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena. It is frequently convenient to analyse 
this phenomenon or set of phenomena as if it occurred in a highly abstract world which contains only 
theoretically-relevant variables (Friedman, 1953pp.39-40). When attempting to analyse a complex 
problem, in other words, it is often a good strategy to refrain from attacking the problem directly; rather, 
it is often a good idea to construct an artificial situation that is amenable to systematic analysis. One can 
often gain insight into the real problem by solving the artificial problem (Davis, 1969p.26). A small 
number of "initial conditions" simplify theoretical analyses and specify the circumstances under which 
they are expected to be valid. Four initial conditions, each of which is implicit in the conjectures set out in 
section 3.1, facilitate the analysis of non-major party formation, electoral support and dissolution. 
(Appendix C discusses and justifies this study’s "instrumentalist" methodology in detail).
IC.l (Institutional Arrangements): Liberal democratic institutional arrangements and procedures 
govern the conduct of elections: all adults are fully enfranchised; elections occur at regular intervals; ballots 
are cast without coercion and carry equal weight; party competition proceeds unhindered and electoral 
results are respected (Harrop and Miller, 1987); (Dahl, 1966); (Dahl, 1967); (Dahl and Tufte, 1973); 
(Sartori, 1987).
IC.2 (Voter Behaviour): (1) Voters are rational (goal-directed) actors (Robertson, 1976p.20); (Goldberg, 
1969). Specifically, voter preferences are determined by the same influences which affect consumer tastes 
in the economic theory of demand: like consumers, voters maximise the expected satisfaction (utility) 
obtained from alternate "firms" (parties) and vote for the party which provides the greatest utility from 
government activity (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973pp.8-44); (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Voters act as if 
they are cognizant of their (subjectively-determined) self-interest; they evaluate parties and programmes 
competing for their support in terms of this self-interest and cast ballots on the basis of this self-interest 
(Downs, 1957); (Enelow and Hinich, 1984p.3); (Robertson, 1976pp.197-200).
(2) The greater is the salience (importance) of a particular issue(s), the greater is voter turnout at 
elections.
IC3  (Party Behaviour): Parties are goal-directed (rational) actors. They never seek office as a means of 
carrying out particular policies. Rather, their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office (Downs, 
1957p.28) and they are as indifferent to the policies they espouse as to the welfare of the citizens whose 
voles they solicit. For this reason, they are prepared to advocate any policy that will help them win office 
(Hartley andTisdell, 1981pp.45-67); (Buchanan, 1978); (Schumpeter, 1950p.285).
IC.4 (The Interaction Between Voters and Parties):
• IC4.1: The mass electorate’s preferences with respect to particular issues, together with the 
salience (importance) of these issues, are the sole determinants of a political party’s policy 
positions: no other actor (pressure group, government bureau, etc) influences a party’s 
policies.
• IC4.2: Electoral laws (i.e., the laws that govern the process by which electoral preferences 
are articulated) greatly influence the process by which popular votes are translated into 
parliamentary representation (Rae, 197lp. 14); they do not, however, influence voter or party 
behaviour at elections.17
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• IC4.3: (a) Parties always respond to changes in voter preferences and issue salience, (b) they 
do not, however, necessarily respond satisfactorily to changes in voter preferences and issue 
salience.
It follows from these initial conditions that voter dissatisfaction with the major parties, together with 
issue salience, are the sole determinants of non-major party formation and electoral support. If the 
salience of an issue(s) is low, and if voters are dissatisfied with the policies of one or both of the major 
parties, voters will abstain from electoral competition. If, however, the salience of an issue(s) is great and 
if voters are dissatisfied with the policies of one or both of the major parties, voters will consider voting 
for a non-major party -  and "political entrepreneurs" will therefore stand as non-major party candidates 
(i.e., non-major party formations results).
Non-major party formation and dissolution thus refer to the extent to which non-major party candidates 
contest elections. An increase in the number of constituencies that the non-major party’s candidates 
contest (regardless of its percentage share of the total vote within these constituencies) constitutes non­
major party formation. The greater the number of constituencies which a non-major party contests from 
one election to another, the greater is non-major party formation at the latter election. Conversely, a 
decrease in the number of constituencies which a non-major party’s candidates contests constitutes 
non-major party dissolution. The greater the decrease in the number of constituencies which a non-major 
party contests from one election to another, the greater is non-major party dissolution at the latter 
election.
IC.1-IC.4 can be expressed mathematically. Following Riker and Ordeshook (Riker and Ordeshook, 
1973pp.310-322), let
1. x = (Xj, x2, . . . ,  xn) represent a citizen’s most preferred outcome for each of n issues, where 
xi represents his preference with respect to issue i.
2. 9 = (9j, 02, . . . ,  0n) represent a citizen’s estimate of party l ’s position for each of n issues, 
where 0j represents the citizen’s estimate of party l ’s position with respect to issue i (where 
party 1 is a major party).
3. y  = (\jfj_, \g2, . . . , Yn) represent a citizen’s estimate of party 2’s position for each of n 
issues, where represents the citizen’s estimate of party 2’s position with respect to issue i 
(where party 2 is a major party).
4. (xi - G^2 represents the disparity between the citizen’s preference with respect to issue i and 
his perception of party l ’s position with respect to this issue — in short, the citizen’s 
dissatisfaction (with respect to issue i) with the position of party 1.
5. (xj - xjq)2 represents the disparity between the citizen’s preference with respect to issue i and 
his perception of party 2’s position with respect to this issue -  in short, the citizen’s 
dissatisfaction (with respect to issue i) with the position of party 2.
6. represents the importance (salience) of issue i to the citizen.
7. Citizens satisfied with one of the two major parties will behave in the following manner: If
<t>i(Xi - Gi)2 < ^(X j - x^)2 
they will vote for party 1; if
4>i(Xi - Yx)2 < - 0i)2
they will vote for party 2.
8. Clearly, however, not all citizens are satisfied with one or the other of the major parties. Nor 
do all citizens vote. Thus, let A(y) represent the change between election k and election k-1 
in the number constituencies contested by non-major party candidates (or, equivalently, the 
change in non-major party support as a percentage of total votes cast in the constituency 
between k and k-1).
9. a  represents the percentage of the total electorate without a partisan identification with one
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of the major parlies -  and hence the percentage of the total electorate that is most prepared, 
when dissatisfied with one or both of the major parties, to consider a non-major party as an 
alternative to a major party (0 < a  < 1).
10. X  represents, among a, the durability of the conversion from a major party to a non-major 
party (0 < \<  1).
11. Y represents, among a , the strength of the conversion from a major party to a non-major 
party (0< y^  1).
12. r(k) represent voter turnout at election k. Specifically,
a. Voter turnout at elections increases (decreases) as the utility associated with one 
party becomes more (less) distinguishable from the utility associated with the other 
party. Voter participation (abstention), in short, is a function of the perceived 
presence (lack) of choice between parties (Downs, 1957pp.270-276); (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954pp.314-315); (Enelow and Hinich, 1984p.90); (Brody 
and Page, 1973pp.2-3); (Ordeshook, 1970p.52). Hence,
r(k) = + f](xi - e^2 - (xj -Vi)2!.
b. Voter abstention is not merely a function of apathy, indifference or satisfaction with 
the status quo; it is also a function of dissatisfaction with the status quo -  i.e., of 
"disgust with the alternatives proffered by the major parties" (Converse, 1966p.24); 
see also (Brody and Page, 1973pp.2-3); (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). Hence,
r(k) = - f[(Xi - öj)2, (Xj - Vi)2].
c. The greater the salience of issue i, the greater the voter turnout at elections. Hence,
r(k) = + f ^ ] .
3.1.2. Formalisation
The hypotheses which were summarised in section 3.1 related the formation of non-major parties to (1) 
voter dissatisfaction with major parties, (2) the salience to voters of the issues responsible for this 
dissatisfaction, and (3) voter turnout at elections. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) use the terms set out in section 
3.1.1 in order to express these three hypotheses formally:18
A y(k) = |(xj - Gj)2 - (xf - Vi)2Kk) + 4>i00 + ay(k-l) - r(k)
k = 0, 1 , 2 . . .  (3.1)
r(k) = yy(k-l) + Xr(k-l) k = 0, 1, 2 . . .  (3.2)
This linear, first-order system of difference equations expresses an output (the change in the number of 
constituencies with non-major party candidates/non-major party support as a percentage of total votes cast 
between time k and time k-1) as a function of two exogenous inputs (voter dissatisfaction with major 
parties and an economic issue whose salience attains crisis proportions), a past output, an endogenous 
variable (voter turnout at election k) and a series of constants (a, y , Ä.).19 In order to make these 
relationships clearer, equation (3.1) may be re-written:
A y(k) = Uj(k) + u2(k) + ay(k-l) - r(k)
k = 0, 1,2, . ..(3 .3 )
where the u terms represent the system’s inputs:
Uj(k) = |(xi - G^ 2 - -Vjq)2!
u2(k) = ({r.
Substituting y(k) - y(k-l) for A y(k) and re-arranging the terms of equation (3.3) gives
>'(k) - y(k-l) = Uj(k) + u2(k) + ay(k-l) - r(k)
y(k) = Uj(k) + u2(k) + y(k-l) + ay(k-l) - r(k)
y(k) = Uj(k) + u2(k) + (1 + a)y(k-l) - r(k)
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k = 0, 1 , 2 . . .  (3.4)
The terms of equation (3.4) can be re-arranged in order to obtain an expression for r(k-l) in terms of y 
and u:
-y(k-l) + Uj(k-1) + u2(k-l) + (1 + a)y(k-2) = r(k-l)
k = 0, 1 , 2 . . .  (3.5)
The terms of equation (3.5) can be substituted into equation (3.2):
r(k) = yy(k-l) + X[-y(k-l) + u^k-1) + u2(k-l) +
(1 + a)y(k-2)]
r(k) = yy(k-1) - Xy(k-1) - Xuj(k-1) - Xu2(k-1) +
>.(1 + a)y(k-2)
r(k) = (y - X)y(k-1) + X(1 + a)y(k-2) + Xuj(k-1) + Xu2(k-1)
Equation (3.6) can be substituted into equation (3.4):
y(k) = Uj(k) + u2(k) + (1 + oc)y(k-l) - (y-X)y(k-l) - 
X(1 + a)y(k-2) - Xuj(k-1) - Xu2(k-1)
Equation (3.7) can be re-written:
y(k) = Uj(k) + u2(k) - Xuj(k-1) - Xu2(k-1) +
(1 + a  - y + X)y(k-1) - X(1 + a)y(k-2)
k = 0, 1,2. . . (3.6)
k = 0, 1 , 2 . . .  (3.7)
k = 0, 1,2. . . (3.8)
Equation (3.8) is a second-order linear difference equation written in terms of the system’s inputs, Uj 
and u2, and its output, y. It is in all respects equivalent to equations (3.1) and (3.2). Equation (3.8) can be 
solved by means of a z-transform and an inverse z-transform (Boynton, 1980pp.59-90). As a first step, the 
system’s outputs and inputs must be segregated:
y(k) - (l+oc-yfX)y(k-l) + X(l+ot)y(k-2) = ut + u2 - X u ^ - l)  - Xu2(k-1)
k = 0 , 1 , 2 . .  (3.9)
The z-transform of the output sequence of equation (3.9) yields 
Z[y(k) - (l-t-a-Yt-X)y(k-l) + X(l+a)y(k-2)]
= Y(z)- (l+a-yfX)z'1Y(z) + X (l+a)z2Y(z) (3.10)
= [1 - (1+a-Y +^z1 + X (l+a)z2]Y(z) (3.11)
(where Y(z) represents the z-transform of y(k)).
The z-transform of the input sequence of equation (3.9) yields 
Z[Uj(k) + u2(k) - Xu^k-1) - Xu2(k-1)]
= Uj(z) + U2(z) - XujZ^Ujfc) - Xu2z_1U2(z)
= (1 - Xz^U^z) + (1 - \ z l)\J2(z)
= 1 -Xz-1[U1(z) + U2(z)] (3.12)
(where Uj(z) and U2(z) represent the z-transform of Uj(z) and 
u2(z)).
Recombining equations (3.11) and (3.12) gives
[1 - (l+cc-y+XK1 + X(l+cx)z'2]Y(z) = (1 - X z^tU ^z) + U2(z)] 
Dividing both sides by 1 - (l+a-y+X ^'1 + X(l+a)z'2 gives
Y(z)
1 -X z  1
l-(l+a-y+X)z_1
+ X ( l+ a ) z -2
[Ul (z)+U1{z)).
(3.13)
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Multiplying (3.14) through by z2 gives the solution to equations (3.1) and (3.2):
Y(z)
z2-(\+a-y+X)z+
X ( \ + a )
[Ux(z)+U2(z)l
(3.14)
(3.15)
3.1.3. Analysis
Equation (3.15) describes the manner in which the system’s inputs (dissatisfaction with major parties 
and issue salience) are transformed into an output (non-major party formation and non-major party 
electoral support). The system’s response characteristics can be obtained when numeric values are as­
signed to its constants and the characteristics of its input terms are specifies. Accordingly, let 
a=.l 
Y=.2 
h=.2
£/ (£ )= / 0 if*=0
1 \ 1  for all other k
£/(*)= J O  if£=0
2 \  1 for all other k
(3.16)
Equation (3.16) indicates that partisan attachment to major parties is great (ninety percent of voters 
identify with one of the major parties) and that the strength and durability of any change in vote choice 
from the major parties to a non-major party is relatively low (.2, where 0 < y ^ l  and 0<X<1). Further, 
equation (3.16) indicates that Uj(k) and U2(k) are step inputs -  in other words, that voter dissatisfaction 
with major parties and the salience of a particular issue i is initially absent (k=0) and subsequently present 
(k > 0) and constant at the value of Uj = U2 = 1.
Secondly, let
a =.2
y=A
h=A
^  (*)=/? p=o1 L 1 for all other k
£/(*)= J O  i(k=0
2 \  1 for all other k
(3.17)
Equation (3.17) indicates that partisan attachment to major parties is low relative to equation (3.16) (with 
only eighty percent of voters identifying with one of the major parties) and that the strength and durability 
of any change in vote choice from the major parties to a non-major party is high relative to equation 
(3.16). Again, issue salience and voter dissatisfaction with the major parties is absent at k=0 and present 
(at the constant level of Uj = U2=l) at k>0.
Equation (3.18) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) under the conditions set out in 
equation (3.16). Equation (3.19) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) under the conditions 
set out in equation (3.17). (Appendix D sets out these mathematical derivations).
Y(k) = -18.42(.84)k + 1.29(.27)k + 16.70(l)k
k = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . .  (3.18)
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Y(k) = 15.0(.6)k -40.00(.8)k + 25.00(l)k k = 0 , 1,2, ...(3 .1 9 )
Figure 3-1: Non-Major Parly Formation
and Electoral Support in Response 
to Two Unit Step Inputs
-----  Equation (3.18)
----- Equation (3.19)
Time
Figure 3-1 plots equations (3.18) and (3.19). In each case, non-major party formation and electoral 
support is nil at k=0, increases rapidly at 0<k<10, and stabilises at k>10. Given the conditions set out in 
equations (3.16) and (3.17), the non-major party exists indefinitely. Figure 3-1 also indicates that the 
lower the level of partisan identification with major parties, and the stronger and the more durable the 
response to the non-major party, the greater is non-major party formation and support: for all k, equation 
(3.19) >(3.18).
The indefinite presence of voter dissatisfaction with major parties and issue salience thus cause the 
indefinite presence of non-major party formation and support. However, equation (3.15) indicates that 
non-major party longevity does not require sustained levels of both inputs. Let 
a= .l
y=-2 
h=. 2
U (k)=S  0 if£=0
1 \  1 for all other k
U (k)—S  1 if£=0
2{ ) \ 0  for all other k
(3.20)
With respect to the values of the constants, equations (3.16) and (3.20) are identical. With respect to the 
second input term, however, equations (3.16) and (3.20) differ. Uj(k) (voter dissatisfaction with major 
parties) remains a step input -  absent at k=0 and present at a constant level at loO. U2(k) (issue salience), 
however, is a Kronecker Delta input -  present at k=0 and absent at k>0. Equation (3.20) thus describes a
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Situation in which the partisan attachment to the major parties is relatively high, the response to non­
major parties is relatively low, voter dissatisfaction with major parties is continuously present at k=0 but 
issue salience is absent after k=0.
Secondly, let
a=.2
y=A
X=.4
£/ (*)=J o  if*=0
1 \  1 for all other k
U (lc)=f  1 if£=0
2 \  0 for all other k
(3.21)
With respect to the values of constant terms, equations (3.21) and (3.17) are identical. With respect to 
input terms, equations (3.21) and (3.20) are identical. Equation (3.21) thus describes a situation in which 
partisan attachment to the major parties is relatively low, the response to major parties is relatively high, 
voter dissatisfaction with the major parties is present at k>0 and issue salience is absent at k>0.
Equation (3.22) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) to the conditions described in 
equation (3.20). Equation (3.23) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) to the conditions 
described in equation (3.21).
Y(k) = -7.46(.84)k -1.09(.27)k + 8.56(l)k k=0 ,1 , 2 , . . .  (3.22)
Y(k) = 2.50(.6)k - 15.00(.8)k + 12.50(l)k k=0 ,1 , 2 , . . .  (3.23)
Figure 3-2: Non-Major Party Formation
and Electoral Support in Response 
to One Unit Step and One Kronecker Delta Input
20
Time
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Figure 3-2 plots equations (3.22) and (3.23). As in Figure 3-1, non-major party formation and support is 
0 at k=0, increases rapidly at 0<k<10, and stabilises at k>10. As in Figure 3-1, a relatively low level of 
partisan attachment to the major parties, together with a relatively strong and durable response to the 
non-major party, is associated with higher levels of non-major party formation support: for all k, (3.23) > 
(3.22). At the same time, however, Figure 3-2 conveys new information. Most importantly, as long as 
voter dissatisfaction with the major parties remains unabated -  even if the salience of the issue which 
engenders this dissatisfaction quickly dissipates -  the non-major party continues to exist indefinitely. 
However, the number of constituencies in which non-major party candidates are present, as well as the 
non-major party’s percentage share of the total vote in these constituencies, is lower when the non-major 
party is sustained only by voter dissatisfaction with major parties than when it is is sustained by both 
voter dissatisfaction and issue salience: for all k, (3.22) < (3.18) and (3.23) < (3.19). Studies of non-major 
parties [i.e., (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984); (Pinard, 1975); (Mazmanian, 1974) anticipate neither 
of these findings.
Nor do these studies do not explicitly address the process of non-major party dissolution. Equation 
(3.15), however, provides insight into this process. Let
a=.l
Y=.2
k =.2
U (lc)=S 1 if£=0
^  \ 0  for all other k
U (k)=S  1 if£=0
\ 0  for all other k
(3.24)
and let
a =.2
y=A
h=A
U (lc)=f 1 if&=0 
^  ’ \ 0  for all other k
II (k)=S  1 if£=0
\  0 for all other k
(3.25)
In terms of the value of its constants, equation (3.24) is equivalent to equations (3.16) and (3.20) -- the 
partisan attachment to the major parties is relatively strong and the strength and durability of any change 
in vote choice towards a non-major party is relatively low. In terms of the value of its constants, equation
(3.25) is equivalent to equations (3.17) and (3.21) -  the partisan attachment to major parties is relatively 
weak and the strength and durability of any change in vote choice towards a non-major party is relatively 
great. Input terms, however, distinguish equations (3.24) and (3.25) -  both describe situations in which 
issue salience and voter dissatisfaction with major parties is initially (at k=0) present and subsequently (at 
k>0) absent.
Equation (3.26) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) to the conditions specified in 
equation (3.24); equation (3.27) gives the response characteristics of equation (3.15) to the conditions 
specified in equation (3.25).
Y(k) = 3.51(.84)k -3.5l(.27)k
Y(k) = -10.00(.6)k +10.00(.8)k
k=0,1,2,. ..(3.26) 
k=0,1,2,. ..(3.27)
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Figure 3-3: Non-Major Party Formation, Electoral Support 
and Dissolution in Response to Two Kronecker 
Delta Inputs
Equation (3.26) 
Equation (3.27)
Figure 3-3 plots equations (3.26) and (3.27). Each equation indicates that non-major party formation 
and support is nil at k=0, increases rapidly at 0 < £ < 4 , and declines (somewhat less rapidly) at k>4. 
Figure 3-3, in short, indicates that if issue salience and voter dissatisfaction with major parties disappears, 
so too does the non-major party and its electoral support. Once again, however, the lower the level of 
attachment to the major parties, and the stronger and more durable the response to the non-major parties, 
the greater is non-major party formation and support: for all k, equation (3.21) > (3.24). Non-major party 
dissolution is therefore contingent upon the disappearance, not merely the attenuation, of voter dissatis­
faction with major parties. Again, studies of non-major parties (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984); 
(Pinard, 1975); (Mazmanian, 1974) do not anticipate this result.
3.1.4. Hypotheses
A more complete and more precise set of hypotheses emerges from this formalisation and analysis:
• The simultaneous appearance of both voter dissatisfaction with major parties and an 
economic issue whose salience attains crisis proportions causes non-major party formation 
and non-major party electoral support.
• Factors which are unrelated to voter dissatisfaction with major parties and this salient issue 
are unrelated to non-major party formation and electoral support.
• The non-major party’s electoral support is drawn from voters who are dissatisfied with one or 
the other or both of the major parties. Initially, at k=0 (i.e., in the absence of a non-major 
party alternative), dissatisfied voters abstain from electoral participation; subsequently, at 
k>0 (given the presence of a non-major party alternative), dissatisfied voters support the 
non-major party. A negative relationship therefore exists between voter turnout at election 
and non-major party support is negative.
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• The continued presence over time of both voter dissatisfaction with major parties and an 
economic issue whose salience attains crisis proportions causes the non-major party to exist 
indefinitely.
• In the event that voter dissatisfaction with major parties continues and the salience of the 
economic issue disappears, the non-major party will continue to exist and to receive electoral 
support. The number of constituencies in which it fields candidates, as well as its electoral 
support in these constituencies, will be lower than if both voter dissatisfaction with the major 
parties and the crisis-laden issue continue to exist.
• If both voter dissatisfaction with the major parties and the issue whose salience attains crisis 
proportions disappear, the non-major party ceases to receive electoral support and therefore 
ceases to field candidates.
3.2. Agrarian Party Formation, Electoral Support and Dissolution
Section 3.1 analysed the relationship between voter dissatisfaction with major parties, an economic 
issue whose salience attains crisis proportions and the formation, electoral support and dissolution of 
non-major parties. This section applies this theory to a specific set of events -  the formation, in the years 
immediately after the First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand; the 
rapid dissolution, in these years, of the Canadian Progressive Party and the New Zealand Country Party; 
and the continued presence, to this day (although with a different name) of the Australian Country Party. 
Section 3.2.1 adds to IC.1-IC.4 two further initial conditions that specify economic behaviour and market 
structure in rural districts. Section 3.2.2 specifies the economic antecedents of rural voter dissatisfaction 
with major parties. Section 3.2.3 specifies the issue most directly responsible for agrarian party formation, 
electoral support and dissolution.
3.2.1. Further Initial Conditions
IC.1-IC.4 set out decision-rules which govern voter and party behaviour. IC.5 sets out the decision-rule
that governs the economic behaviour of primary producers:
IC.5 (Economic Behaviour): The primary producer is an income maximiser who, ceteris paribus, prefers 
a higher money income to a lower money income. An increase in income increases the primary producer’s 
utility (satisfaction) and a decrease in income decreases his utility. For this reason, primary producers 
attempt to maximise the income that they obtain from commodity production.
IC.6 specifies the structure of agricultural commodity markets:
IC.6 (Market Structure): Agricultural commodity markets are perfectly competitive markets (for an 
extended discussion, see (Stigler, 1957pp. 1-17):
1. Agricultural commodity producers are price-takers (i.e., no single commodity producer is 
able to influence the price of any commodity), and no actor (producer, government, party, 
etc) is able to influence consumer demand for agricultural commodities. The demand for 
agricultural commodities, in other words, is completely exogenous.
2. The output of any given commodity producer is in all respects identical to the output of all 
other producers.
3. Primary producers possess perfect and complete knowledge of input costs and commodity 
prices.
3.2.2. The Economic Antecedents of Rural Voter Dissatisfaction
The income received by agricultural commodity producers depends upon the total amount of money that 
consumers spend on agricultural commodities. A decrease in consumer expenditure on a particular com­
modity, for example, usually causes a decrease in the income of the producers of that commodity (Lipsey, 
1966p.l 16). The total amount of money that consumers spend on an agricultural commodity depends,
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among other things, upon the price of that commodity and consumers’ disposable income. For this reason, 
changes in consumer disposable income and in the price of agricultural commodities are important 
determinants of the incomes of primary producers. The elasticity of demand, rj, measures this relation­
ship. Price elasticity of demand refers to the percentage change in quantity demanded that is induced by a 
percentage change in price (holding income constant). Expressed more formally,
Similarly, income elasticity of demand refers to the percentage change in quantity demanded that is 
caused by a percentage change in disposable income (holding commodity price constant). Expressed 
more formally,
(3.28)
(for an overview of these concepts, see (Bodenhom, 1968pp.543-545). If a commodity’s income elasticity 
of demand is negative, consumers purchase less of a commodity as their income increases. If this income 
elasticity is positive (but less than unity), consumers purchase more of the commodity as their income 
increases, but spend a smaller proportion of their income on the commodity. If this income elasticity of 
demand is positive (and greater than unity) consumers spend a higher proportion of their increased 
income on the commodity.
q Ap Ap q
With respect to the price elasticity of demand, the terms of equation (3.27) can be re-arranged to yield
„ =
(3.29)
Equation (3.29) indicates that the price elasticity of demand consists in two distinct terms. The ratio of the 
change in quantity to the change in price, —, is related to the slope of the demand curve. The second term,
Ap 
p 
<7
is related to the point on the demand curve at which elasticity is estimated (Drummond,
1976pp. 140-150).
Figure 3 4  depicts the linear demand curve Dj. At all points along the curve, a ten-unit decrease in price 
augments quantity demanded by 40 units. The slope of the curve, is therefore -10/40, or -.25. Because
a constant (unit) change in price is associated with a constant (unit) change in quantity demanded at every 
point along the curve, Dj has a constant slope. Price elasticity of demand, however, does not remain 
constant. If price decreases from 90 to 80 units, price changes by [(-10/85)100], or by -11.8 percent. 
Quantity demanded increases by [(40/60)100], or by 66.6 percent. The price elasticity of demand, there­
fore, is 66.6/-11.8, or -5.6. This elasticity obtains only at this point on Dj. If price declines from 20 to 10, 
for example, prices changes by [(-10/15)100], or by 66.6 percent, quantity demanded increases by 
[(40/340)100], or 11.8 percent, and the elasticity of demand is 11.8/-66.6, or -0.177.
By definition, therefore, price elasticity of demand cannot remain constant at different points along a 
linear demand curve. Although the numerator of each price-ratio calculation (as well as the numerator of 
each quantity-ratio calculation) remains constant, the denominator changes. Percentage changes in price 
grow steadily larger as the absolute level of price declines. Similarly, percentage changes in quantity 
demanded grow steadily smaller as quantity demanded increases in absolute magnitude. More formally,
Generalisation 1: The elasticity of a downward-sloping linear demand curve varies from °° at the vertical 
(price) axis to zero at the horizontal (quantity) axis (Lipsey, 1966p.l23).
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Figure 3-4: Price Elasticity and the Slope 
of a Straight-Line Demand Curve
P (dollars)
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Source: Drummond (1976:150).
It follows that parallel shifts of a straight-line demand curve decrease the price elasticity of demand (at 
each price) when the curve shifts outward, and increase the price elasticity of demand when the curve 
shifts inward. Figure 3-4 also illustrates this result. The demand curves Dj and D2 are parallel. The slope 
of each, therefore, is identical. Price elasticities at comparable ranges of each curve, however, differ: for 
D2, if price decreases from 90 to 80 units, price continues to change by [(-10/85)100], or by -11.8 percent. 
Quantity demanded, however, changes by [(40/460)100], or by 8.7 percent, so that the price elasticity of 
demand is 8.7/-11.8, or -0.739 — compared to -5.3 in Dj. Hence,
Generalisation 2: Given two downward-sloping linear demand curves with the same slope, the one 
farther from the origin is less elastic at each price than the one closer to the origin (Lipsey, 1966p.l23).
The magnitude of t| falls into one of three categories (Ferguson, 1972pp.99-100). If r\ > 1, demand is 
elastic, and a given percentage change in price induces a greater percentage change in quantity demanded. 
A small change in price will thus cause a much more significant change in quantity demanded. If T| =  1, 
demand has unit (or unitary) elasticity, meaning that a given percentage change in price induces an 
equivalent percentage change in quantity demanded. If r| < 1, demand is inelastic, and a given percentage 
change in price induces a smaller percentage change in quantity demanded. Even a relatively large price 
change will thus induce only a small change in quantity demanded.
The price elasticity of demand indicates how total revenue (i.e., income) received from the sale of a 
commodity changes in response to a change in price. Figure 3-5 illustrates this relationship. Total 
revenue (income) from the sale of a commodity at any price Pj corresponds to the area piqi under the 
demand curve. Total revenue received from the sale of the commodity at price pj, for example, is p ^ j .  
Total revenue changes in response to a change in price. In the elastic portion of the demand curve, a 
decrease in price is associated with an increase in total revenue (the area of p3q3 < p2q2). 1° the inelastic
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Figure 3-5: Total Revenue and the Price
Elasticity of a Straight-Line Demand Curve
> -  Q
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portion of the demand curve, however, a decrease in price is associated with a decline in total revenue 
(Pjqj < p2q2). Total revenue is thus maximised at the price at which T| = 1. Hence,
Generalisation 3:
1. If I T) I > 1, a decrease in price induces an increase in quantity demanded that is sufficient to 
increase the total revenue (income) received from the sale of a commodity. Conversely, an 
increase in price induces a decrease in quantity demanded that is sufficient to decrease the 
total revenue (income) received from the sale of a commodity.
2. If I T| I = 1, a change in price induces a change in quantity demanded; the extent of this 
change, however, does not alter the total revenue (income) obtained from the sale of the 
commodity.
3. If I r\ I < 1, a decrease in price induces such a small increase in quantity demanded that the 
total revenue (income) received from the sale of the commodity decreases. Conversely, an 
increase in price induces such a small decrease in quantity demanded that the total revenue 
(income) received from the sale of the commodity increases.
Table 3-1: The Characteristics of the Per Capita 
Demand Function, Sugar, United States, 1875-1936
Year Price Per Capita Price R2
(Cents) Consumption Elasticity
(Deflated) (Lbs) (ai&
1875-1895 -2.2758 0.7900 -0.3970 .9526
(0.7297) (0.2123) (0.1580)
1896-1914 4.4810 1.0558 -0.3613 .9876
(0.7719) (0.1623) (0.0780)
1921-1929 -7.0589 0.0969 -0.3060 .9448
(1.7108) (0.0337) (0.1038)
1922-1936 -6.0294 -0.4217 -.2416 .9145
(1.3334) (.2685) (.0964)
N.B.: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Schultz (1957:177-233)
Table 3-1, which sets out the parameters of demand for sugar between 1875 and 1936, corroborates 
these results. The figures in column 2 (price in cents) measure the slope of the demand curve for sugar at 
selected sub-periods. They indicate that between 1875 and 1895 a decline of one cent in the real 
(deflated) price of sugar, other things being equal, was associated with an increase of 2.2758 pounds in 
annual per capita consumption. But other things did not remain equal. Most notably, the demand curve 
did not remain stationär)'. The figures in column 3 (per capita consumption) estimate the rate at which 
demand shifted over time. Between 1875 and 1895 per capita quantity demanded increased (as a result of 
changes in taste and other factors) at the rate of .7900 pounds per annum. Consumers, in short, demanded 
greater amounts of sugar at the same (deflated) price, or were willing to pay a higher price for an 
equivalent quantity demanded. Finally, the figures in column 4 (which estimate this commodity’s price 
elasticity of demand at the mean price within each sub-period) indicate that (holding the position of the 
demand curve constant) a one percent decrease in price is associated with an increase of .3970 percent in 
quantity demanded.
Table 3-1 indicates that the demand for sugar changed in important respects after 1895. (1) The slope of 
the demand curve increased: a decrease of one (deflated) cent per pound in the price of sugar, other things
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being equal, was associated with an increase of 4.4810 pounds (1896-1914) and 7.0589 pounds 
(1921-1929) in annual per capita consumption. (2) Demand continued to expand until the eve of the First 
World War; thereafter, annual per capita consumption reached its apex, and the curve remained virtually 
stationary. Indeed, it began to shift downward during the 1920s. This development suggests that, in the 
years immediately following the First World War,
the average consumer no longer bought increased quantities of sugar from one year to the next [even if 
price remained constant], and that producers could no longer count on an increased per capita consumption 
unless prices were reduced or unless new uses for sugar were found. This fact loomed large behind many of 
the difficulties which confronted producers since the [First World] War. (Schultz, 1957pp.229-230).
Table 3-2: Elasticities of Demand 
at Selected Points on the Demand Curve, 
Sugar, 1875-1895
Year
Elasticity at Price: 
5.718 8.319 11.566
1875 -.26 -.43 -.72
1885 -.22 -.36 -.59
1895 -.20 -.31 -.49
Source: Schultz (1957:177-233)
Table 3-2, which lists price elasticities of demand for sugar, sets out the consequences of changes in 
consumer demand upon producers’ incomes. Listed in the table are price elasticities of demand for sugar 
at the lowest observed price (5.718 cents per pound), the mean price (8.319 cents per pound) and the 
highest observed price (11.566 cents per pound) between 1875 and 1895. These figures are consistent 
with the expectations of micro-economic theory. Movement along the demand curve, from a higher to a 
lower price (i.e., reading from right to left across the table) reduces price elasticity of demand. Further, 
an upward shift of demand to a higher quantity demanded at the same price (i.e., reading down the table) 
also attenuates the price elasticity of demand. Both results indicate that the demand for this commodity 
was inelastic and that it grew more inelastic over time.
Three results emerge from an analysis of Tables 3-1 and 3-2. First, between 1875 and 1936 a decrease 
in the price of sugar decreased the incomes sugar producers. Secondly, as time passed an equivalent 
percentage decrease in the price of this commodity caused an ever-greater percentage decrease in the 
incomes of sugar producers. Finally, and most importantly, this phenomenon became particularly marked 
in the years immediately following the First World War.
Chapter 1 observed that in these years (1) producers of primary commodities faced unprecedented 
economic difficulties; that (2) these difficulties were particularly acute for countries whose primary 
commodities figured prominently in international trade and whose principal export market was the United 
Kingdom, and therefore that (3) pressure to adjust primary production to new market conditions was 
particularly acute in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Chapter 1 therefore suggested that the common 
pattern of agrarian politics in Britain’s Dominions in these years might have stemmed the pattern of 
primary commodity consumption in Britain (and that agrarian party formation and electoral support in 
these countries was a local response to more universal economic phenomena).
Table 3-3 sets out characteristics of primary commodity consumption in Britain between 1921 and
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Table 3-3: Selected Price and Income Elasticities, 
United Kingdom, 1921-1935
Commodity Elasticity Elasticity
(Income) (Price)
Bread (Wheat) -0.05(± 0.04) -0.08(± 0.07)
Mutton, Lamb (Imported) 0.70(± 0.12) -0.70(± 0.43)
Beef (Imported) 0.34(± 0.06) -0.46(± 0.45)
Vegetables 0.93(± 0.14) -0.96(± 0.41)
Apples 1.33(± 0.21) -1.16(± 0.69)
Oranges 0.92(± 0.17) -0.93(± 0.29)
Source: Stone (1954:322-327).
1935. Listed in the table are price- and income-elasticities for three groups of commodities (grains, meats 
and fruits and vegetables). It demonstrates that these commodities’ price and income elasticities of 
demand varied considerably -- and therefore that, depending on the composition of his output, the impact 
of a decline in commodity price upon a producers’ income also varied considerably. In terms of its 
income elasticity of demand, grain was an inferior good: during these years an increase of one percent in 
disposable income in Britain was associated with a decrease of 0.150 percent in the quantity demanded of 
this commodity. Conversely, fruits and vegetables were normal or superior goods: during the inter-war 
years British consumers demanded more fruits and vegetables in response to an increase in disposable 
income [see also (Wold and Jureen, 1952); (Fox, 1958)]. Changes in quantity demanded (induced by an 
increase in disposable income) thus exerted a harsh impact upon grain growers and a favourable impact 
upon fruit and vegetable growers.
Price elasticities of demand re-inforce this result Demand for grain and beef was most inelastic. A 
decrease in grain and beef prices therefore had adverse consequence for grain and beef producers’ 
incomes. Conversely, demand for other commodities, such as fruits and vegetables, mutton and dairy 
products, was far more price elastic. In consequence, a reduction in the price of these commodities had a 
negligible or a beneficial impact upon the producers of these commodities. Indeed, a decline in fruit 
prices augments the income of fruit growers. An identical (percentage) decrease in the price of grain and 
beef and fruits and vegetables thus exerted an opposite impact upon the income of producers of these two 
groups of commodities.
Hypotheses
The analysis undertaken in this section indicates that an equivalent change in the price of two primary 
commodities may bear an opposite impact upon the income of a primary producer. The direction and 
magnitude of the resultant change in his income depends upon the direction and magnitude of each 
commodity’s price elasticity of demand and upon the importance of each commodity relative to his total 
commodity output. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the price of a price-inelastic commodity decreases the 
incomes of producers of that commodity. The greater the extent to which a commodity producer produces 
price-inelastic commodities, the more his income decreases in response to a decline in the price of such a 
commodity. Conversely, a decrease in the price of a price-elastic commodity increases the incomes of 
producers of that commodity. The greater the extent to a commodity producer produces price-elastic 
commodities, the more his income increases in response to a decrease in the price of such a commodity.
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IC.5-IC.6 indicated that a decrease in the price of one or more commodities and a decrease in 
consumers’ disposable income causes economic dissatisfaction among primary producers. It follows from 
IC.5-IC.6 that parties cannot alleviate or rectify this dissatisfaction, and from IC.3 that parties will ignore 
or obfuscate primary producers’ economic dissatisfaction. Following IC.2, primary producers’ dissatis­
faction with their income is readily transformed into voter dissatisfaction with the major parties.
If non-major party formation and electoral support is caused by voter dissatisfaction with major parties 
(Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984); (Pinard, 1975); (Mazmanian, 1974), then agrarian party formation 
and electoral support is caused by the rural voter dissatisfaction which is engendered by a decline in the 
price of price-inelastic agricultural commodities:
• In any given rural locality, the greater the extent to which primary producers’ income 
declines in response to a decline in commodity price (i.e., the greater the production of 
price-inelastic agricultural commodities), the greater the voter dissatisfaction with major 
parties, the greater the likelihood (given the presence of an economic issue whose salience 
attains crisis proportions) that an agrarian party candidate will appear in the locality and the 
greater the agrarian party’s percentage share of the locality’s total vote.
• Voter dissatisfaction with major parties is most pronounced among the producers of price- 
inelastic commodities. The presence of agrarian party candidates and the percentage share of 
the agrarian party vote is therefore most closely associated with the production of price- 
inelastic commodities (most notably grain and beef).
• Voter dissatisfaction with major parties is absent among the producers of price elastic com­
modities. The presence of agrarian party candidates and the percentage share of the agrarian 
party vote is negatively associated with the production of price-elastic commodities (most 
notably fruits and vegetables, dairy products and sheep).
3.23 . Economic Adjustment and Agrarian Voter Dissatisfaction
Consumer demand for agricultural commodities is not the sole determinant of a primary producer’s 
income. Nor is a reduction in consumer expenditure on agricultural commodities the only force which 
exerts downward pressure upon a primary producer’s income. Adjustments undertaken by commodity 
producers in response to changes in commodity price and consumer demand for agricultural commodities 
are also important determinants of farm income. Optimal adjustment to changes in consumer demand 
maximises the total revenue obtained from production, minimises the total costs of production and 
thereby maximises the profit (income) derived from production. Sub-optimal adjustment to changes in 
consumer demand neither maximises total revenue nor minimises total cost — and thereby maintains or 
re-inforces downward pressure on income. In order to maximise total revenue, producers must optimally 
adjust the quantity and the composition of output. In order to minimise total costs, they must adjust the 
composition and quantity of resources (land, capital and labour) employed in production.
Maximisation of total revenue requires that the quantity of output be set at a level where the marginal 
cost of production is equal to the marginal revenue obtained from production (Due and Clower, 
1961pp. 185-195); (Ferguson and Gould, 1975p.231). Figure 3-6 illustrates this result. Given price con­
ditions represented by pand cost conditions represented by MC, the profit-maximising short-run equi­
librium obtains at E, which corresponds to q units of output. At levels of output less than q (e.g., qe), 
marginal revenue (c^B) exceeds marginal cost (qeA). A marginal increase in output therefore increases 
total revenue more than total cost and thereby increases profit. As long as marginal revenue exceeds 
marginal cost, an increase in output increases profit. Conversely, at levels of output greater than q(e.g., 
qu, marginal cost (quF) exceeds marginal revenue (quC). An increase in output increases total cost more 
than total revenue and thereby decreases profit. As long as marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue, an 
increase in output decreases profit.
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Figure 3-6: The Optimum Level of 
Commodity Output
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Figure 3-7: Producer Income at the
Optimum Level of Commodity Output
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At this optimum level of output, the numeric difference between commodity price and average total 
(unit) cost determines the absolute magnitude of profit or loss. If price is greater than the unit cost of 
production, a short-run profit results. If unit cost exceeds price, a short-run loss is incurred (Ferguson, 
1972p.266). Figure 3-7 illustrates two aspects of this relationship. (1) (Within the inelastic portion of the 
demand curve) a decline in commodity price decreases producers’ total revenue and thereby decreases 
their margin of profit. At price p l5 for example, short-run equilibrium obtains at units of output. At this 
level of output, total revenue is equal to the area of the rectangle OqjCpj and total cost is equal to OqjEF. 
Profit (the excess of total revenue over total cost) is therefore equal to CEFpj. At price p2, short-run 
equilibrium obtains at q2 units of output. Here, cost (Oq2AG) exceeds revenue (Oq2Bp2) and a loss of 
p2GAB is incurred. For this reason, a decline in total revenue in response to a decline in commodity price 
provides an incentive to adjust the composition of commodity output away from price-inelastic com­
modities and towards price-elastic commodities.
(2) A decrease in the marginal cost of agricultural production also increases producers’ total revenue 
and thereby increases the profitability of their operations. Under price conditions represented by pj, for 
example, the lower the marginal cost and average total cost of production the smaller the area of OqjEF 
and the larger the area of CEFpj. Clearly, therefore, there exists an incentive to decrease the marginal cost 
of commodity production.
Primary producers can decrease the marginal cost of production by adjusting (1) the composition and 
(2) the quantity of the inputs (land, capital and labour) employed in production. Adjustment (1) requires 
that more productive (and/or less expensive) inputs be substituted for less productive (and/or dearer) 
inputs. Typically, and throughout most of the twentieth century, this adjustment has entailed mechanisa­
tion — the substitution of capital for labour (Schultz, 1945); (Schultz, 1953); (Heady, 1965). Adjustment 
(2) requires that greater quantities of capital and labour be applied to Fixed quantities of land.
Hypotheses
This section indicates that adjustments undertaken by primary producers in response to changes in 
commodity price and the demand for particular agricultural commodities are also important determinants 
of income. Initial conditions suggest that sub-optimal adjustment in response to price changes engenders 
economic dissatisfaction among producers and that economic dissatisfaction is transformed into rural 
voter dissatisfaction -  and that, given an economic issue whose salience attains crisis proportions, it is 
transformed into agrarian party formation and electoral support. This study therefore hypothesises that
• The less primary producers in a rural district can adjust the composition of output from price- 
and income-inelastic to price- and income-elastic commodities, the less income they receive 
from the sale of their output, the greater their economic dissatisfaction, the greater their 
dissatisfaction with major parties — and hence the more conducive the district to agrarian 
party formation and agrarian party electoral support.
• The less primary producers in a rural district can (in response to a decrease in commodity 
price) decrease the output of price-inelastic commodities and increase the output of price- 
elastic commodities, the less income they receive from the sale of their output, the greater 
their economic dissatisfaction, the greater their dissatisfaction with major parties — and hence 
the more conducive the district to agrarian party formation and agrarian party electoral 
support.
• The more (less) primary producers in a rural district can reduce the amount of labour and 
increase the amount of capital (machinery) employed in production, the more (less) income 
they receive from the sale of their output, the less (greater) their economic dissatisfaction, the 
less (greater) their dissatisfaction with major parties — and hence the less (more) conducive 
the district to agrarian party formation and electoral support. A negative relationship thus 
exists between mechanisation and agrarian party formation and agrarian party electoral sup­
port.
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3.2.4. The Commodity Price Collapse of 1921-1922
Section 3.1 hypothesised that non-major party formation and electoral support is a function of two 
inputs: (1) voter dissatisfaction with major parties and (2) an economic issue whose salience to voters 
attains crisis proportions. Section 3.2.2 defined rural voter dissatisfaction with major parties in terms of 
the response of producers’ incomes to changes in commodity price. It implicitly identified the level of 
commodity price as the economic issue which engenders agrarian party formation and electoral support. 
This section specifies the conditions under which the salience of the level of commodity price to rural 
voters attains crisis proportions.
Figure 3-7 demonstrated that a commodity producer’s profit or loss is equal (at the equilibrium level of 
output) to the numeric difference between commodity price and the average total (unit) cost of produc­
tion. If commodity price is greater than the unit cost of production, a short-term profit obtains; if unit cost 
exceeds price, a short-term loss is incurred. Figure 3-8 extends and elaborates this analysis. It indicates 
that, given certain adverse price conditions, the producer loses less by continuing production than by 
ceasing production. Specifically, as long as total revenue exceeds total variable cost (as distinguished 
from total fixed cost) at the equilibrium level of output, losses are minimised by continuing production 
(Ferguson and Gould, 1975p.234).
At price Pj, for example, short-term equilibrium obtains at B, which corresponds to qj units of output. 
Here, the producer loses AB dollars per unit of output; nonetheless, average variable costs of production 
are met — indeed, because the average variable cost of variable inputs is q2C dollars per unit, and the 
price of output is qjB dollars per unit, an excess of BC dollars per unit emerges from production. This 
excess can be applied to fixed costs. As a result, not all of the fixed costs (qjC) are lost, as would result if 
production were halted. The total loss sustained is therefore smaller than that associated with nil output. 
At price p2, however, average variable exceeds marginal revenue. Here, producers lose not only fixed 
costs: they also lose EF dollars per unit in variable cost. Thus, when commodity price falls below the 
average variable cost of commodity production, short-term equilibrium output is nil (i.e., income- 
maximising commodity producers cease production).
Producers must either subsist on past earnings or transfer resources out of agriculture when agricultural 
commodity prices decline below the average variable cost of production. It is thus under these cir­
cumstances that the political salience of agricultural commodity prices attains crisis proportions: it is 
under these circumstances, in other words,, that rural economic dissatisfaction, rural voter dissatisfaction 
with major parties -  and hence agrarian party formation and electoral support -- occurs.
Figure 3-9 plots Australian and Canadian price indices for the commodities hypothesised in section
3.2.2 to be associated most closely with agrarian party formation and electoral support.20 It indicates that 
the price of agricultural commodities was most likely to decline below the average variable cost of 
production (and therefore that the price of price-inelastic commodities was most likely to be a salient 
political issue) in the years immediately after the First World War. Between 1919 and 1921, the price 
index of Canadian wheat declined 65.82 percent (from 3485 to 1191); between 1920 and 1922, the price 
index of Australian meat declined 45.50 percent (from 3279 to 1787) and that of Australian wheat fell
28.02 percent (from 2480 to 1758). The price of these commodities fell more precipitously in these years 
than during the depths of the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1931, the price index of Canadian 
wheat fell 63.80 percent (from 1544 to 559); that of Australian meat fell by 32.86 percent (from 2246 to 
1508) and that of Australian wheat fell by 20.80 percent (from 1803 to 1428). This study therefore
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Figure 3-8: Commodity Price and the
Average Variable Cost of Production
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Figure 3-9: Australian and Canadian
Price Indices, Wheat and Meat, 1910-1940
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Year
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Source: Australia (1920-1940); Canada (1920-1940).
hypothesises that agricultural commodity prices declined below the average variable cost of production 
(and therefore that conditions were conducive to agrarian party formation and electoral support) during 
these years.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses set out in section 3.1 may, following the analyses undertaken in section 3.2, be more 
precisely specified:
• The simultaneous appearance of a decrease in producer income in response to a decrease in 
commodity price and a decrease in commodity price below the average variable cost of 
production causes agrarian party formation and agrarian party electoral support.
• The agrarian party is an economic entity: non-economic variables, such as religious and 
occupational variables, are unrelated to agrarian party formation and agrarian party electoral 
support.
• Following equations (3.22) and (3.23) and Figure 3-2, a subsequent recovery of commodity 
price above the average variable cost of production, together with the continued presence of 
rural voter dissatisfaction with major parties, reduces (but does not eliminate) the number of 
constituencies with an agrarian party candidate and the agrarian party’s percentage share of 
the total vote.
• Following equations (3.24) and (3.25) and Figure 3-3, a subsequent recovery of commodity 
price above the average variable cost of production, together with the disappearance of rural 
voter dissatisfaction with major parties, causes agrarian party dissolution.
3.3. Summary
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"Instrumentalist" theories are judged according to the extent to which they satisfy the purpose(s) for 
which they are designed and whether they perform better than alternate theories (see Appendix C). "All 
theories, by their very' nature, are no more than approximations of the phenomena under consideration; 
being approximations, they are obviously false in some absolute sense. The relevant question, however, 
addresses the extent to which [a theory] is a good enough approximation to be useful for the purpose for 
which it was designed" (Davis, 1969p.31); (Friedman, 1953). The theory which was formulated in this 
chapter attempts to account for the formation, in the years immediately following the First World War, of 
agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand; the rapid dissolution, in these years, of the 
Canadian Progressive Party and the New Zealand Country Party; and the continued presence, to this day 
(although with a different name) of the Australian Country Party. This theory attempts, in other words, to 
resolve the problem for research formulated in Chapter 1.
For this purpose, this theory is more suitable than the interpretations assessed in Chapter 2. It specifies 
the timing of agrarian party formation and source of agrarian party electoral support and dissolution in 
greater detail than competing interpretations. Most importantly, by hypothesising that agrarian party 
formation, electoral support and dissolution is a logical consequence of rational behaviour in political and 
economic markets, it possesses what, according to Davis, is "the first essential for every useful theory. It 
is capable of being [empirically] contradicted. Not all theories have this attribute" (Davis, 1969p.23).
Chapter 4 describes the research techniques and data which are required in order to corroborate this 
theory’s propositions.
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Chapter 4
Data and Research Techniques
Chapter 3 set out a theory of non-major and agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. 
This theory, which analysed the impact of agricultural economic stimuli upon voter behaviour in rural 
areas, relates closely to a major concern of current research in political science: the imputed relationship 
between economic stimuli and voter behaviour has, in recent years, spawned a large number of 
"econometric" analyses of voter behaviour. These analyses pose important questions and produce sugges­
tive (if partial and limited) results. In consequence, "it is widely accepted that the economy does influence 
voting. [However], there is far less certainty concerning the degree, constancy or nature of this influence" 
(Monroe, 1979p.l56).
This chapter evaluates these econometric studies. In so doing, it identifies the data, statistical models 
and estimation techniques which are required in order to evaluate this study’s empirical propositions.
4.1. Econometric Analyses of Voter Behaviour
Econometric analyses of voter behaviour construct, estimate and evaluate statistical models of the 
relationship between economic conditions and voter behaviour. The notion that economic conditions 
influence voting invites a wide range of potential research hypotheses (Frey and Schneider, 1978). 
However, as a result of the influence of Goodhart and Bhansali, Kramer and Mueller -- the First sys­
tematic econometric analyses of electoral behaviour---- the focus of inquiry has narrowed considerably
(Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970); (Kramer, 1971); (Mueller, 1970). Accordingly, this literature tests the 
hypothesis that when economic conditions improve (deteriorate), voters give greater (less) electoral 
support to the incumbent party (Paldham, 1981pp.l83-184); (Budge, 1983pp.l-7); (Lewis-Beck, 1984); 
(Frey and Schneider, 1982); (Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984p.370).21
4.1.1. Initial Conditions
Two sets of contentions underlie this hypothesis. (1) These studies typically argue that personal 
economic self-interest is an important determinant of voter behaviour and therefore that changes in 
personal economic well-being influence vote choice (Kramer, 1971); (Hibbs, 1977); (Hibbs, 1979); 
(Weatherford, 1983); (Feldman, 1984). These studies contend, in other words, that voters are rational 
actors,22 that each major party is equally susceptible to the electoral effects of fluctuations in economic 
conditions, and that there are no sub-national (local, provincial or regional) variations in economic 
conditions. They also contend that the influence of economic conditions on voter behaviour is continuous 
over time, that their magnitude is constant and that their impact is felt equally by all voters (Kramer, 
1983).
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(2) In particular, these studies argue that personal economic well-being is influenced first and foremost 
by the government’s (incumbent party’s) economic policies, that the government’s macro-economic 
policies bear most directly upon personal economic well-being and that voters respond to short-term 
fluctuations in leading macro-economic indicators (income, inflation and unemployment) (Hibbs, 1987); 
(Whiteley, 1984); (Whiteley, 1986); (Pissarides, 1980).23 The government’s macro-economic policies, in 
other words, determine levels of income, inflation and unemployment and for this reason voters hold the 
government responsible for these conditions (Paldham, 1981p. 183). These studies therefore test the 
hypothesis that an increase in inflation and unemployment (or a decrease in real income) prompts a 
decline in the incumbent party’s electoral support and an increase in the opposition’s electoral support, 
and that a decrease in inflation and unemployment (or an increase in real income) causes an increase in 
the incumbent’s electoral support (Arcelus and Meitzer, 1975p. 1232).
A very different set of initial conditions underlies the propositions set out in Chapter 3. This study 
hypothesises that personal economic well-being in rural areas is not influenced by the incumbent party’s 
macro-economic policies; rather, it is influenced first and foremost by m/cro-economic developments 
which major parties can neither control nor influence. Further, under normal circumstances rural voters 
choose between the two major parties; however, when adverse economic conditions engender dissatis­
faction with one or the other (or both) of the major parties, rural voters choose between their "most 
favoured" major party and a non-major party alternative.
This study also hypothesises that voters in rural areas respond to both long-term and short-term changes 
in micro-economic conditions (i.e., to changes in both consumer demand for agricultural commodities 
and to reductions in commodity prices below the average variable cost of production). Finally, it 
hypothesises that the influence of agricultural economic stimuli on electoral behaviour in rural districts is 
sporadic (discontinuous), that its magnitude is variable and that its impact is not felt equally by all 
primary producers.
4.1.2. The Model
Most econometric analyses construct an additive and linear model of voter behaviour.24 The incumbent 
party’s percentage share of the vote is represented by the function
j',=ß0+ß1r+8,(ß2+ß3F(+ß4p,+ß5(c/,)+ß6vp+£.
t = 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 . . . .  (4.1)
where
• Yt represents the incumbent party’s percentage share of the major party (or, in some studies, 
total) vote in congressional/parliamentary elections held at time t. (Econometric studies of 
electoral behaviour thus ignore the impact of economic conditions on non-major party for­
mation, electoral support and dissolution).25
• ß0 is a constant which represents the incumbent’s "normal" vote (the "baseline" vote around 
which short-run forces, such as economic conditions, cause the observed vote to fluctuate) 
(Tufte, 1975pp.812-26).
• T represents the effect of time (the temporal change in the electorate’s partisan preferences, 
net of economic influences) (Fair, 1978); (Fair, 1982); (Fair, 1988).
• 8t is an incumbency index (in American studies, 8t = 1 if the President is a Republican and 8t 
= -1 if the President is a Democrat) (Bloom and Price, 1975p.l244).
• ß2 is a constant that represents the institutional (dis)advantage of incumbency.
• Yt is a measure of per capita personal income (real or deflated).
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• pt is a measure of the price level (consumer cost-of-living index).
• Ut is a measure of unemployment (as a fraction of the civilian labour force).
• V2 represents the "coat-tail" effect of the President’s popularity on the vote of his party’s 
congressional candidates (Goodharl and Bhansali, 1970); (Kramer, 1971).
• £ is a normally-distributed stochastic error term and
• the ßk are coefficients estimated from a set of data.
4.13 . Data
The initial conditions set out in section 2.1, together with the specification of Equation (4.1), heavily 
influence the choice of data employed in econometric analyses of voter behaviour. Macro-level variables 
require macro-level data: because Equation (4.1) relates macro-economic conditions (which are assumed 
not to vary sub-nationally) to electoral outcomes, econometric estimates of voter behaviour are derived 
from nationwide aggregates of income, inflation, unemployment and the incumbent party vote 
(Weatherford, 1983p. 158). With only three exceptions (Owens, 1984); (Owens and Olson, 1980); (Owens 
and Wade, 1988), all Anglo-American studies use national-level economic data as independent variables 
and nationally-aggregated electoral data (or a national sample of public opinion) as the dependent vari­
able.
Despite the fact that American congressional elections are intensely local in character (Mayhew, 1974); 
(Fenno, 1978); (Fiorina, 1978); (Mann, 1978); (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980), and that, in the United 
Kingdom, local and regional economic conditions vary substantially with respect to unemployment, 
inflation and real income (Madgewick and Rose, 1982); (McAllister and Rose, 1984); (Yantek, 1985), 
econometric studies analyse a general election involving hundreds of actual (constituency) elections as if 
it were a single national election (Owens and Wade, 1988p.31). These analyses thereby submerge sub­
national variations in economic conditions and electoral support in order to capture the effect of the 
government’s macro-economic policy on voting.
The estimation of Equation (4.1) also requires time-series data. By definition, macro-economic con­
ditions do not vary at a single point in time; rather, they vary over time. For this reason, econometric 
analyses of electoral behaviour are most frequently longitudinal analyses (analyses of aggregate economic 
conditions and national electoral outcomes over a long series of elections). Kramer, for example, analyses 
thirty-one of the thirty-five bi-annual United States House of Representatives elections between 1896 and 
1964 (Kramer, 1971); Mueller analyses monthly observations of presidential popularity in the United 
States from 1945 to 1969 (Mueller, 1970), and Goodhart and Bhansali analyse a monthly popularity 
series for parlies and party leadership in the United Kingdom from 1947 to 1968 (Goodhart and Bhansali, 
1970).
4.1.4. Findings
Econometric analyses of voter behaviour produce contradictory results.26 Some find unemployment, 
others inflation, some both (and others neither) as significant determinants of voter behaviour [for a 
review of findings, see (Budge, 1983pp.7-10); (Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984pp.375f)]. Some studies seem to 
provide strong evidence that voters respond to changes in economic conditions. Kramer’s seminal 
analysis, for example, concludes that short-term fluctuations in macro-economic indicators are "important 
influences on [American] congressional elections, with economic upturns helping congressional can-
62
didates of the incumbent party and economic decline benefitting the opposition" (Kramer, 
1971 pp. 140-141). Similarly, the findings of Goodman and Kramer are
broadly (though not completely) consistent with the notion that the electorate punishes the party in power 
according to its economic performance. To be sure, there is still substantial uncertainty about the detailed 
nature and magnitude of these effects; but on the basic question of whether such effects exist, it seems to us 
that the answer is clear: they do (Goodman and Kramer, 1975p.l264)27
Reviewing more recent works, Kiewiet and Rivers conclude that
the electoral fortunes of the incumbent president and congressional candidates of his party, as well as the 
president’s approval rating, are influenced by fluctuations in employment, prices and real output. Beyond 
documenting common sense, we now have a rough sense, at least, of the magnitude of the effects of real 
income fluctuations on voting (Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984p.374).
Other studies contest this conclusion. Arcelus and Meitzer, for example, find that
with the possible exception of inflation, aggregate economic variables affect neither the participation rate 
in congressional elections nor the relative strength of the two major parties. There is very little evidence 
that an incumbent president can affect the composition of the congress by measures that have short-term 
effects on unemployment or real income (Arcelus and Meitzer, 1975p. 1238j.28
Similarly, one of the most rigorous British studies concludes that
even during the period of unprecedented economic strife presided over by the Thatcher government, the 
state of the economy was not a systematic influence upon the public’s rating of the government (Yantek, 
1985p.482).
4.1.5. Assessment
Two sets of difficulties seem to produce these contradictory findings. First, and most importantly, these 
studies’ theoretical foundations are weak:
[They] offer many speculations but little theory (beyond the observation, agreed upon by all, that general 
economic conditions might somehow have an effect on some elections) that suggest specific hypotheses 
about which economic variables should be important or what kinds of time perspectives voters might use in 
evaluating the pre-election performance of the economy (Tufte, 1975p.816).
In consequence, the initial conditions which underlie these analyses are imprecise and possibly er­
roneous. For example, evidence does not (without careful qualification) sustain the contention that 
economic self-interest is an important determinant of vote choice at elections. In particular, (1) personal 
economic well-being does not continuously influence voter behaviour. Voting in response to economic 
conditions is most prevalent during periods of deep recession or depression: "in bad times the economy 
becomes a salient issue, whereas in good times it diminishes in importance relative to other determinants 
of voting behaviour" (Bloom and Price, 1975p.l244); see also (Mueller, 1970); (Alt, 1983pp.152-155).
The results of econometric analyses of voter behaviour may therefore depend upon the period of time 
under examination. Changes in the time-series change the results of the analysis. Stigler, for example, 
finds that "a single change of coverage of one year [the omission of a single observation from the 
time-series] reduces [the magnitude of] a regression coefficient by three fourths and deprives it of 
statistical reliability" (Stigler, 1973p.l64). Radcliff demonstrates most clearly that the relationship be­
tween economic conditions and voting is time-dependent (Radcliff, 1988) [see also (Fiorina, 1978); 
(Kiewiet, 1983); (Weatherford, 1983); (Owens and Olson, 1980); (Atesoglu and Congleton, 1982). 
Specifically, the impact of short-term economic fluctuations on voting in congressional elections has 
decreased dramatically over time, such that economic conditions are no longer major determinants of 
House elections. Given this result,
the solution to the puzzle of why [econometric studies] find incompatible results seems clear. Aggregate 
studies produce significant results because they are longitudinal in nature. A sufficient portion of the 
time-series — the early part — is affected by economic conditions, which makes the entire series appear to 
be so affected. Individual-level studies done in the latter half of the postwar period find little or no effect 
because the phenomenon [of economic voting] has subsided (Radcliff, 1988p.450).
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(2) Voters do not automatically attribute changes in their economic fortunes to the economic policies of 
the incumbent party (or even to the state of the economy). Under normal circumstances, voters attribute 
their improved fortunes to personal initiative. For this reason, voter behaviour will normally be inde­
pendent of personal economic conditions (Kinder and Mebane, 983a); (Brody and Sniderman, 1977); 
(Sniderman and Brody, 1977); (Feldman, 1984). Voters attribute their personal economic well-being to 
the incumbent party’s economic policies only when they perceive government economic policy to be the 
major determinant of their well-being -  i.e., when they identify (and hence blame) the government’s 
economic policies as responsible for their hardship. Once this connection is made, changes in economic 
well-being exert a powerful influence on vote choice (Feldman, 1982); (Feldman, 1984).
(3) It is not apparent that voters should respond solely to short-term fluctuations in economic con­
ditions. By restricting attention to short-term fluctuations, these studies "may ignore [other] important 
economic influences [i.e., long-term trends] which are perhaps more subtle and more constant but are 
nevertheless real" (Monroe, 1979p.l56); (Stigler, 1973pp.l64-167); (Bloom and Price, 1975p.l250); 
(Ireland, 1973p.l79). In particular, "any attempt to measure the impact of cuirent economic cir­
cumstances on voting must recognise that long-term [non-economic] predispositions heavily influence 
voter behaviour" (Owens and Wade, 1988p.36); (Bellucci, 1984p.388). Because they do not analyse these 
predispositions, econometric studies probably over-estimate the effect of current economic conditions on 
vote choice (Owens and Wade, 1988p.37). Clearly, therefore, measures of occupation, religion and 
territoriality -  long recognised as the most fundamental cleavages dividing Western electorates (Lane and 
Ersson, 1987) -  must be incorporated into econometric analyses of voter behaviour. Inclusion of such 
variables provides a baseline against which the independent effects of economic conditions on voter 
behaviour may be assessed.
(4) It is not apparent that voters should respond first and foremost to short-term fluctuations in leading 
macro-economic indicators (such as unemployment and inflation). Studies of the political effects of 
unemployment indicate that joblessness engenders political apathy and loss of self-esteem rather than 
political activism (Pinard, 1975); (Schlozman and Verba, 1977); (Stigler, 1973p.l62). Dissatisfaction 
with the incumbent’s macro-economic policies need not lead automatically (or even primarily) to an 
increase in the opposition’s electoral support: macro-economic indicators affect voter turnout (the deci­
sion whether to vote) rather than vote choice (the decision for whom to vote) (Arcelus and Meitzer, 
1975); (Monroe, 1979p.l68); (Toinet, 1984). Arcelus and Bloom and Price confirm this result: the major 
effect of fluctuations in aggregate economic conditions is a change in electoral participation rather than a 
shift in votes between the two major parties (Arcelus and Meitzer, 1975); (Bloom and Price, 1975). 
Measures of electoral participation must therefore be incorporated into econometric analyses of voter 
behaviour.
(5) The results of econometric analyses of voter behaviour also depend upon the operationalisation 
(definition and measurement) of the dependent variable and independent variables, the specification of 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables and the data employed in 
the analysis. These studies focus on United States House of Representatives (not Senate or Presidential) 
elections29 and define the incumbent party in the House of Representatives as the party which controls the 
Presidency. However, determination of incumbency (and hence responsibility) in American politics is not 
a straighforward matter, since it is possible for one party to control either or both houses of Congress 
whilst the other party controls the presidency. Clearly, therefore, the same economic conditions cannot 
explain both a solid Democratic congressional victory and a Republican presidential landslide (Okun, 
1973p.l73).30 Voters’ difficulty in ascertaining "incumbency" might therefore provide a partial account 
of the unstable and contradictory nature of these studies’ findings.
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Indeed, "the American case is [inherently] contaminated as a best test of economic voting" (Owens and 
Wade, 1988p.33). Relative to British parties, American parties are ideologically heterogeneous, 
decentralised and undisciplined. These characteristics decrease the extent to which American parties can 
implement -  and can be held responsible for -- economic policies. So too does the American 
constitution’s separation of executive and legislative authority. Not surprisingly, therefore, because 
Senators are held more responsible for policy performance than are members of the House of Represen­
tatives (Erikson, 1971); (Fenno, 1978), and because issues (economic and non-economic) are more salient 
in Senate elections than in House of Representatives elections (Hinckley, 1980); (Abramowitz, 1980), 
economic voting is more likely to occur in Senate elections than in House of Representatives elections 
(Kuklinski and West, 1981); (Wright and Berkman, 1986); (Abramowitz, 1988).
Generally, political systems in which parties are disciplined and cohesive, in which executive and 
legislative authority is fused -  and therefore in which the incumbent party directly controls economic 
policy -- should provide the clearest test of the presence of economic voting. Australia, Britain, Canada 
and New Zealand meet these criteria more than the United States, and for this reason may be more 
appropriate settings for econometric analyses of voter behaviour.
The results of econometric analyses are not robust against changes in the definition of independent 
variables. No consensus has emerged with respect to the definition of these variables: some studies 
measure levels of personal income, inflation and unemployment; others measure rates of change in these 
variables over time. Each construction yields different results (Okun, 1973p.l73). Moreover, small 
changes in variable definition engender large changes in results. Most notably, results are sensitive to 
changes in lag structure: Stigler for example, by measuring changes in income, inflation and unemploy­
ment over a two-year rather than a one-year period, finds that seemingly strong relationships disappear or 
change direction (Stigler, 1973p.l85).
Collinearity among the independent variables engenders similar difficulties. The correlation between 
annual percentage changes in real GNP and annual changes in the unemployment rates was, between 
1948 and 1971, approximately -0.9. As a result, it is virtually impossible to distinguish the independent 
effects of these variables on voter behaviour: "anything can happen when both an unemployment and a 
real income variable [are incorporated into the model]," and "unstable coefficients are to be expected" 
(Okun, 1973p.l74). Similarly, high levels of inflation are historically infrequent and are largely as­
sociated with the occurrence of wars, that high peacetime inflation rates are a recent phenomenon, and 
that unemployment rates are correlated with real income. For these reasons, "it is unlikely that aggregate 
time-series can provide meaningful estimates of the relative impact on voting behaviour of inflation and 
unemployment" (Bloom and Price, 1975pp. 1251-1252). Owens and Wade is the only study which recog­
nises and remedies the problems caused by collinear variables (Owens and Wade, 1988).
These studies’ contradictory results may be a consequence of model mis-specification. The linear 
combination of inflation, unemployment and real income may relate inconsistently to voter behaviour 
because the functional form of this relationship is, in fact, non-linear. Paldham notes that "many theorists, 
when [selecting a model specification], just choose one with no reference, and no obvious relation, to the 
findings of [this] literature. The elements entering into this choice must be some mixture of introspection, 
the clear blue sky, considerations of formal convenience, and a certain tradition" (Paldham, 198 lp. 189); 
(Goodman and Kramer, 1975p. 1257); (Achen, 1982p. 11). As a result, "resultant estimates are likely to be 
unstable" (Paldham, 1981p.l83).
The contradictory results of econometric analyses of voter behaviour may stem from the use of nation-
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wide aggregates of economic conditions and electoral results. These data combine local observations with 
respect to these variables into summary measures (arithmetic means). The greater the extent to which 
local conditions diverge from the nationwide arithmetic mean, the less representative of local conditions 
is the nationwide mean -  and hence the more misleading are the results of analyses based upon this data 
(Johnson, 1985). Nationally aggregated data, in short, hide variations observed at the sub-national level. 
Accordingly,
further progress is unlikely to come by continued use of the same type of data in traditional ways. More 
promising will be efforts to identify new sources and types of data that are potentially informative about 
outstanding theoretical issues (Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984p.387).
It is for this reason that several studies31 suggest that econometric analyses of electoral behaviour be
replicated with more disaggregated data, and that Owens and Wade analyse the 1983 British election with
disaggregated (constituency-level) data (Owens and Wade, 1988). They find that
a research design focussing upon a large number of real constituency elections and local economic 
conditions provides a more reliable understanding of the relationship between economic condition and 
voting than models that rely upon a small number of hypothetical elections and highly aggregated national 
economic statistics (Owens and Wade, 1988p.32).
Finally, these contradictory results may also stem ffom problems inherent in the use of statistical 
time-series. Three problems accompany the use of such data. (1) the number of observations in the series 
is small [generally, n < 35; for (Tufte, 1975), n = 8]: although unbiased and consistent regression 
coefficients emerge from the analyses of short time-series, the generation of coefficients with small 
standard errors (and therefore the discovery of statistically significant relationships) is difficult. (2) These 
time-series extend over such a long period of time (generally the years 1896-ca.l970) that the stability of 
the relationship between economic stimuli and voter response becomes questionable (Kiewiet and Rivers, 
1984p.372). The twentieth century has seen vast change in the structure of the economy (and hence in the 
causes of inflation and unemployment) and in the pervasiveness of government policy (and hence in the 
willingness and ability of governments to set and enforce macro-economic targets). (3) Use of data for 
this period ignores the fact that conscious and effective macro-economic policy dates, in most Western 
countries, only from the late 1930s.
4.2. The Econometric Analysis of Agrarian Party Formation
The assessment undertaken in section 4.1.5 has two implications for an econometric analysis of for­
mation, electoral support and dissolution, in the years immediately following the First World War, of 
agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. (1) The empirical propositions set out in Chapter 
3 are consistent with the findings of econometric analyses of voter behaviour. Personal economic self- 
interest (and a change in personal economic well-being) is not always an important determinant of voter 
behaviour at elections; rather, as this study’s propositions hypothesise, its influence is sporadic, its 
magnitude is variable and its impact is not felt equally by all voters. In short, the initial conditions set out 
in Chapter 3 seem, a priori, to produce reasonable empirical propositions. (2) This assessment indicates 
that an analysis of the influence of micro-economic stimuli upon rural voter behaviour necessitates 
disaggregated cross-sectional data and careful attention to model specification (the inclusion of non­
economic -  occupational, religious and territorial -  variables, collinearity among independent variables, 
and the model’s functional form).
An econometric analysis of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution thus entails the 
construction, estimation and evaluation of two sets of equations. The first set of equations analyses 
agrarian party formation and dissolution. These equations relate agrarian party elites’ decision to present 
candidates in particular electorates to non-economic (occupational, religious and territorial) variables and
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to the economic characteristics of agricultural and pastoral production. These equations attempt to in­
dicate why the agrarian party contests electorate y  (but not electorate z) at time tj and why it did (or did 
not) contest this electorate at time tQ. These equations, in short, attempt to respond to the first question for 
empirical research set out in Chapter 1.
The second set of equations analyses agrarian party electoral support. These equations relate (1) the 
decision to vote and (2) the decision to vote for the agrarian party to non-economic variables and to the 
economic characteristics of agricultural production. These equations attempt to indicate (given the 
presence of an agrarian party candidate in electorate y  at time tQ) why voters in this electorate vote for the 
agrarian party candidate, and why voters in this electorate maintain or abandon their preference for the 
agrarian party candidate at t v  These equations, in short, attempt to respond to the second question for 
empirical research set out in Chapter 1.
4.2.1. Data and Variables
Studies of electoral behaviour typically rely upon one of two types of data. Aggregate-level data, such 
as the data used by most econometric analyses of voter behaviour, consist in distributions of entire 
populations grouped according to some criterion (such as geographic proximity). Individual-level data, 
which are usually derived from sample surveys, consist in "facts specifically and directly known about 
[and derived directly from] individuals" (Ranney, 1962p.91).
Unlike survey data, aggregate-level data are readily and widely available. Most Western democratic 
nations have, since the nineteenth century, published electoral returns and conducted censuses. As a 
result, these countries possess immense bodies of aggregate-level data. Because survey data in these 
countries are generally available only for the period after 1960, any econometric analysis of agrarian 
party formation, electoral support and dissolution in Australia, Canada and New Zealand must rely upon 
aggregate-level data.
Section 4.1.5 emphasised that the estimation of the effects of economic stimuli upon voter behaviour 
necessitates disaggregated cross-sectional data. Analysis of the relationship between agricultural 
economic stimuli and rural voter behaviour makes the need for disaggregated data even more acute.32 
Accordingly, an econometric analysis of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution 
demands agricultural economic, electoral and census data measured at the local level. Australia is 
well-endowed with such data. (1) Accounts of local patterns of agricultural production for the years 
1922-1928 are readily available in the Statistical Registrars published by each Australian state (except 
Victoria);33 (2) The Commonwealth Electoral Department collected detailed statistics of voter turnout 
and party support at the local (subdivision) level (Australia, 1923); (Australia, 1926); (Australia, 1929). 
(3) The Census of the Commonwealth, 1921 sets out religious and occupational statistics for the years 
immediately following the First World War (Australia, 1921). Measures of agricultural economic, elec­
toral and census variables thus exist for 492 common units (electoral subdivisions) across Australia.34 It 
is upon these units that the analysis is based. Table 4-1 shows the number of subdivisions in each state for 
which data are available.35 Table 4-2 describes the variables constructed from these data.36
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Table 4-1: The Data Set: Summary Description
State Number of
Observations
Ne w  South Wales 254
Victoria o**
Q u e e n s l a n d 100
South A u stralia 57
We s t e r n  A u stralia 37
Tasmania 44
Austr a l i a 492
**Suitable data not available.
4.2.2. Model Specification
The computation of valid quantitative estimates of behavioural relationships requires (1) well-specified 
statistical models and (2) appropriate estimators (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp.80-86). This section 
specifies two econometric models of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution, and sets 
out criteria by which these models may be assessed. Section 4.2.3 sets out appropriate means by which 
these models’ parameters may be estimated.
Perfectly-specified statistical models are linear in the coefficients and in the error term; they include all 
relevant (and exclude all irrelevant) independent variables; they reflect the true functional form (linear, 
additive, multiplicative, exponential, etc) of the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables; the expected value of their residual (disturbance) term is zero; the residual term for 
any one observation is independent of the residual term for other observations (no autocorrelation); the 
variance of the residual term is constant (homoskedastic), normally-distributed and uncoiTelated with any 
independent variable and no two of its independent variables are perfectly correlated (perfectly collinear) 
(Kennedy, 1985pp.40-48); (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1985pp.l28-134); (Johnston, 1984pp.259-267); 
(Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979pp.413-419).
In practice, statistical models are never perfectly specified (Achen, 1983pp.83-84); (Irwin and 
Lichtman, 1976pp.422-423); (Hanushek, Jackson and Kain, 1974p.99); (Studenmund and Cassidy, 
1987pp. 120-178). For this reason, all statistical models violate of one or more of these conditions. 
Depending upon the extent to which these conditions are violated, statistical model mis-specification 
(also known as specification bias or specification error) may yield misleading or incorrect estimates of 
behavioural relationships.
Some works indicate that (regardless of the specification of the statistical model) aggregate-level data 
(such as the data described in Table 4-2) produce misleading or incorrect estimates of the behaviour of 
individuals. In particular, Robinson argues that these data cannot be used to study the behaviour of 
individuals (Robinson, 1950pp.351-357). Robinson finds that bivariate product-moment correlation coef­
ficients (r’s) computed with aggregate-level data bear no consistent relationship to bivariate r ’s computed 
with individual-level data and that, therefore, analysis based upon aggregate-level data may lead to 
misleading or erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, individual-level data are unambiguously better than 
aggregate data because attempts to make inferences with aggregate-level data succumb to an "ecological 
fallacy" [see also (Alker, 1969pp.69-86); (Goodman, 1959); (Hammond, 1973); (Stokes, 1969)]. Indeed,
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Table 4-2: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Type* Description
Dependent Variables
CPcand b CPcand = 1 if there is a Country Party 
candidate in the subdivision;
otherwise, CPcand = 0.
NPcand b NPcand = 1 if there is a National Party 
candidate in the subdivision; otherwise,
NPcand = 0.
ALPCand b ALPcand = 1 if there is a Labor Party 
candidate in the subdivision; otherwise,
ALPcand = 0.
Turnout c The percentage of registered voters that 
cast ballots in the subdivision.
CPVote c Country Party support as a percentage of 
total votes cast in the subdivision.
NPVote c National Party support as a percentage of 
total votes cast in the subdivision.
ALPVote c Australian Labor Party Support 
as a percentage of total votes cast 
in the subdivision.
Independent Variables
Anglican c Anglicans as a percentage of the 
subdivision's total population.
Business c Percentage of the workforce in the 
subdivision in tertiary occupations .
Catholic c Roman Catholics as a percentage of the 
subdivision's total population.
Cattle c Average number of beef cattle per farm in 
the subdivision (logarithm).
Dairy c Average number of dairy cattle per farm 
in the subdivision (New South Wales only)
(logarithm)
Farmer c Percentage of the workforce in the 
subdivision which own farms.
Fruit Acreage c The average number of acres of all fruits 
and vegetables per farm in the subdivision
(logarithm)
Grain Acreage c The average number of acres of grain 
(wheat, oats, and barley) per farm 
in the subdivision (logarithm).
Grazier c Percentage of the workforce in the 
subdivision which own stations.
Labour c Percentage of the workforce in the
subdivision employed in secondary industry.
Mechanisation c Average number of horses per farm in the 
subdivision (logarithm).
Sheep c Average number of sheep per farm in the 
subdivision (logarithm).
State b Dummy measure of territoriality: State = 1 
if the subdivision is in New South Wales;
otherwise, State = 0.
* Where b indicates a binary (dichotomous) variable 
and c indicates a continuous variable.
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the glastly results all too common in working with aggregate voting data are well documented, and the 
"ecological fallacy" has destroyed the credibility of many well-intentioned projects. Indeed, skepticism 
about aggregate data is so widespread that the quantitative historical research once so common in the 
discipline has very nearly disappeared (Achen, 1983pp.70-71).
More recent studies reject Robinson’s conclusions. The "ecological fallacy" results from an incorrect 
model specification and from improper statistical methods rather than from the use of inappropriate 
(aggregate-level) data (Hanushek, Jackson and Kain, 1974p.92); (Irwin and Lichtman, 1976); (Langbein 
and Lichtman, 1976); (Broder and Lichtman, 1983); (Jones, 1972); (Lichtman, 1974); (Kousser, 1973). 
The mere existence of individual-level data does not guarantee accurate estimates of individual behaviour 
(Kramer, 1983). Regardless of the type of data employed, mis-specified statistical models bias estimates 
of individual behaviour and correctly-specified models yield valid estimates of individual behaviour. A 
re-analysis of Robinson’s (1950) own data demonstrates this result (Hanushek, Jackson and Kain, 1974).
These studies also indicate that Robinson does not distinguish between specification bias and aggrega­
tion bias. Aggregation bias is the difference between the expected value of a statistical relationship 
estimated with individual-level data and the expected value of the same relationship estimated with 
aggregate-level data (Irwin and Lichtman, 1976p.411). It is a type of specification bias which results from 
the process of grouping individuals into units of aggregation. Aggregation bias disappears when statistical 
models are correctly specified. Regardless of the criterion by which individuals are grouped, well- 
specified models yield valid inferences about the behaviour of individuals (Irwin and Lichtman, 1976); 
(Hanushek, Jackson and Kain, 1974); (Blalock, 1964pp.103-112); (Shively, 1969).
Two implications for an econometric analysis of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolu­
tion emerge from these studies. First, if they are used in conjunction with a well-specified statistical 
model, aggregate-level data (such as the data described in Table 4-2) yield valid estimates of individual 
behaviour. Indeed, such estimates are far more valid than estimates derived from an incorrectly-specified 
statistical model using individual-level data (Irwin and Lichtman, 1976p.433); (Kramer, 1983); (Johnston, 
1984pp.259-261). Secondly, multivariate statistical models yield more valid estimates of individual be­
haviour than bivariate product-moment correlation coefficients (King, 1987); (Kousser, 1973); (Jones, 
1972); (Lichtman, 1974). In particular, analyses of voter behaviour which rely upon bivariate correlations 
produce unreliable results (Kousser, 1976).
Clearly, therefore, quantitative analysis of the behaviour of rural voters requires multivariate statistical 
models. Equally clearly, these models must be carefully specified: they must include as many relevant 
explanatory (independent) variables as possible, and must approximate the true functional form of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Table 4-2 set out a more complete set of 
explanatory variables (agricultural economic, occupational, religious, territorial and political) than other 
econometric studies of voter behaviour; to the extent that these variables constitute a complete list of the 
determinants of rural voter behaviour, statistical models incorporating these variables will be well- 
specified.
Specification of the functional form of the relationship between the dependent variable and each inde­
pendent variable is less straightforward. Like most theories, Chapter 3 does not specify the functional 
form of the causal relationship among variables; in general, any attempt to do so would necessarily result 
in over-simplified and erroneous explanations (Achen, 1982pp.13-15); (Johnston, 1984pp.500-502). This 
poses difficulties for the verification of theoretical propositions, since alternate model specifications can 
suggest very different forms of voter behaviour.
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Previous research, however, suggests that two functional forms are appropriate for statistical models of 
agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. Soares and Hamblin argue that the non-major 
party’s electoral support is a consequence of feelings of frustration with the status quo and that the 
intensity of this frustration increases as an exponential function of the economic and social stimuli acting 
upon the voter, accordingly, they find that a multiplicative and exponential model specification provides a 
better representation than a linear and additive model specification of the social and economic influences 
on the vote for non-major party candidates (Soares and Hamblin, 1967pp. 1053-1065).37
Further, Burnham and Sprague find that linear and additive models best portray vote choice during 
periods of electoral stability, that non-linear and multiplicative specifications will best characterise voter 
behaviour during periods of crisis, that linear and additive models best represent the influence of social 
and economic variables on the major party vote and that non-linear and multiplicative functional forms 
best fit patterns of non-major party support (Burnham and Sprague, 1970pp.471-490). They interpret this 
result to mean that non-major parties reflect alienation from the broad consensus forged by the major 
parties and thus that the non-major party vote represents "an act of aggressive alienation against the 
leaders, parties and policies associated with the established political order" (Burnham and Sprague, 
1970p.488).
Given these results, one of two statistical models may be appropriate representations of agrarian party 
formation, electoral support and dissolution. Each model incorporates the independent variables set out 
in Table 4-2. However, the functional form of these models differs. The first model’s functional form is 
linear and additive:
Yj = a  + ftX u  + ß2X2i + . . .  + ßkXü  + Ej = 1 . '2 . . .  n (Model 1)
The second model’s functional form (the Cobb-Douglas production function) is exponential and mul­
tiplicative:
Yj = a(X liß1)(X2jß2)(Xkll3k)8i i = 1, 2 . . .  n (Model 2)
where
• Yj is the model’s dependent variable (CPcand, NPcand and ALPcand for analyses of agrarian
party formation and dissolution; CPVote, NPVote and ALPVote for analyses of agrarian
party electoral support) [see also (Firebaugh, 1988)];
• a  is a constant (intercept) term;
• is the coefficient of the &th independent variable;
• Xjj is the zth observation on the jlh independent variable set out in Table 4-2;
• £j is a randomly distributed residual (disturbance) term with constant variance.
The functional form of Model (2) is not linear. However, transformation of this model in terms of 
logarithms yields a linear equation that meets classical conditions. Following Kruskal (Kruskal, 
1968p.l89), this logarithmic transformation takes the form
InYj = ß0 + ßjlnUXjj)] + ß2[ln(X2i)] + . . .  + ß^lnQ ^)] + %
i = 1 , . . .  n (Model 2)
Caution must accompany the interpretation of these models’ parameters. The coefficients of Model (1) 
represent the absolute change in Yj that is associated, on average, with a unit change in an X^. In Model 
(1), then,
The coefficients of Model (2) indicate that the effect upon Yj of a given change in an Xj varies according 
to the magnitude of the Xj (i.e., that their relationship is non-linear). For every one percent change in Xj, 
in other words, Yj changes by ßk percent (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977p.97):
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ß* =
The coefficients of Model (2) are thus constant elasticities (Johnston, 1984pp.65-66).
The coefficients of Model (2) also indicate that the change in Yj that is associated with a change in an 
Xj varies according to the magnitude of the other X i (i.e., that their relationship is multiplicative). 
Conversely, in Model (1) the marginal effect of a change in the value of any X i on Y i is independent of 
the effect of the other Xi (i.e., their relationship is additive) (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp.97-99).
In the absence of perfectly-specified statistical models, an econometric analyses of voter behaviour 
requires criteria by which these models may be assessed. The most commonly used statistic, R2, is not 
appropriate for this purpose. R2 can only provide a meaningful comparison of models with identical 
dependent variables (King, 1987p.675); (Seidman, 1976); clearly, however, because Models (1) and (2) 
address different sources of variation (Yi and lnYi respectively), their R2 are not commensurate 
(Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp.l00-101). Moreover, R2 is only of limited value because it gives only an 
indirect indication of proper specification (the predictive power of the equation) (Theil, 1971p.542).
The residual variance criterion is the most important criterion by which alternate model specifications 
may be assessed (Johnston, 1984pp.504-510). Accordingly, the relative validity of Models (1) and (2) 
may be assessed in terms of the extent to which the variance the disturbance term is constant 
(homoskedastic), normally-distributed and correlated with one or more independent variables. Accord­
ingly, the analysis of party formation and dissolution set out in Chapter 5 reports likelihood-ratio tests, 
Maddala’s R2, Cragg-Uhler’s R2, McFadden’s R2 and Chow’s R2 (Chow, 1983). The analysis of party 
electoral support set out in Chapter 6 reports statistics devised by Jarque and Bera in order to assess the 
homoskedasticity of the models’ residuals; it performs Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests and computes 
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis in order to assess the normality of the models’ residuals (Jarque and 
Bera, 1980pp.255-259); (Klein, 1974p.368); (Smillie, 1966p.95); and it computes correlation matrices in 
order to assess the collinearity of the models’ independent variables. (All calculations are carried out with 
SHAZAM (White, 1978)).
4.2.3. Model Estimation
Given this study’s data and its statistical models, there exists a large number of ways in which be­
havioural relationships might be estimated. The Gauss-Markov Theorem proves that (if a model is 
perfectly specified) the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE). The OLS estimator is "best" in the sense that the sampling distribution of its Bk have the 
smallest variance; it is "unbiased" in the sense that the sampling distribution of each Bk is centred on the 
true value of Bk (Johnston, 1984pp.l71-174). Because it possesses these desirable statistical properties, 
the OLS estimator is the most frequently used estimator of the separate effects of independent variables 
upon a dependent variable.
However, because statistical models are never perfectly specified (in other words, because one or more 
classical conditions are always violated) the OLS estimator is not always an appropriate estimator of 
behavioural relationships. For every analysis, therefore, an appropriate estimator (OLS or other) must be 
chosen.
For two reasons, the OLS estimator is an inappropriate estimator of models of agrarian party formation
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and dissolution. (1) The OLS estimator incorrecdy assumes that there is a linear relationship between the 
model’s dichotomous dependent variable and its independent variables. This implies, for example, that an 
increase in the value of an independent variable is associated with an increase in the probability that a 
Country Party candidate will stand for election — regardless of the value of that independent variable. In 
practice, this assumption frequently produces nonsensical results (such as probabilities less than zero and 
greater than one) (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977ch 7).
(2) Aldrich and Nelson demonstrate that such models’ residuals are inherently heteroskedastic (Aldrich 
and Nelson, 1984pp.l-20). As a result, OLS estimates are not "best" estimates (in the sense that in the 
sense that the sampling distribution of its Bk have the smallest variance). In consequence, they may 
seriously mis-estimate the effects of independent variables and may invalidate statistical inferences (t- 
tests, F-tests and confidence intervals). Probit and logit estimators, which are designed especially for 
statistical models with dichotomous dependent variables, resolve these difficulties (Pindyck and Rubin- 
feld, 1985) and are thus the most appropriate estimators of models of agrarian party formation and 
dissolution.
Similarly, the OLS estimator is not (because its residuals will be heteroskedastic) an appropriate es­
timator of models of agrarian party electoral support. Heteroskedasticity is frequently encountered in 
cross-sectional analyses in which (1) observations are drawn from aggregate units whose size and popula­
tion differ considerably, (2) there is a wide disparity between the largest and the smallest observed values 
of an independent variable, and (3) the dependent variable is a proportion. The greater the extent to which 
each condition obtains, the greater is the likelihood that disturbance terms will have non-constant variance 
(i.e., will be heteroskedastic) (Studenmund and Cassidy, 1987pp.244-263); (Hanushek and Jackson, 
1977pp. 141-150).
As a result, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator, though unbiased, is no longer the Best (in the sense 
that its variance is minimised) Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). It is possible, however (by taking into 
account the expected variance of the disturbance term), to generalise the OLS estimator. Weighting the 
dependent variable and all independent variables by a constant, that is proportional to the variance of 
the disturbance term yields a specification that satisfies classical conditions (see Appendix E). For this 
reason, the GLS (Generalised Least Squares) estimator is preferred to the OLS estimator and is a more 
appropriate estimator of models of agrarian party electoral support.
4.3. Summary
Econometric analyses of electoral behaviour are distinguished both by their subject matter and by their 
analytic techniques. In terms of subject matter, these studies may be summarised by the dictum "when 
you think politics, think elections; when you think elections, think economics" (Tufte, 1978p.65). In 
terms of method, they attempt (through the use of techniques of econometric research) to quantify the 
hypothesised relationship between economic conditions and electoral behaviour.
This study’s theoretical propositions relate closely to these studies’ subject matter. At the same time, its 
propositions and research design differ in important respects from most econometric analyses of electoral 
behaviour. This study investigates the impact of microeconomic developments upon rural electoral 
behaviour; it analyses far more competitive elections (n=492), using more finely-disaggregated data, than 
most econometric analyses (where, generally, n > 35); it analyses a particular point in time and uses more 
appropriately-specified statistical models and estimators, together with a more complete array of diag­
nostic statistics, than most other studies.
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Chapters 5 and 6 report the results of an econometric analysis of the formation, electoral support and 
partial dissolution, in the years 1922-1928, of the Australian Country Party. Chapter 5 utilises probit and 
logit estimators and Models (1) and (2) in order to analyse agrarian party formation and dissolution (as 
represented by the distribution of Country Party candidates at the Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 
and 1928). Chapter 6 utilises the Generalised Least Squares estimator and Models (1) and (2) in order to 
analyse the Country Party’s electoral support at these elections.
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Chapter 5
Agrarian Party 
Formation and Dissolution 
(Party Behaviour)
Chapter 3 hypothesised that the formation of non-major parties (including agrarian parties such as the 
Australian Country Party) is a consequence of voter dissatisfaction with major parties and an economic 
issue(s) whose salience attains crisis proportions. It defined non-major party formation and dissolution as 
a function of the extent to which the non-major party’s candidates contest elections. An increase in the 
number of constituencies in which the non-major party’s candidates are present (regardless of their 
percentage share of the vote in these constituencies) constitutes non-major party formation; the greater the 
increase (from one election to another) in the number of constituencies in which a non-major party’s 
candidates are present, the greater is non-major party formation. Conversely, a decrease in the number of 
constituencies in which the non-major party’s candidates are present constitutes non-major party dissolu­
tion; the greater the decrease (from one election to another) in the number of constituencies in which a 
non-major party’s candidates are present, the greater is non-major party dissolution.
More specifically, Chapter 3 hypothesised that the agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli which 
influence the electoral behaviour of rural voters also influence the electoral behaviour of agrarian party 
leaders. These leaders respond to a decrease in agricultural commodity prices below the average variable 
cost of production by fielding agrarian party candidates in the constituencies where voter dissatisfaction 
with major parties is greatest.
This chapter evaluates these hypotheses. It uses probit and logit estimators and Models (1) and (2) in 
order to determine whether (as well as the extent to which) agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli 
influenced Country Party leaders’ decision to contest (or, alternatively, not contest) a given constituency. 
Its results are consistent with the hypothesis that these economic stimuli were the most important in­
fluence upon this decision.
5.1. The 1922 Commonwealth Election
A short summary of Australian political development after 1910 places the 1922 election in context. By 
1910, following the fusion of the Free Traders and the Protectionists, two political parties (the Liberal 
Party and the Australian Labor Party) dominated Australian parliaments and elections (Loveday, Martin 
and Parker, 1977). Two events soon upset this nascent two-party system. First, in 1916 disagreement with 
respect to military conscription split the Australian Labor Party. The Prime Minister, four Ministers and 
twenty-four Members of Parliament left the ALP, formed a minority "National Labor" government 
(sustained by the Liberals) and in 1917 merged with the Liberals (forming the Nationalist Party). Second, 
"the appearance and consolidation of the Australian Country Party was the most striking political 
development within the Commonwealth parliament between the split of the Labor Party and its return to
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power in 1929" (Alexander, 1967:59). The presence of Australian Country Party candidates, as opposed 
to Australian "country party" candidates, commenced at the 1922 election. Unlike the 1919 election (at 
which rural "country party" conducted unco-ordinated campaigns under a variety of labels, often with 
help from the Nationalist Party), Country Party candidates formed an independent and cohesive bloc at 
this election (Hughes, 1985p.36); (Hughes and Graham, 1974pp.320-325); (Page, 1963pp.62-85); 
(Graham, 1966pp. 166-167 and 325).
The 1922 election was thus contested by two major parties (the Nationalist Party and the Australian 
Labor Party), a non-major party (the Australian Country Party) and several independent candidates. The 
Prime Minister’s allegedly autocratic style, "fig-leaf socialism" and "theatrical posturing" were the 
campaign’s most notable features (Fitzhardinge, 1979pp.509-510). Its results were a debacle for the 
Nationalist Party: five of its Ministers were defeated, its leader was "discredited" and the Country Party 
gained the balance of power in the House of Representatives (Page, 1963pp.86-87). In consequence, the 
Nationalist Party changed leaders and a Nationalist Party-Country Party coalition government took office.
Table 5-1: Non-Metropolitan Electoral Subdivisions 
With Country Party, Nationalist Party and 
Australian Labor Party Candidates,
Commonwealth Election, 1922
Country Nationalist Labor
Party Party Party
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
New South Wales 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania
156 ( 6 1 . 4 ) 
76 ( 7 6 . 0 ) 
30 ( 5 2 . 6 ) 
9 ( 2 4 . 3 ) 
37 ( 8 4 . 7 )
229  ( 9 0 . 2 ) 
54 ( 5 4 . 0 ) 
19 ( 3 3 . 3 ) 
32 ( 8 6 . 5 ) 
4 4 ( 1 0 0 . 0 )
215  ( 8 4 . 7 ) 
100  ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 
38 ( 6 6 . 7 ) 
23 ( 6 2 . 1 ) 
31 ( 7 0 . 5 )
Australia 308 ( 6 2 . 6 ) 378 ( 7 6 . 8 ) 407 ( 8 2 . 7 )
N.B.: Figures refer to House of Representatives elections.
Table 5-1 reports (1) the number of non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which Country Party, 
Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party candidates were present in House of Representatives elec­
tions, and (2) the percentage of non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which these parties’ House of 
Representatives candidates were present. (The analysis in this chapter excludes Senate elections because 
Australian Senators are elected from state-wide, not local, constituencies). It indicates that (with the 
exception of Australian Labor Party candidates in Queensland and Nationalist Party candidates in 
Tasmania) these parties’ candidates were not present in every non-metropolitan electoral subdivision. 
ALP and Nationalist Party candidates were present in the greatest number of electoral subdivisions. At 
the same time, however, Country Party candidates were present in more than one-half of each state’s 
electoral subdivisions (except in Western Australia) -  indeed, in Queensland and South Australia they 
were present in more electoral subdivisions than were Nationalist Party candidates. Clearly, therefore, 
agrarian party formation was appreciable at this election.
Table 5-2 sets out determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution (i.e., the presence or absence 
of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision) in House of Representatives elections.38 Five of
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Table 5-2: Country Party 
Formation and Dissolution, 
Commonwealth Election, 1922
Australia NSW OtherStates
Estimator
Model
N
logit
(1)
492
probit
(1)
254
logit
(1)
238
Independent V a r i a b l e s :
Religion
Anglican 2 . 6 5 ( 0 . 4 2 ) - 0 . 2 9 ( 0 . 0 7 ) - 0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 08 )
Occupation
Farmer
Grazier
Labour
Business
- 0 . 6 5  ( 0 . 0 2 )  
- 1 . 3 9 ( 0 . 4 9 )  
- 1 4 . 2 0  ( 0 . 82 )  
7 . 1 1  (0 . 52 )
7 . 0 0  (0 . 10 )  
- 1 9 . 1 6 ( 0 . 1 5 ) *  
* * * - 1 4 . 0 4 ( 0 . 9 3 ) * *  
*** 9 . 8 5 ( 0 . 5 5 ) * *
1 . 9 9  ( 0 . 09 )  
- 1 . 0 1  ( 0 . 03 )  
0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 1 )  
0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 07 )
Land Utilisation
Grain Acreage 0.16(0.09)*
Fruit Acreage -0.11(0.02)
Sheep 0.01(0.02)
Cattle 0.35(0.40)**
Mechanisation -0.49(0.36)*** -0.64(0.69)** -0.24(0.17) 
Dairy -0.33(0.14)
0 . 5 2  ( 0 . 4 3 ) * * * - 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 2 0 ) * * *  
- 0 . 1 8 ( 0 . 0 3 )  - 0 . 0 6 ( 0 . 0 1 )
- 0 . 2 3 ( 0 . 4 3 ) * *  0 . 1 1 ( 0 . 1 3 )
0 . 7 9 ( 1 . 2 3 ) * * *  0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 1 0 )
Voter Turnout 
State (Dummy)
0 . 0 6 ( 0 . 0 1 )
0 . 3 1 ( 0 . 0 5 )
2 . 9 0 ( 0 . 7 9 ) *  - 3 . 5 4 ( 0 . 7 4 ) *
N.B.: The dependent variable is CPCAND22
Figures within parentheses are elasticities 
(computed at the independent variable's mean).
* indicates that t < 1.96 
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58 
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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this table’s relationships merit attention.39 (1) Agricultural and pastoral economic variables (such as the 
Cattle, Grain Acreage and Mechanisation variables) are more powerful predictors of Country Party 
formation and dissolution than agricultural and pastoral occupational variables (such as the Farmer and 
Grazier variables). Indeed, at this election occupational status as a farmer or a grazier was not associated 
with the presence or absence of Country Party candidates (the grazier variable in New South Wales is an 
exception). The economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production, however, related strongly to 
the presence of Country Party candidates. (2) Country Party formation was associated with the production 
of price- and income-inelastic commodities (such as grain and beef cattle) and Country Party dissolution 
was associated with the production of price- and income-elastic commodities (such as fruits and 
vegetables and sheep/wool). (3) At this election Country Party formation was associated with the 
presence of rural businessmen and professionals, and Country Party dissolution was associated with the 
presence of workers in secondary industry. (4) The Anglican variable was not associated with the 
presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision. (5) The presence or absence 
of Country Party candidates was not related to voter turnout at this election. Nor was it more marked in 
New South Wales than in other states.
A much stronger pattern of results appears in New South Wales. Again, agricultural and pastoral 
economic variables were more powerful predictors of Country Party formation and dissolution than 
agricultural and pastoral occupational variables; the Anglican variable was unrelated to Country Party 
formation or dissolution; Country Party formation was associated with the production of price- and 
income-inelastic commodities; Country Party dissolution was associated with mechanisation and the 
production of price- and income-elastic commodities (including dairy products). In each instance, the 
coefficients of these variables were greater for New South Wales electoral subdivisions than for electoral 
subdivisions across Australia.
Conversely, a much weaker pattern of results emerges in states other than New South Wales. Country 
Party formation and dissolution were related to neither agricultural and pastoral economic variables 
(except Grain Acreage) nor to agricultural and pastoral occupational variables. At this election, in other 
words, neither occupational status as a farmer or a grazier nor the economic attributes of primary produc­
tion (except Grain Acreage) were associated with Country Party formation and dissolution. Nor, indeed, 
were the Anglican, Business and Labour variables. Only the Voter Turnout variable uncovers a strong 
relationship: in these states, the presence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision was 
associated with low levels of voter turnout.
Two results emerge from Table 5-2. First, at this election Country Party formation in New South Wales 
and states other than New South Wales rested upon very different foundations. In particular, Country 
Party formation in states other than New South Wales lacked all of the underpinnings that it possessed in 
New South Wales. The coefficients of the Business, Cattle and Grain Acreage variables in these states are 
much smaller, their standard errors much larger (and, for the Grain Acreage variable, the sign of the 
coefficient is reversed) than their counterparts in New South Wales. At this election, in other words, 
Country Party formation corresponded much less clearly to the hypothesised determinants of voter dis­
satisfaction with major parties in these states than in New South Wales.
Secondly, at this election the Business, Cattle and Grain Acreage variables are most strongly associated 
with Country Party formation. Conversely, the Labour, Mechanisation and Sheep variables are most 
strongly associated with Country Party dissolution. Moreover, the effect upon Country Party formation 
and dissolution of a one-percent change in the value of the Cattle, Grain Acreage and Mechanisation
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variables (cf. the elasticity of the coefficient of these variables) was greater than an equivalent percentage 
change in the value of the Business, Farmer, Grazier variables. At this election, therefore, these agricul­
tural and pastoral economic variables were more important determinants of Country Party formation and 
dissolution than occupational variables.
This result, together with the observation that Country Party formation and dissolution at this election 
was unrelated to the Anglican variable, is consistent with the hypothesis that (given a decrease in 
agricultural commodity prices below the average variable cost of commodity production) the economic 
attributes of agricultural and pastoral production engender voter dissatisfaction with the major parties, and 
that this dissatisfaction is the most important catalyst of agrarian party support and dissolution.
Table 5-3 sets out, for comparative purposes, determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolu­
tion (the presence or absence of a Nationalist Party candidate in an electoral subdivision in House of 
Representatives elections). The table indicates that occupational and religious variables (particularly 
Anglican and Business) are more important determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution 
than agricultural and pastoral economic variables. Only two economic variables, Grain Acreage and 
Sheep, were consistently associated with the presence or absence of Nationalist Party candidates, and 
there existed no clear relationship between the production of price- and income-(in)elastic commodities 
and Nationalist Party formation and dissolution. Further, in New South Wales the Voter Turnout variable 
is a strong determinant of Nationalist Party formation. Its coefficient indicates that high levels of voter 
participation at this election were associated with the presence of Nationalist Party candidates.
The results set out in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 are thus consistent with the hypothesis that the combined 
impact of voter dissatisfaction with major parties (which, in turn, is engendered by the production of 
price- and income-inelastic commodities) and an issue whose salience attains crisis proportions (a decline 
in commodity price below the average variable cost of production) engenders agrarian party formation. 
Agricultural and pastoral economic variables, together with the Business variable, were the strongest 
determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution at this election; conversely, occupational and 
religious variables were the strongest determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution at this 
election.
5.2. The 1925 Commonwealth Election
The Country Party’s leader in the Commonwealth Parliament observed that between 1922 and 1925 "a 
deep fission in political thinking developed between the Government and the Labor Opposition. Labor’s 
position had moved steadily to the left since the [National Labor] breakaway in the First World War. 
Their policies conflicted with Nationalist Party and Country Party doctrine in vital matters, including the 
free enterprise system" (Page, 1963p.l71). Moreover, "the deep infection of Communist doctrine in the 
Labour movement was having severe repercussions on the industrial front The Government faced strikes 
which threatened to undermine the process of democratic government and to disrupt the country’s 
economic development" (Page, 1963p. 172); (Graham, 1966p.232). The Government thus "chose to fight 
this election almost entirely on the issue of "law and order" and the "Menace from Moscow"; it was the 
first of the full-scale "Red Scare" campaigns that were to be frequent during the next forty years" 
(Fitzhardinge, 1979p.545).
Table 5 4  reports (1) the number of non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which Country Party, 
Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party candidates were present at this election, and (2) the percent-
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T a b le  5-3: N ationalist Party
Form ation  and D issolution ,
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1922
Australia NSW OtherStates
Estimator probit probit logit
M o del (2) (2) (1)
N 492 254 238
Independent Variables:
R e lig io n
A n g lican 1.96 (0.48)*** -1.68 (0.13) 8.55(1.08)***
O c c u p a t io n
Farmer 0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) -1.41 (0.05)
Grazier -0.15 (0.19)* 0.00 (0.00) -2.85 (0.07)
Labour -0.01 (0.01) 1.90 (0.38)** -1.92 (0.11)
Business -0.52 (0.34)* -1.77 (0.39)** -0.36(0.03)
L a n d  U tilisa t io n
G r ain Acreage 0.11(0.05)* 0.18 (0.03)* 0.23 (0.09) *
Fruit Acreage 0.03(0.00) 0.17 (0.00) -0.16(0.03)
Sheep -0.15 (0.16)*** -0.11(0.04) - 0 . 4 6(0.45)***
Cattle 0.03(0.03) 0.05(0.01) 0.19(0.19)
M e c h a n i s a t i o n 0.02 (0.01) -0.42 (0.09) -0.25(0.02)
D a i r y 0.11 (0.02)
V o t e r  Turnout 2.03 (0.34)*** 3.86(0.24)*** 1.72 (0.29)
State (Dummy) 0.95(0.14)***
(Constant) 1.72 (0.51)** 3.46(0.33) -2.34 (0.63)
N.B.: The dependent variable is N P C A N D 2 2 .
Figures within parentheses are point elasti c i t i e s
(measured at the independent variable 's m e a n ) .
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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Table 5-4: Non-Metropolitan Electoral Subdivisions
With Country Party, Nationalist Party and 
Australian Labor Party Candidates, 
Commonwealth Election, 1925
Country N a t i o n a l i s t Labor
Party P a rty Party
Number (%) N u m b e r  (%) Number (%)
Ne w  South Wales 103 (40.6) 207 (81.5) 254 (100.0)
Q u e e nsland 38 (38.0) 40 (40.0) 78 (78.0)
South Australia 0 (0.0) 57 (100.0) 57 (100.0)
Western A ustralia 14 (37.8) 23 (62.2) 37 (100.0)
Tasmania 13 (29.6) 44 (100.0) 44 (100.0)
Australia 168 (34.2) 371 (74.4) 469 (95.3)
N.B.: Figures refer to House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e l e c t i o n s .
age of total non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which these parties’ candidates were present. It 
indicates that Australian Labor party candidates were present in 15.2 percent more electoral subdivisions 
in 1925 than in 1922. ALP formation was particularly marked in New South Wales, where the number of 
subdivisions with ALP candidates increased by 18.1 percent at this election. The number of subdivisions 
in other states with ALP candidates increased by 12.5 percent. As a result, Australian Labor Party 
candidates were present in almost all (95.3 percent) of Australia’s non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions 
at this election.
Conversely, Nationalist Party and Country Party candidates were present in fewer electoral subdivisions 
at this election than at the 1922 election. For each party, sub-national distinctions appear. Across 
Australia, for example, the number of electoral subdivisions with Nationalist Party candidates declined 
very slightly (by 1.9 percent) between the 1922 election and the 1925 election. In New South Wales this 
number decreased by 9.6 percent; in states other than New South Wales, however, it increased by 10.1 
percent. At this election, therefore, Nationalist Party dissolution occurred in New South Wales and 
Nationalist Party formation took place in states other than New South Wales.
The percentage change in the number of electoral subdivisions in which Country Party candidates were 
present was much greater than the percentage change in the number of electoral subdivisions in which 
Australian Labor Party or Nationalist Party candidates were present. At the 1925 election, the Country 
Party’s House of Representatives candidates were present in 168 electoral subdivisions. Across Australia, 
therefore, Country Party candidates were present in 45.5 percent fewer electoral subdivisions in 1925 than 
in 1922. Moreover, Country Party dissolution took place in all states. Country Party dissolution was less 
marked in New South Wales (where the party’s candidates were present in 34.6 percent fewer subdivi­
sions in 1925 than in 1922) than in states other than New South Wales (where its candidates were present 
in 57.2 percent fewer subdivisions at this election). In consequence, only in New South Wales were 
Country Party candidates present in more than 40 percent of a state’s electoral subdivisions. This result is 
consistent with the differential (New South Wales versus, states other than New South Wales) pattern of 
results observed at the 1922 election.
Clearly, if the number of constituencies in which a party’s candidates are present is a valid indicator of
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lhat party’s vigour, then the Country Party was much weaker in 1925 than in 1922. Particularly at this 
election, however, this inference may not be valid. Between the 1922 election and the 1925 election the 
Country Party entered into an electoral alliance with the Nationalist Party [for a detailed discussion of this 
alliance, see (Graham, 1966); (Page, 1963Appendix 6)]. In some House of Representatives elections, the 
two parties agreed that they would accord one another electoral preserves, within which they would not 
compete for votes. In other House of Representatives elections (and in Senate elections), each party urged 
its supporters to give their second preference vote to the other party.
Between the 1922 election and the 1925 election Country Party and Nationalist Party leaders thus 
restricted their respective parties’ electoral manoeuvrability (the freedom to present candidates in any and 
all constituencies) in return for greater electoral security (in some constituencies, the status as the sole 
non-Labor party; in other constituencies, the recipient of the other party’s second preference votes). It 
follows from the initial conditions specified in Chapter 3 that in such circumstances each party would 
attempt (subject to the bargaining strength of the other party) to negotiate an agreement that would permit 
it to direct organisational resources away from constituencies in which electoral returns were least attrac­
tive and to concentrate them in constituencies in which electoral returns were most attractive. Accord­
ingly, the decline between 1922 and 1925 in the number of constituencies in which Country Party 
candidates were present may constitute a rationalisation or a re-allocation (not necessarily an erosion) of 
the party’s organisational resources.
Table 5-5, which sets out determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution, indicates that the 
Country Party’s organisational resources were both eroded and re-allocated at this election. In New South 
Wales, the Country Party consolidated the strengths observed at the 1922 election. Agricultural and 
pastoral economic variables (particularly the Cattle, Grain Acreage and Mechanisation variables) 
remained much more powerful determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution than agricultural 
and pastoral occupational variables (such as the Farmer and Grazier variables). Indeed, the magnitude of 
the coefficients of all occupational variables drops precipitously (and their standard errors increase) at this 
election: unlike the 1922 election, at which three of the four occupational variables were associated with 
the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision, at the 1925 election only 
the Business variable showed such a relationship. (At both elections, the presence of businessmen and 
professionals in an electoral subdivision is strongly associated with Country Party formation in that 
subdivision).
Conversely, the relationship between the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production and 
the presence of Country Party candidates increased markedly at this election. The elasticity of the coef­
ficient of the Grain Acreage variable increases from 0.43(1922) to 1.21(1925); the elasticity of the 
coefficient of the Cattle variable increases from 1.23(1922) to 5.53(1925), and the elasticity of the 
coefficient of the Mechanisation variable increases from 0.69(1922) to 3.71(1925). These results, together 
with the large standard errors of the coefficients of the Fruit Acreage, Sheep and Dairy variables, indicate 
that in New South Wales electoral subdivisions a much stronger relationship existed between the produc­
tion of price- and income-inelastic commodities and Country Party formation (and the production of 
price- and income-elastic commodities and Country Party dissolution) at the 1925 election than at the 
1922 election. In New South Wales, in other words, the allocation of the Country Party’s candidates 
seemed to respond more clearly to the hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the major 
parties in 1925 than in 1922. This result suggests that (in organisational terms at least) in constituencies 
contested at both elections the Country Party seemed to be a stronger entity in 1925 than in 1922.
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T able 5-5: C ountry  Party 
Form ation  and D issolution , 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1925
Australia NSW OtherStates
E s t i m a t o r
M o del
N
logit
(1)
492
logit
(2)
254
probit
(2)
238
Indepe n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s :
R elig ion
A n g l i c a n 1.82 (0.61) -4.87 (3.16)** 1.99(3.01)**
O ccu pation
Far m e r
G r a z i e r
Labour
Business
2.77 (0.17) 
-10.80(0.32)** 
-8.97 (1.01)*
5.68 (0.74)**
0.23 (0.75) 
0.04 (0.17) 
-0.27 (0.45) 
3.14(5.85)**
-0.09(0.40) 
-0.02 (0.13) 
0.11(0.42) 
-0.52 (2.15)
L and  U tilisation
G r a i n  Acr e a g e  
Fruit Acr e a g e  
Sheep 
Cattle
M e c h a n i s a t i o n
D a i r y
0.37 (0.59)*** 
-0.36(0.22)**
0.04(0.11)
0.63(1.24)*** 
-1.23 (2.06)***
1.03(1.21)*** 
0.04(0.01) 
-0.03 (0.09)
2.41 (5.53)*** 
-2.13(3.71)** 
0.26(0.33)
-0.24 (1.22)* 
-0.10 (0.26) 
0.57 (3.94) * * *  
-1.34 (6.25)* * *  
0.62 (2.67) *
V o t e r  Turnout 
State (Dummy) 
(Constant)
-7.07 (4.21)**  
0.38 (0.15)
4.77 (3.49)*
-3.22 (0.56) -0.35(0.12)
N.B.: The dependent variable is CPCAND25.
Fig u r e s  within par e n t h e s e s  are point 
(measured at the independent variable
elasticities  
' s m e a n ) .
* indicates that t < 
**  indicates that 2.32 
* * *  indicates that t >
1.96
< t < 2.58 
2.58
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A very different pattern of results appears in states other than New South Wales. As in 1922, none of 
the four occupational variables was associated with the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate 
in one of these state’s electoral subdivisions. The Anglican variable, however, became a powerful deter­
minant of Country Party formation. As in New South Wales electoral subdivisions at this election, the 
coefficients of several agricultural and pastoral economic variables (e.g., Grain Acreage, Cattle, Sheep 
and Mechanisation) increased markedly in magnitude at this election. However, the direction of these 
variables’ coefficients is the opposite of that observed in New South Wales, and directly contradicts 
theoretical expectations. In these states a relationship existed between the production of price-elastic 
commodities and Country Party formation and the production of price-inelastic commodities and Country 
Party dissolution. In these states, in other words, the allocation of the Country Party’s candidates did not 
correspond with the hypothesised determinants voter dissatisfaction with the major parties.
Table 5-6, which sets out determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution at this election, 
helps to resolve this anomaly. In New South Wales electoral subdivisions the coefficient of the Labour 
variable is no longer associated with Nationalist Party formation. Further, the coefficient of the Grain 
Acreage variable changes direction (from 0.18 in 1922 to -0.30 in 1925) as does the coefficient of the 
Cattle variable (from 0.05 in 1922 to -0.64 in 1925). At the 1925 election, therefore, these agricultural and 
pastoral variable were associated with the departure of Nationalist Party candidates from New South 
Wales electoral subdivisions.
The elasticity of the coefficients of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables remained constant or 
increased markedly in magnitude in states other than New South Wales. (The elasticity of the coefficient 
of the Grain Acreage variable was 0.09 in 1922 and 0.08 in 1925, and the elasticity of the coefficient of 
the Cattle variable increased from 0.19 in 1922 to 0.38 in 1925). In these states, however, these variables 
were associated with the presence -  not the absence -  of Nationalist Party candidates in electoral 
subdivisions. Finally, the relationship between Nationalist Party formation and dissolution and the 
Mechanisation and variable increased in magnitude (the elasticity of the coefficient of the Mechanisation 
variable increased from 0.02 in 1922 to 0.29 in 1925), and was associated with the absence of Nationalist 
Party candidates from electoral subdivisions. In these states, then, the agricultural and pastoral economic 
determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution are stronger than the corresponding deter­
minants of Country Party formation and dissolution. In short, the determinants of Nationalist Party 
formation and dissolution in these states closely resemble the determinants of Country Party formation 
and dissolution in New South Wales.
Table 5-4 indicated that at the 1925 election (1) Nationalist Party dissolution occurred in the state in 
which the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in 1922 were strongest (i.e., in New 
South Wales), and that (2) Nationalist Party formation occurred in the states in which the determinants of 
Country Party formation and dissolution in 1922 were weakest (i.e., in states other than New South 
Wales). Table 5-4 thus indicated that at the 1925 election the Nationalist Party directed organisational 
resources away from constituencies in which the Country Party responded most clearly to voter dissatis­
faction with the major parties and directed organisational resources towards constituencies in which the 
Country Party responded least clearly to to voter dissatisfaction with the major parties.
Tables 5-5 and 5-6 corroborate this result. In states other than New South Wales the Nationalist Party 
responded to voter dissatisfaction with major parties by directing organisational resources towards con­
stituencies in which voter dissatisfaction with the major parties was greatest. It was for this reason that the 
determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales and the determinants of 
Nationalist Party formation and dissolution in states other than New South Wales are similar.
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T a b le  5-6: N ationalist Party  
F orm ation  and D issolution , 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1925
A u stralia NSW OtherStates
Estimator probit logit probit
Model (1) (2) (2)
N 492 254 238
Independent Variables:
R e lig io n
Anglican -2.31 (0.32) * -1.39(0.13) -2.40 (0.09)**
O c c u p a tio n
Farmer 0.00 (0.00) -4.09(0.02) 0.20 (0.02)
Grazier 4.11(0.05) * 9.71(0.03) -0.01(0.01)
Labour 9.37(0.44) *** 8.63(0.24) 0.63 (0.06)
Business -4.78(0.26) *** -4.56(0.10) 0.05 (0.01)
L a n d  U tilisa t io n
Grain Acreage -0.05(0.03) -0.30(0.09)** 0.60 (0.08)***
Fruit Acreage 0.16(0.04) -0.09(0.01) 0.05(0.01)
Sheep -0.03 (0.03) 0.01(0.01) -0.61 (0.11)**
Cattle 0.16(0.13) -0.64(0.37)** 3.24 (0.38)***
M e c h a n i s a t i o n 0.03(0.02) 0.44 (0.19) -2.68 (0.29)***
D airy 0.05 (0.02)
V o ter Turnout 1.81 (0.45) -0.68 (0.11) 0.52 (0.01)
State (Dummy) 0.07 (0.01)
(Constant) -0.67 (0.20) 3.07 (0.64) 0.70 (0.03)
N.B.: The depe n d e n t  variable is N P C A N D 2 5 .
Figures within parentheses are point elasticities
(computed at the independent v a r i able's mean).
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2 .32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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Two results emerge from an analysis of Country Party and Nationalist Party formation and dissolution 
at this election. First, the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales 
are consistent with theoretical expectations (and corroborates the results observed at the 1922 election). In 
this state, agricultural and pastoral economic variables, together with the Business variable, were the most 
powerful determinants of the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivi­
sion.
Second, results in states other than New South Wales illuminate an important (and hitherto 
unrecognised) aspect of the Country Party-Nationalist Party electoral coalition. Country Party dissolution 
between 1922 and 1925 was most prevalent in the constituencies in which the Country Party responded 
least clearly to the hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties in 1922 (i.e., 
in non-New South Wales constituencies). It was in these constituencies that Nationalist Party formation 
was most prevalent in 1925, and in which the Nationalist Party responded most clearly to the 
hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties. The Country Party-Nationalist 
Party electoral alliance thus permitted the Country Party to concentrate resources in the constituencies in 
which it responded best to voter dissatisfaction (i.e., New South Wales constituencies). At the same time, 
it permitted the Nationalist Party to concentrate resources in constituencies in which the Country Party 
responded relatively poorly to voter dissatisfaction with the major parties (i.e., in non-New South Wales 
constituencies). This electoral alliance, in other words, facilitated a more efficient allocation of the 
non-Labor parties’ electoral resources.
5.3. The 1928 Commonwealth Election
At the 1928 election the Nationalist Party-Country Party coalition government repeated the strategy 
which proved to be successful at the 1925 election: "the Government’s election programme was again 
based almost entirely on the issue of industrial peace. We sought a further mandate to impose law and 
order on the trade unions" (Page, 1963p.l77). Similarly, a former Nationalist Party leader and Prime 
Minister "represented the election as a conflict between two sets of principles; on the one hand liberty, 
equality before the law and the participation of all in law-making; on the other, oppression, dictatorship 
and lawlessness" (Fitzhardinge, 1979p.568).
Table 5-7 sets out, in each state and across Australia, (1) the number of non-metropolitan electoral 
subdivisions in which Country Party, Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party candidates were 
present at this election, and (2) the percentage of total non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which 
these parties’ candidates were present. It indicates that Australian Labor Party candidates present in 32.7 
percent fewer electoral divisions in 1928 than in 1925. ALP dissolution was particularly marked in states 
other than New South Wales, where the number of electoral subdivisions with Labor party candidates 
decreased by 49.1 percent between 1925 and 1928. (The number of electoral subdivisions in New South 
Wales with ALP candidates decreased by 25.7 percent). As a result, in no state were Australian Labor 
Party candidates present in more than 75 percent of electoral subdivisions.
Nationalist Party and Country Party dissolution was less pronounced than Australian Labor Party 
dissolution at this election. Across Australia, Nationalist Party candidates were present in 21.6 percent 
fewer electoral subdivisions in 1928 than in 1925. (They were present in 22.7 percent fewer electoral 
subdivisions in New South Wales and 20.1 percent fewer electoral subdivisions in states other than New 
South Wales).
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Table 5-7: Non-Metropolitan Electoral Subdivisions
With Country Party, Nationalist Party and 
Australian Labor Party Candidates, 
Commonwealth Election, 1928
Country Nationalist Labor
Party Party Party
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
N e w  South Wales 85 (33.5) 160 (63.0) 189 (74.4)
Q u e e n s l a n d 37 (37.0) 30 (30.0) 67 (67.0)
South A ustralia 30 (52.6) 57 (100.0) 27 (47.4)
W e s t e r n  Australia 9 (24.3) 0 (0.0) 9 (24.3)
Tasmania 0 (0.0) 44 (100.0) 7 (15.9)
A u stralia 161 (32.7) 291 (59.2) 299 (60.8)
N.B.: Figures refer to House of R e presentatives e l e c t i o n s .
Country Party candidates were present in only 4.4 percent fewer electoral subdivisions at the 1928 
election than at the 1925 election. As in 1925, sub-national distinctions in Country Party formation and 
dissolution continued to appear in 1928. At this election Country Party candidates were present in 17.5 
percent fewer electoral subdivisions in New South Wales, but were present in 13.9 percent more electoral 
subdivisions in states other than New South Wales. At the 1928 election, in other words, Country Party 
dissolution occurred in New South Wales and Country Party formation occurred in states other than New 
South Wales.
Table 5-8 sets out determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution (i.e., determinants of the 
presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision) at this election. In New 
South Wales, agricultural and pastoral economic variables (such as Cattle, Grain Acreage, Mechanisation 
and Sheep) remained more powerful predictors of Country Party formation and dissolution than agricul­
tural and pastoral occupational variables (such as Farmer and Grazier). In this state, in other words, 
occupational status as a farmer or a grazier continued to be unassociated with the presence of a Country 
Party candidate in an electoral subdivision; the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral produc­
tion, however, were strong predictors of such a relationship. This finding corroborates the results ob­
served at the 1922 and the 1925 election.
Similarly, Country Party formation remained associated with the production of price- and income- 
inelastic commodities (such as grain and beef cattle) and Country Party dissolution remained associated 
with the production of price- and income-elastic commodities (such as fruits and vegetables and 
sheep/wool) as well as with farm mechanisation. Further, Country Party formation remained associated 
with the presence of rural businessmen and professionals, and Country Party dissolution remained as­
sociated with the presence of workers in secondary industry.
At the same time, the magnitude of the coefficients of agricultural and pastoral economic variables 
declined (in absolute terms and relative to the magnitude of the coefficients of occupational variables) 
between the 1925 election and the 1928 election. The coefficient of the Grain Acreage variable, for 
example, decreased from 1.03(1925) to 0.88(1928); the coefficient of the Cattle variable decreased from
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T a b le  5-8: C ountry  Party 
Form ation  and D issolution , 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1928
Australia NSW OtherStates
Estimator
Model
N
probit
(2)
492
logit
(2)
254
logit
(2)
238
Independent V a r i a b l e s :
R elig io n
Anglican -1.00 (0.81)*** -4.60 (2.80)** -0.61 (0.29)
O ccu p a tio n
Farmer
Grazier
Labour
Business
0.19(0.64)**
0.02 (0.01) 
-0.54(1.15)** 
0.83(1.91)***
0.01 (0.04)
0.37(1.35) 
-0.32 (0.51) 
3.28 (5.72)**
0.17 (0.25) 
0.05 (0.11) 
-0.55(0.68) 
0.75(2.15)
L a n d  U tilisa t io n
Grain Acreage 
Fruit Acreage 
Sheep 
Cattle
Mecha n i s a t i o n
D a iry
0.13 (0.21)*** 
-0.08 (0.04) 
0.06 (0.22) 
0.22 (0.59)*** 
-0.41 (0.86)***
0.88 (0.93) * * *  
0.06(0.02) 
-0.27 (0.76) * 
2.09(4.40)*** 
-0.55(0.87) 
-0.37 (0.98)
-0.14 (0.15) 
-0.07 (0.03) 
0.14(0.31) 
-0.19(0.28) 
0.00 (0.00)
V o ter Turnout 
State (Dummy)
0.22 (0.04) 
0.04 (0.02)
2.96(0.43) 1.41(0.14)
N.B.: The dependent variable is CPCAND28.
Figures within parentheses are point 
(computed at the independent variable
e l a s ticities  
' s m e a n ) .
* indicates that t <  
** indicates that 2.32 
* * *  indicates that t >
1.96
< t < 2.58 
2.58
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2.41(1925) to 2.09(1928), and the coefficient of the Mechanisation variable decreased from -2.13(1925) 
to -0.55(1928). Conversely, the coefficients of the Anglican and Business variables remained almost 
unchanged between these elections. In New South Wales, therefore, the Country Party responded less 
clearly to voter dissatisfaction with the major parties in 1928 than in 1925 (although it responded more 
clearly to this dissatisfaction in 1928 than in 1922).
A much weaker pattem of results appears in states other than New South Wales. In these states, the 
coefficients of all variables decreased between 1925 and 1928. The elasticity of the coefficient of the 
Anglican variable decreased from 3.01(1925) to 0.29(1928); the elasticity of the coefficient of the Grain 
Acreage variable decreased from 1.22(1925) to 0.15(1928); the elasticity of the coefficient of the Cattle 
variable decreased from 6.25(1925) to 0.28(1928) and the elasticity of the coefficient of the Mechanisa­
tion variable decreased from 2.67(1925) to 0.00(1928). As a result, at this election none of the model’s 
variables was associated with the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral 
subdivision. Accordingly, the theoretically-anomalous results observed in these states at the 1925 election 
did not re-appear at the 1928 election. As in 1925, however, in these states the Country Party failed to 
allocate electoral and organisational resources in response to voter dissatisfaction with the major parties. 
The New South Wales versus non-New South Wales divergence that was observed at the 1922 and 1925 
elections thus continues to appear at the 1928 election.
Conversely, the allocation of the Nationalist Party’s candidates seemed to respond to voters who were 
satisfied with the major parties. Table 5-9 sets out determinants of Nationalist Party formation and 
dissolution at this election. It indicates that the coefficients of occupational variables declined in mag­
nitude between 1925 and 1928. Across Australia, for example, the coefficient of the Anglican variable 
declined from -2.31(1925) to -0.96(1928); the coefficient of the Grazier variable declined from 
4.11(1925) to 0.09(1928); the coefficient of the Labour variable declined from 9.37(1925) to 0.74(1928) 
and the coefficient of the Business variable declined from -4.78(1925) to -0.32(1928).
At the same time, the coefficients of agricultural and pastoral economic variables increased markedly at 
this election. The coefficient of the Grain Acreage variable, for example, increased from -0.05(1925) to 
-0.12(1928); the coefficient of the Fruit Acreage variable increased from 0.16(1925) to 0.29(1928); the 
coefficient of the Sheep variable increased from -0.03(1925) to 0.07(1928); the coefficient of the Cattle 
variable increased from 0.16(1925) to -0.25(1928) and the coefficient of the Dairy variable increased 
from 0.05(1925) to 0.90(1928). As a result — and much more clearly than in 1922 or 1925 -- the 
production of price- and income-elastic commodities (fruits and vegetables, sheep/wool and dairy 
products) was associated with the presence of a Nationalist Party candidate in an electoral subdivision and 
the production of price- and income-inelastic commodities (grain and beef cattle) was associated with the 
absence of a Nationalist Party candidate from an electoral subdivision.
At this election, in other words, the agricultural and pastoral economic determinants of Nationalist Party 
formation and dissolution and the agricultural and pastoral economic determinants of Country Party 
formation and dissolution were polar opposites. Country Party candidates responded to voters who were 
dissatisfied with the major parties. Nationalist Party candidates responded to voters who remained 
satisfied with the major parties.
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T a b le  5-9: N ationalist Party
F orm ation  and  D isso lu tion ,
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1928
Australia NSW OtherStates
Estim a t o r probit logit probit
Model (2) (2) (2)
N 492 254 238
Independent V a r i a b l e s :
R e lig io n
Angli c a n -0.96(0.42)** 2.18 (0.50) -1.28(0.53)**
O c c u p a t io n
Farmer 0.06(0.10) 0.33 (0.39) 0.05(0.07)
G r azier 0.09(0.21) 0.05 (0.06) 0.08(0.15)
Labour 0.74(0.84)*** 1.01(0.61) 0.92 (0.98)
Business -0.32 (0.39) -0.46(0.30) -0.50 (0.56)
L a n d  U tilisa t io n
Grain Acr e a g e -0.12 (0.11)** -0.62 (0.25)*** 0.00 (0.00)
Fruit A c r e a g e 0.29(0.08)*** 0.17 (0.02) 0.23 (0.08)**
Sheep 0.07 (0.15)** 0.55(0.58)*** 0.00 (0.00)
Cattle -0.25 (0.36)*** -1.73 (1.39)*** -0.17 (0.22)*
M e c h a n i s a t i o n 0.03(0.03) -0.55 (0.33) 0.10(0.11)
D a i r y 0.90 (0.42)**
V o t e r  Turnout 3.00 (0.29)** -2.62 (0.14) 3.96(0.33)**
State (Dummy) 0.08 (0.02)
(Constant) -0.67 (0.20) 7.85(2.32) 1.61(0.77)**
N.B.: The dependent variable is NPCAND28.
Figures within parentheses are point elasti c i t i e s
(computed at the independent variable 's m e a n s ) .
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates thar 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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5.4. Summary and Conclusion
Three results emerge from the analysis undertaken in this chapter. (1) At the 1922, 1925 and 1928 
elections the agricultural and pastoral economic variables (together with the Business variable) were the 
most important determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production (and not occupational 
status as a farmer or a grazier) are the most important criteria which guide agrarian party leaders’ decision 
to present candidates in particular constituencies.
(2) Between 1922 and 1928 the production of price- and income-inelastic commodities (particularly 
grain and beef cattle) was the most important determinant of Country Party formation and the production 
of price- and income-elastic commodities (particularly fruits and vegetables, sheep/wool and dairy 
products), together with farm mechanisation, was the most important determinant of Country Party 
dissolution. Conversely, the production of price- and income-inelastic commodities was associated with 
(but was not the most important determinant of) Nationalist Party dissolution, and the production of price- 
and income-elastic commodities was associated with (but was not the most important determinant of) 
Nationalist Party formation. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that Country Party formation 
(and Nationalist Party dissolution) was a consequence of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties, and 
that Nationalist Party formation (and Country Party dissolution) was a consequence of satisfaction with 
the major parties.
(3) This analysis indicates that the greater the extent to which agrarian party formation responds to the 
hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties, the longer-lived is the agrarian 
party. At the 1922, 1925 and 1928 elections the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral produc­
tion were stronger predictors of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales than in 
states other than New South Wales. At none of these elections did Country Party formation correspond, in 
states other than New South Wales, to the hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the 
non-major parties. This analysis thus suggests that it is at least in part for this reason that the Country 
Party proved to be a relatively durable entity in New South Wales and a relatively ephemeral entity in 
states other than New South Wales.
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Chapter 6
Agrarian Party Electoral Support 
(Voter Behaviour)
Chapter 3 hypothesised that non-major parties’ electoral support (including the electoral support of 
agrarian parties such as the Australian Country Party) is a consequence of voter dissatisfaction with the 
major parties and an economic issue(s) whose salience attains crisis proportions. It defined non-major 
party electoral support as the non-major party’s percentage share of the total vote in constituencies in 
which its candidates are present
More specifically, Chapter 3 hypothesised that agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli influence 
rural voter behaviour given a decrease in primary commodity prices below the average variable cost of 
commodity production, the production of price- and income-inelastic engenders dissatisfaction with the 
major parties and (given the presence of an agrarian party candidate) electoral support for the agrarian 
party. Chapter 3 hypothesised that these two factors are the most important determinants of the agrarian 
party’s electoral support. This chapter tests these hypotheses. It analyses, using the Generalised Least 
Squares estimator and Models (1) and (2), the extent to which agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli 
influenced rural voter behaviour at the Australian (Commonwealth) elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928. It 
concludes that these economic stimuli were the most important determinants of the Country Party’s 
electoral support at these elections.
6.1. The 1922 Commonwealth Election
Electoral support for the Australian Country Party, as opposed to electoral support for an Australian 
"country party", commenced at the 1922 Commonwealth election. Unlike the 1919 election, at which 
rural "country party" candidates conducted unco-ordinated, independent campaigns under a variety of 
labels (often with help from the Nationalist Party), the Country Party contested the 1922 election as a 
cohesive party (Hughes, 1985p.36); (Hughes and Graham, 1974pp.320-325); (Graham, 1966pp. 166-167); 
(Page, 1963p.62 and 85).
There is currently no study which analyses the extent to which members of particular religious 
denominations gave disproportionate electoral support to the Country Party. Several studies, however, 
discuss the party’s economic and occupational base of support. Graham, for example, contends that grain 
growers (and particularly wheat growers) were the party’s strongest base of support at these elections 
(Graham, 1966pp.21-22 and 27-28) and that dairy farmers and fruit and vegetable growers also supported 
the Country Party (Graham, 1966p.ll9). Alexander argues that "to some extent the Country Party 
provided a channel through which the old conservative pastoralist or squatter group might regain an 
active part in Australian politics," and that, generally speaking, the small "cocky" farmer also supported 
the Country Party (Alexander, 1967p.60); see also (Graham, 1966pp.21-28). Finally, Aitkin concludes 
that rural business interests were an important component of the party’s electoral support (Aitkin, 1972).
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Considered as a group, these studies seem to concur with contemporary observers’ contention that the 
Country Party "included all classes of producers and consumers, farmers and city men, employers and 
workers" (Page, 1963p.77).
This study hypothesises that the Country Party received electoral support from much more specific 
strata of the rural electorate. It hypothesises that grain growers supported the Country Party and that fruit 
and vegetable growers, dairy farmers and graziers did not support the Country Party. It also hypothesises 
that producers which employed greater amounts of farm machinery rejected the Country Party; that 
producers of beef cattle (but not producers of sheep and wool) supported the Country Party; that the 
Country Party did not receive disproportionate support from members of any religious denomination; that 
a negative relationship exists between voter turnout and Country Party support and, most importantly 
(because agrarian party electoral support is hypothesised to be a consequence of voter dissatisfaction from 
major parties and the salience of agricultural commodity prices), that the Country Party’s electoral 
support is best described with a multiplicative and exponential rather than with an additive and linear 
statistical model.
Table 6-1: Electoral Support,
Commonwealth Election, 1922 
(Summary Statistics)
Country Nationalist Labor
Party Party Party
Mean s.d.* Mean s.d.* Mean s.d.
H ouse o f  R ep resen ta tives**
New South Wales 33.4 17.5 26.4 16.0 31.2 18.8
Queensland 32.5 16.9 14.9 19.7 48.5 15.0
South Australia 19.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 30.0 12.9
Western Australia 72.1 10.0 13.0 11.3 0.0 0.0
Tasmania 37.0 13.0 31.1 13.6 20.7 18.4
Australia 33.3 18.1 21.0 18.1 32.7 20.3
S e n a te * * *
New South Wales 22.7 15.7 29.2 15.0 36.5 13.8
Queensland 13.4 8 . 9 31.0 9.6 41.6 11.8
South Australia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Western Australia 16.1 16.5 34.7 12.4 38.6 16.0
Tasmania 9.0 5.5 44.9 14.7 37.1 17.6
Australia 18.6 14.6 31.7 14.4 37.9 14.1
* s.d. indicates the mean's standard deviation. 
** Figures refer to the percentage of the total 
vote in subdivisions with a Country Party 
candidate (House of Representatives).
*** Figures refer to the percentage of the total 
vote in subdivisions with a Country Party 
candidate (Senate).
Table 6-1 summarises the results of the 1922 Commonwealth election in electoral subdivisions con­
tested by the Country Party. It indicates that in House of Representatives elections the Country Party’s 
percentage share of the vote was generally greater than that received by the Nationalist Party and the
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Australian Labor Party. Only in Western Australia, however, did it receive the support of a majority of 
electors. It also indicates that in Senate elections the major parties’ percentage share of the vote was 
generally twice as great as the Country Party’s share of the vote. Clearly, therefore, at this election the 
Country Party received considerable but not overwhelming support in the electoral subdivisions in which 
its candidates were present.
Table 6-2: Preferred Models of Electoral Support, 
Commonwealth Election, 1922
House of
Representatives Senate
Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
Country Party*
Austr a l i a  (All States) (2) (2) (2) (2)
N ew South Wales (1) (2) (2) (2)
Other States (2) (2) (2) (2)
Australian Labor Party***
Austr a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (2) (1)
Ne w  South Wales (1) (1) (1) (1)
Other States (2) (1) (1) (1)
Nationalist Party**
A u s t r a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (2) (1)
Ne w  South Wales (1) (1) (1) (1)
O t her States (1) (1) (2) (1)
* In subelectorates c o n t e s t e d  by the C o u n t r y  Party
** In subelectorates c o n t e s t e d  by the C o u n t r y  Party and
the National Party
*** In subelectorates c o n t e s t e d  by 
the A u s t ralian Labor Party
the C o u n t r y  Party and
Table 6-2 summarises the results of model specification tests.40 It indicates that in all states and in both 
House of Representatives and Senate elections, a multiplicative and exponential model (Model 2) 
provides a more adequate representation of the Country Party’s electoral support than a linear and 
additive specification (Model 1). It also indicates that Model (1) represents the electoral support of the 
Nationalist Party and the Australian Labor Party more adequately than Model (2) (see section 4.2.2. for 
details of these model specifications). These findings replicate the observation made by Burnham and 
Sprague at the American presidential elections of 1968 (at which a non-major party candidate received 
thirteen percent of the national vote) (Burnham and Sprague, 1970). Because a multiplicative and ex­
ponential function is the general form of the relationship between the magnitude of voter dissatisfaction 
with the major parties and electoral behaviour, this result is consistent with the Sprague’s hypothesis that 
the non-major party vote is an "act of positive or aggressive alienation" with the major parties (Burnham 
and Sprague, 1970p.l056).
Table 6-2 indicates that Country Party support at this election is statistically distinctive. If the Country 
Party’s electoral support was indeed a consequence of voters’ "aggressive hostility towards the leaders, 
parties and policies of the existing political order" (Burnham and Sprague, 1970), and if Model (2) taps
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voter dissatisfaction with major parties, do the coefficients of this model reflect this dissatisfaction? Are 
the parameters of Country Party support distinct from the parameters of Nationalist Party and Australian 
Labor Party support? In short, is the Country Party’s electoral support distinctive in substantive terms?
Table 6-3 reports estimated parameters of voter turnout and Country Party electoral support in subdivi­
sions across Australia with Country Party candidates.41 Each type of independent variable — religious,42 
occupational, economic and political — is a strong predictor of voter turnout. Two sets of relationships 
merit elaboration. (1) The tendency for graziers, rural businessmen and farmers to participate at elections 
differed markedly at this election: occupational status as a grazier and as a rural businessman facilitated 
electoral participation, and occupational status as a farmer discouraged electoral participation. At the 
same time, some agricultural and pastoral economic variables (such as the Grain Acreage, Cattle and 
Mechanisation variables) encouraged voter turnout. (2) Voter turnout was fifteen to twenty percent below 
the national average in New South Wales.
Most variables are also strong predictors of the Country Party’s electoral support. Five relationships are 
particularly noteworthy. (1) At this election the Country Party had no religious base of support: the 
standard error of the Anglican variable (as well as alternate model specifications employing Methodist, 
Presbyterian and Roman Catholic variables) is large relative to the size of its coefficient. (2) At this 
election occupational status as a grazier was not related to the Country Party’s electoral support. One of 
the economic measures of pastoral production, however, was a strong predictor of Country Party support: 
the greater the average size of herds of beef cattle (but not sheep) per farm, the greater the support for the 
Country Party.
(3) Occupational status as a farmer was associated with electoral support for the Country Party at this 
election. Nonetheless, the coefficients of economic measures of agricultural production (such as the Grain 
Acreage and Mechanisation variables) are larger than the coefficient of the Farmer variable. These 
economic variables are therefore stronger determinants of the Country Party vote than the Farmer vari­
able. At this election, in other words, these economic attributes of agricultural production were stronger 
predictors of Country Party support than was occupational status as a farmer.
(4) In House of Representatives elections the coefficient of the Business variable is four times larger 
than the coefficient of the Farmer variable. It is also larger than the coefficients of the economic variables. 
This result indicates that rural businessmen constituted a bulwark of Country Party electoral support at 
this election. (5) The relationship between electoral participation and the Country Party’s electoral sup­
port was strongly negative at this election. The coefficient of Voter Turnout (House of Representatives) 
indicates that the Country Party drew disproportionate support from districts with low levels of electoral 
participation. Indeed, this coefficient represents the strongest relationship in the table: a one percent 
decline in voter turnout in a subdivision was associated, on average, with an increase of 1.84 percent in 
the Country Party’s share of the vote in that subdivision. This negative relationship also emerges in other 
coefficients. Farm owners, for example, were less likely to cast ballots but were disproportionately likely 
to vote for the Country Party; farm mechanisation encouraged electoral participation but reduced the 
Country Party vote; voter turnout was lowest in New South Wales whilst Country Party support was 
greatest in that state.
Table 6-4 reports estimated parameters of voter turnout and Country Party electoral support for electoral 
subdivisions in New South Wales that were contested by Country Party candidates at this election.43 Four 
features distinguish the Country Party’s electoral support in New South Wales from its electoral support 
across Australia. (1) Graziers in New South Wales rejected the Country Party. In both House of
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Table 6-3: Country Party Electoral Support, All States, 
Commonwealth Election, 1922
House of
Representatives Senate
Variable Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
R elig ion
Anglican -.2 1*** .14 - . 41 * * * -.37
O ccupation
Farmer - .10*** . 13** -. 06*** .24***
Grazier 04*** .01 04*** -.02
Labour .05 _79*** . 07* -.41***
Business .10** . 52*** #12*** . 32**
L and U tilisation
Grain Acreage .03*** .15*** .03*** _ 14 * * *
Fruit Acreage .01 -.25 -.01 -.02
Sheep - .02 * * * .01 .02 * * * .01
Cattle .06*** . 42*** . 05*** .28***
Mechanisation .04* _ 4 0 * * * .04** - .28***
Voter Turnout 
State (Dummy) -. 15***
-1.84*** 
.20* -.2 0***
-.26
.73***
(Constant) t .55*** -3.15*** _ _ 41 * * * -2 .86***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (2 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )
N 313 313 435 435
N.B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC22, CSPC22 AND TOUT22 
The coefficients of Model (2) are both unstandardised 
b's and constant elasticities.
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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Table 6-4: Country Party Electoral Support, New South Wales, 
Commonwealth Election, 1922
House of
Representatives Senate
Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
Variable
Religion
Anglican -. 18** - . 2 2 CMO1 o u>
Occupation
Farmer -.55** . 1 1 * - . 0 2 .13**
Grazier .34 -.04** . 0 1 -.1 1 **
Labour CNO - . 2 1 - . 0 2 -.2 0 **
Business -.07 . 61** -.03 . 61***
Land Utilisation
Grain Acreage -.0 1 ** .2 2 *** . 0 1 _ * * *
Fruit Acreage . 0 1 - . 1 1 -. 05** -. 23***
Dairy - . 0 1 -. 2 2 ** .08*** _ _ i Q * * *
Sheep . 0 1 -. 08** . 03*** -.05*
Cattle — o 4 * * * _ 7 4 *** -.05** . 62***
Mechanisation . 05*** -.48** .04** -.25***
Voter Turnout 
(Constant) . 67***
-2.07*** 
-3.42*** -.78*** -2
-.17**
1 2 ***
Model (1 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS
N 156 156 254 254
N.B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC22, CPSPC22 and TOUT22. 
The coefficients of Model (2) are both unstandardised 
b's and constant elasticities. The coefficients of 
Model (1) are unstandardised b's.
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that > 2.58
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Representatives and Senate elections a strong negative relationship exists between the Grazier variable 
and the Country party vote. Occupational status as a grazier, in other words, was associated with electoral 
support for parties other than the Country Party. The Cattle variable, however, continues to be a strong 
predictor of the party’s support. Indeed, the magnitude of its coefficient is much greater within New 
South Wales than across Australia. These results indicate that in New South Wales the economic at­
tributes of pastoral production were more important determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support 
than was occupational status as a grazier. They also indicate that pastoral economic variables were 
stronger determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support in New South Wales than in other states.
(2) The coefficient of the Dairy variable indicates that, at least within New South Wales, an increase in 
the size of dairy herds per farm decreased the Country Party’s electoral support. (3) Occupational status 
as a farmer in New South Wales was associated with electoral support for the Country Party. At the same 
time, agricultural economic variables (particularly Grain Acreage and Mechanisation) yield larger and 
more efficient coefficients than the Farmer variable. Like the Cattle measure, the magnitude of these 
variables is greater in New South Wales than across Australia. This result indicates that voting in 
response to agricultural economic conditions was more prevalent within this state than in other states.
(4) A strong relationship emerges between the Business variable and the Country Party’s electoral 
support. The size of its coefficient relative to other coefficients indicates that rural businessmen were a 
bulwark of the Country Party vote in this state. (5) The negative relationship between electoral participa­
tion and Country Party support represents the strongest relationship in the table. Farm owners, for 
example, were less likely to vote but more likely to vote for the Country Party. Conversely, farm 
mechanisation encouraged voter turnout but discouraged Country Party electoral support. This relation­
ship is stronger within New South Wales than across Australia (the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
Turnout variable, for example, increases from -1.84 to -2.07). Moreover, other sets of coefficients bear 
signs of this relationship: an increase in the value of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables, for example, 
decrease voter turnout but increase Country Party support; increases in the Grazier, Dairy, Sheep and 
Fruit Acreage variables show the opposite tendency.
Country Party support in New South Wales and states other than New South Wales differed sharply at 
this election. Table 6-5 reports estimated parameters of voter turnout and the Country Party’s electoral 
support in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.44 Once again, five relation­
ships are noteworthy. (1) In these states the Country Party had no religious base of support. (Indeed, in 
Senate elections the coefficient of the Anglican variable is strongly negative). (2) In these states (unlike 
New South Wales) occupational status as a grazier is associated with electoral support for the Country 
Party. At the same time, the magnitude of economic coefficients of pastoral production (particularly the 
coefficient of the Cattle variable), is much smaller in these states than in New South Wales. The pastoral 
bulwark of the Country Party support which is present in New South Wales is thus largely absent in other 
states.
(3) To a slightly greater extent than in New South Wales (particularly in Senate elections) occupational 
status as a farmer was associated with electoral support for the Country Party. Conversely, agricultural 
economic indicators yield much smaller coefficients (and hence suggest weaker links to the Country Party 
vote) in these states than in New South Wales. The party’s agricultural economic bulwark was thus 
weaker in these states than in New South Wales. (4) Similarly, the relationship between the Business 
variable and Country Party support is much weaker in these states than in New South Wales. This result 
indicates that a third bulwark of the party’s strength in New South Wales was much weaker in these other
states.
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Table 6-5: Country Party Electoral Support, 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania, Commonwealth Election, 1922
House of
Representatives Senate
Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
Variable
R elig ion
Anglican -. 35*** .35 - . 4 5*** -.81**
O ccu pation
Farmer -.06*** . 15** ”.04*** .28***
Grazier .04** .06 .04** .1 1*
Labour .01 -1 .0 0*** .01 -.21
Business .16 . 51** .11
L and  U tilisa tion
Grain Acreage .02 . 05** .01 .1 0**
Fruit Acreage .01 -.03 -.01 . 1 1*
Sheep -.03*** .04 — # q  4 ★ ★ ★ .01
Cattle _ ]_!*** .19* .08*** .05
Mechanisation - . 1 1*** -.18 -.07** -.09
Voter Turnout 
(Constant) - .51***
-1.14*** 
-2.60***
.02
-2.04***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (2 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )
N 157 157 181 181
N.B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC22, CSPC22 AND TOUT22 
The coefficients of Model (2) are both unstandardised 
b's and constant elasticities.
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** t < 2.58
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(5) The relationship between the Turnout variable and Country Party support is weaker in states other 
than New South Wales than in New South Wales (-1.14 versus -2.07). This result reflects the generally 
weaker pattern of results observed in these states. Moreover, this negative relationship is replicated in 
only one other pair of coefficients: as in New South Wales, farm owners were less likely to cast ballots 
but were more likely to vote for the Country Party.
Three results emerge from an analysis of Tables 6-3,6-4 and 6-5. First, the Farmer, Business, Cattle and 
Grain Acreage variables were, across Australia, the most important determinants of the Country Party’s 
electoral support at this election. Moreover, these agricultural economic variables were stronger predic­
tors of the Country Party vote than was occupational status as a farmer. This result, together with the 
finding that the party has no religious base, is consistent with the hypothesis that agricultural and pastoral 
economic stimuli are the most important catalysts of the agrarian party’s electoral support.
Second, at this election the Country Party’s electoral support in New South Wales and states other than 
New South Wales rested upon similar but unequally-firm foundations. In states other than New South 
Wales the Country Party lacked at least two of the pillars of support that it possessed in New South 
Wales. In particular, the coefficients of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables are smaller (and their 
standard errors are larger) than their counterparts in New South Wales. This observation also applies to 
the coefficient of the Business variable. The Country Party’s electoral support was thus more tenuous 
(and hence the party itself was weaker) in these states than in New South Wales.
Finally, at this election the parameters of the Country Party’s electoral support closely resemble the 
parameters of its formation and dissolution (which were reported in Chapter 5). A comparison of Tables 
6-3, 6-4, 6-5 and 5-2 reveals that the same variables -  Grain Acreage, Cattle, Business and Mechanisa­
tion — are most closely associated with the Country Party’s formation and electoral support. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that agrarian party candidates appear in the constituencies in which voter 
dissatisfaction with the major parties is greatest and that voters in these constituencies who are most 
dissatisfied with the major parties vote for an agrarian party candidate.
The parameters of the electoral support of the Australian Labor Party and the Nationalist Party differ 
significantly from the parameters of the Country Party’s electoral support. Table 6-6 reports the 
parameters of the Australian Labor Party vote in electoral subdivisions contested by the Country Party 
and the Australian Labor Party.45 Five sets of relationships distinguish the ALP’s electoral support from 
the Country Party’s electoral support (1) In all states and in both House of Representatives and Senate 
elections, the ALP (unlike the Country Party) had a very strong religious base of support (The coef­
ficients of the Catholic variable are among the largest coefficients in the table). (2) Occupational status as 
a grazier in New South Wales was associated with electoral support for the Labor Party, in other words, 
engendered support for the ALP. The economic attributes of pastoral production, however, did not 
engender support for this party: the coefficient of the Cattle variable is consistently (and strongly) 
negative, the direction of the coefficients of the Sheep and Dairy variables is negative (and their standard 
error is generally large). Measures of pastoral economic production, in other words, were determinants of 
of the Country Party’s -  not of the Labor Party’s -  electoral support.
(3) At this election farm owners rejected the ALP. The negative relationship between the Farmer 
variable and the Labor Party vote is, almost without exception, the strongest and most efficient in each 
equation. Further, measures of agricultural economic production (Grain Acreage, Fruit Acreage and 
Mechanisation) yield much more modest (and, with the exception of Mechanisation, negative) relation­
ships. Clearly, therefore, the ALP (unlike the Country Party) lacked an agricultural (or agricultural
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Table 6-6: Australian Labor Party Electoral Support, 
All States, Commonwealth Election, 1922
House of Representatives Senate
Aust N SW Other
V a r i a b l e
Aust NS W  Other
Religion
Catholic 4 t"J * ★ ★ 69*** .35* .56*** .56*** . 66***
Occupation
Farmer #91*** -1.47*** -.96*** _ _ 77***_ 1.73*** -. 66***
Grazier . 32* 1.90** .19 .31* 1.61*** .12
Labour .54** -.15 .69** 72*** _ 41*** .54**
Business .33** .47 -.31* — 4 4 * * * -.56** -. 32**
Land Utilisation
Grain . 02*** -.01 -.02* -.01** -.01 -.01*
Fruit . 02*** -.02 -. 03** -.02** .02 -.03**
Sheep .01 -.01 .01 .01** -.01 -.00
Cattle
Dairy
.06*** -.05**
.01
-.03** -. 05*** -.05*** 
— q 4 * * *
-.01
Mech'is'n .07*** .03 . 05** . 05*** 0 9*** .02
Turnout
State
. 12 
.05**
_7 4*** .07 .01
-.1 0***
.13 -.2 2**
(Constant) . 32*** . 14 # 4 4 * * * .35*** .26*** . 43***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
N 255 125 130 435 254 181
N.B.: The dependent variables are ALPHRPC22 and ALPSPC22.
The coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b's.
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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economic) economic base of support at this election. (4) The magnitude of the relationship between the 
Business measure and the ALP vote, with one exception (the House of Representatives election in New 
South Wales), is strongly negative. This result indicates that the Labor Party, unlike the Country Party, 
lacked support from rural business interests. (5) little or no relationship emerges between electoral 
participation and ALP electoral support. Moreover (contrary to the result observed in Tables 6-3, 6-4, and 
6-5), in all but one instance the coefficient of Turnout is positive.
Table 6-7 reports parameters of the Nationalist Party’s electoral support in electoral subdivisions con­
tested by the Nationalist Party and the Country Party.46 It indicates that at this election the Nationalist 
Party lacked a readily identifiable electoral base. Like the Country Party, the Nationalist Party had no 
religious base of support at this election. The coefficient of the Anglican variable is negative in New 
South Wales (House of Representatives), and its standard error is large in other states. At this election 
occupational status as a grazier was not associated with electoral support for the Nationalist Party. (The 
coefficient of the Grazier variable is generally negative -  in one instance significantly so). Nor, for the 
most part, were measures of pastoral economic production associated with the Nationalist Party’s elec­
toral support: the coefficient of the Cattle variable is negative (or its standard error is large), and the 
coefficient of the Sheep variable gives mixed results. Only the coefficient of the Dairy variable provides 
unambiguously positive results. Primary producers with larger dairy herds supported the Nationalist 
Party. In all other respects, the Nationalist Party lacked a pastoral base of support.
At this election occupational status as a farmer was strongly associated with Nationalist Party support. 
Indeed, the coefficient of the Farmer variable is, without exception, the strongest predictor of the 
Nationalist Party’s electoral support at this election. Measures of agricultural economic production (with 
the exception of the Fruit Acreage variable), however, are poor (and negative) predictors of the party’s 
support. Clearly, therefore, the Nationalist Party lacked an agricultural economic base of support at this 
election. The coefficient of the Business variable is negative and thereby indicates that at this election the 
Nationalist Party did not receive disproportionate support from rural businessmen. Finally, no consistent 
relationship emerges between electoral participation and Nationalist Party electoral support. The sign and 
efficiency of the coefficient of the Voter Turnout variable is inconsistent: it is positive in the House of 
Representatives (strongly so in New South Wales) but negative in the Senate (strongly so in states other 
than New South Wales).
Two conclusions emerge from an analysis of the major parties’ electoral support at this election. First, 
generally speaking (and unlike the pattem of results observed for Country Party), occupational and 
religious variables are the strongest and most efficient predictors of the major party vote (Farmer for the 
Nationalists, Labour and Roman Catholic for the ALP). Second, major parties (in contrast to the Country 
Party) lacked agricultural and pastoral economic underpinnings. Whilst the Grain Acreage, Cattle and 
Mechanisation variables were major determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support, the Fruit 
Acreage and Dairy variables were only minor elements of Nationalist support, and the Mechanisation 
variable was an even more peripheral element of the Australian Labor Party’s electoral support. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that (given a decrease in the price of agricultural commodities 
below the average variable cost of commodity production) production of price- and income-inelastic 
commodities engenders dissatisfaction with the major parties and electoral support for the agrarian party.
Summary of Findings -- 1922
Two principal findings emerge from the analysis undertaken in this section. First, these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the combined impact of voter dissatisfaction with major parties and an
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V a r iable
T ab le 6-7: N ationalist P arty  E lectoral Support, 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1922
House of Represe n t a t i v e s  Senate
Aust N S W  Other Aust NS W O t her
R elig ion
A n g l i c a n -.27** -.24* .01 .10 .05 .07
O ccu pation
Farmer .41* . 98* .05 .38** 1.12*** .18*
G razier -.33 -.65 -.66 -.07 .42 -.27*
Labour .12 -.41 -.03 .03 -.07 .06
Business .06 -.86* .23 -.10 -.18 -.04
L and  U tilisation
Grain -.02* -.01 .01 -. 01** -.01** -.01
Fruit .02* .03* .01 . 03*** .02* . 02**
Sheep -.01* .01* -.01 -.01*** .01* -.01*
Cattle .01 -.03 .03 .01 -.06*** .01
D a i r y .09*** .08***
M e c h ' i s ' n -.04* -. 11*** -.05* -.02* -.06*** -.01
Turnout .18* . 12 .22 -.04 -.03 -.14*
State .06* -.02
(Constant) .33*** .60*** .19 .36*** . 45* * * . 42***
E s t i m a t o r GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
M o del (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
N 215 139 76 435 254 181
N.B.: The dependent variables are NHRPC22 and NSPC22
The c o e f ficients of M o del (1) are u n s t a n d a r d i s e d  b's.
* indicates that t < 1.96
★ * indicates that 2. 32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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economic issue whose salience attains crisis proportions underlies the agrarian party’s electoral support. 
Diagnostic statistics indicate that a multiplicative and exponential model (which taps the presence of 
dissatisfaction with major parties) provides a more adequate representation of the Country Party’s elec­
toral support than an additive and linear model (which does not tap this voter dissatisfaction). Conversely, 
in electoral subdivisions contested by the Country Party an additive and linear model provides a better 
representation of the major party vote than a multiplicative and exponential model. Following Burnham 
and Sprague and Soares and Hamblin, at this election the Country Party received disproportionate support 
from voters that were dissatisfied with one or both of the major parties (Burnham and Sprague, 1970); 
(Soares and Hamblin, 1967).
The coefficient of the Voter Turnout variable is also consistent with this hypothesis. At this election, an 
increase in voter turnout is weakly associated with an increase in the major parties’ electoral support. 
Conversely, a decrease in voter turnout is very strongly associated with an increase in the Country Party’s 
electoral support. The Country Party vote, in short, is greatest in electoral subdivisions where abstention 
is most marked. The coefficients of economic variables, particularly in New South Wales, are also 
consistent with this hypothesis. More extensive production of price- and income-inelastic commodities 
(i.e., an increase in in the value of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables), for example, decreases voter 
turnout and increases the Country Party’s electoral support. Conversely, more extensive production of 
price- and income-elastic commodities (i.e., an increase in the value of the Sheep, Dairy and Fruit 
Acreage variables) increases voter turnout and decreases the Country Party’s electoral support. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that the dissatisfaction which underlay the Country 
Party vote at this election was primarily economic in nature and that it was engendered by the production 
of price- and income inelastic commodities. Not subject to dissatisfaction with the major parties, sup­
porters of the Nationalist Party and ALP voted less strictly along "agricultural economic" lines: occupa­
tional and religious variables were the strongest predictors of these parties’ rural electoral support.
A second set of findings follows directly from the first. The direction and magnitude of the parameters 
of Country Party support conform far more closely to this study’s empirical propositions than to the 
assertions advanced by Graham and Alexander (Graham, 1966); (Alexander, 1967). As expected (and in 
agreement with Graham), grain growers were bulwarks of Country Party support at this election. Also as 
expected (but contrary to Graham’s and Alexander’s assertions) graziers, dairy farmers and fruit farmers 
rejected the Country Party. Further, this study correctly hypothesises that more mechanised producers, a 
group overlooked by Graham, rejected the Country Party. In sum, this study finds that at the 1922 
election the Country Party’s electoral support was distinctive in substantive as well as in statistical terms.
6.2. The 1925 Commonwealth Election
Two changes in institutional arrangements distinguish the 1925 election from the 1922 election. First, 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1924 introduced compulsory voting in Commonwealth elections 
(Australia, 1924pp.2179-2182). Given the initial conditions set out in Chapter 3, such a change in 
electoral law will influence the Country Party’s electoral support: to the extent that rural non-voters 
compulsorily (in response to legal requirements) rather than voluntarily (in response to issue salience and 
dissatisfaction with the major parties) join the active electorate, they will cast ballots for a pre-existing 
party — and will thereby reduce the electoral support, relative to other parties, of the Country Party. 
Second, between 1922 and 1925 the Country Party adopted an explicitly anti-Labor Party and pro- 
Nationalist Party policy. Before the 1925 election the Country Party abandoned its "support for 
concessions" tactics in favour of a formal parliamentary and electoral coalition with the Nationalist Party.
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Given this study’s initial conditions, this electoral alliance will also influence the Country Party’s elec­
toral support: to the extent that erstwhile Nationalist Party supporters in subdivisions contested by the 
Country Party (and, as a result of the parties’ electoral alliance, not contested by the Nationalist Party) 
heeded Nationalist Party leaders’ instruction to vote for the Country Party, the Country Party’s electoral 
support would resemble the Nationalist Party’s electoral support and would thereby become less distinc­
tive.
More favourable economic conditions also distinguish this election from the preceding election. In 
particular, the price of primary commodities rose between 1922 and 1925. The deflated price of wheat, 
for example, increased 21.1 percent (from 2.848 to 3.448 shillings per bushel). The salience of com­
modity prices as a political issue thus declined between these two elections. The propositions set out in 
Chapter 3 indicate that if rural voter dissatisfaction with the major parties also receded at this election 
then the Country Party’s electoral base should weaken. Indeed, Graham contends that the 1925 elections 
constituted a turning point in the Country Party’s electoral fortunes: "towards the end of the 1920s the 
Country Party was beginning to decline. Although it managed to recover the lost support during the 
highly charged politics of the early thirties, the period from about 1925 to 1929 was one in which the 
strategy of joining coalitions and forming electoral alliances with the Nationalists was proving inadequate 
in the face of rural discontent" (Graham, 1966p.232 and 267).
Table 6-8: Electoral Support,
Commonwealth Election, 1925*
(Summary Statistics)
Mean Vote (Percent)
Country Nationalist Labor
Party Party Party
(1925) (1922) (1925) (1922) (1925) (1922)
House of Representatives
New South Wales 44.9 38.6 13.3 21.6 39.7 28.7
Queensland 46.9 33.5 0.0 12.9 50.0 50.0
South Australia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Western Australia 60.1 72.1 0.0 13.1 36.9 30.4
Australia 45.2 39.3
Senate
10.4 19.0 41.8 31.2
New South Wales 20.6 22.7 30.7 29.2 41.3 36.5
Queensland 0.0 13.4 0.0 31.0 0.0 41.6
South Australia 7.5 0.0 32.3 0.0 33.5 0.0
Western Australia 20.8 16.1 28.2 34.7 41.6 38.6
Tasmania 0.0 9.0 0.0 44.9 0.0 37.1
Australia 18.5 18.6 30.7 31.7 40.1 38.0
* Figures refer to the percentage of the total vote
in subdivisions with a Country Party candidate.
Table 6-8 reports the parties’ percentage share of the total vote in electoral subdivisions contested by 
Country Party candidates at both elections. Although it no longer presented candidates in Queensland 
and Tasmania, the Country Party’s electoral strength in Senate elections remained almost unchanged at
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this election (it decreased by by 0.13 percentage points across Australia and by 2.15 percentage points in 
New South Wales). At the same time, however, the Country Party seemed to derive less benefit than the 
Australian Labor Party from Nationalist Party candidates’ departure from House of Representatives 
elections: across Australia, the increase in the Australian Labor Party’s percentage share of the total vote 
between 1922 and 1925 is twice as great as the increase in the Country Party’s percentage share of the 
total vote. Indeed, in South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, the Country Party’s percentage 
share of the total vote decreased between these elections. Only in Queensland did it grow more rapidly 
than the Australian Labor Party’s percentage share of the total vote. Even in this state, however, the 
Country Party’s percentage share of the total vote was much lower than the Australian Labor Party’s 
percentage share of the total vote. In House of Representatives elections, therefore, the Country Party’s 
electoral support (in aggregate terms at least) decreased between 1922 and 1925. This result indicates that 
the Country Party was a weaker entity at this election than at the preceding election.
Table 6-9: Preferred Models of Electoral Support,
Commonwealth Election, 1925
House of
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Senate
Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
Country Party
Aust r a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (1) (2)
Ne w  South Wales (1) (1) (1) (2)
Other States (1) (1) (1) (2)
Australian Labor Party*
Austr a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (1) (2)
Ne w  South Wales (1) (2) (1) (2)
Other States (1) (1) (1) (2)
Nationalist Party**
Austr a l i a  (All States) ★  ★  ★ * * * (1) (1)
Ne w  South Wales *** * * * (1) (1)
Other States *** * * * (1) (1)
* In subelectorates c o n t e s t e d  by the C o u n t r y Party and
the A u s t r a l i a n  Labor Party
** In subelectorates cont e s t e d  by the Cou n t r y Party and
the Na t i o n a l  Party
*** Indicates that there are too few o b s e rvations for an
analysis
Table 6-9 summarises the results of model specification tests. It indicates that the Country Party’s 
electoral support in House of Representatives elections weakened between 1922 and 1925. Specifically, it 
indicates (contrary to the results observed in 1922) that Model (1) provides a better representation of 
Country Party’s electoral support in House of Representatives elections than Model (2). The table also 
indicates that the Country Party’s electoral support in Senate and House of Representatives elections 
differed: as in 1922, Model (2) provides a more adequate representation of the Country Party vote 
(Senate) than Model (1). A comparison of Tables 6-2 and 6-9 therefore indicates that the Country Party’s 
electoral base weakened in House of Representatives elections and remained unchanged in Senate elec­
tions.
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Va r i a b l e
T ab le 6-10: C ountry  P arty  E lectoral Support,
(H ouse o f  R epresen tatives),
C om m onw ealth  E lections, 1925
V o ter Turnout Vote
Aust N S W  Other Aust N S W Other
R elig ion
A n g l i c a n .09 .1 4 * .08 .34 .9 9 ** -.17
O ccu pation
F a r m e r -.01 -.02 -.14 . 96*** 1.21* 1.20**
G r a z i e r -.2 7 * -.56 -.20 -.76 - 1.05 -.78
Labour .11 .19 .13 -.77 - 1.55 -.15
Business -.01 -.15 -.01 .16 -1.10 -.11
L an d  U tilisation
G r a i n  Ac -.01* -.01 -.01 . 02* .01 .02
Fruit .01 .01 .01 .02 -.01 . 10*
Sheep -.01** -.01 -.01* -.01 -.02 .01
Catt l e -.01 .01 -.01 .01 -.02 -.01
D a i r y .01* .02
M e c h ' i s ' n .01 -.01* .01 .03 .10 .02
Turnout .06 .16 -.11
State -.01 .03
(Constant) .7 9 *** .7 8 *** _ 7 9*** .33 .19 . 65***
E s t i m a t o r GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
M o d e l (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
N 168 103 65 168 103 65
N.B.: The dependent v a riables are C H R P C 25 and T O U T 2 5 . The
coefficients of Model (1 ) are u n s t a n d a r d i s e d  b' s .
* indicates that t < 1.96
* * indicates that 2. 32 < t < 2.58
* ★ ★ indicates that > 2.58
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Table 6-10 sets out parameters of voter turnout and Country Party electoral support in House of 
Representatives elections.47 It confirms that the Country Party’s electoral base in House of Represen­
tatives elections eroded between 1922 and 1925. Few independent variables are strong predictors of rural 
voter turnout at this election. Nonetheless, two sets of relationships merit elaboration. First, the propensity 
of farmers and rural businessmen to vote at elections changed between 1922 and 1925. Occupational 
status as a farmer was no longer discouraged electoral competition and occupational status as a rural 
businessman no longer facilitated electoral participation. Second, voter turnout in New South Wales and 
states other than New South Wales no longer differed significantly.
Similarly, most independent variables fail to structure the Country Party’s electoral support. Four 
relationships highlight the erosion in the party’s electoral base. (1) Although the Farmer variable con­
tinues to be a strong predictor of the Country Party’s electoral support (indeed, its coefficient is the 
largest in all three equations), the Grain Acreage, Mechanisation and Cattle variables fail to structure its 
vote. At the 1925 election, in other words, occupational status as a farm owner — not, as in 1922, the 
economic attributes of agricultural production — was the chief attribute of the Country Party’s electoral 
support.
(2) Rural businessmen were not (unlike the 1922 election) a bulwark of Country Party support. 
(Nationwide and in states other than New South Wales, the coefficient of Business is strongly negative; in 
New South Wales, its coefficient is positive but its standard error is large). (3) The relationship between 
electoral participation and Country Party support disappeared at this election. In contrast to the result 
obtained in 1922, the coefficient of Voter Turnout is positive and its standard error is large. Similarly, the 
coefficients of the Farmer, Grain Acreage and Mechanisation variables no longer reflect this negative 
relationship. Clearly, therefore, at this election the Country Party did not draw disproportionate support in 
House of Representatives elections from districts with low levels of voter turnout.
(4) Finally (as in 1922) in states other than New South Wales the Country Party remained without a 
religious base of support. The coefficient of the Anglican variable (as well as alternate model specifica­
tions employing Methodist, Presbyterian and Roman Catholic variables) fails to structure the party’s vote. 
In New South Wales, however, the party did possess a religious base of support. The coefficient of the 
Anglican variable in this state indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the proportion of 
Anglicans in an electoral subdivision is associated, on average, with an increase of .99 percentage points 
in the Country Party’s share of the total vote.
A very different pattern of results appears in Senate elections. Table 6-11 reports estimates of the 
parameters of electoral participation and the Country Party’s electoral support in subdivisions contested 
by the Country Party’s candidates in Senate elections.48 Its results portray a far less electorally-debilitated 
party. Indeed, they replicate the results obtained in 1922. Four relationships are particularly noteworthy. 
(1) In all states the Country Party remained without a religious base of support (in each equation, the 
standard error of the Anglican variable is large relative to the size of its coefficient). (2) In New South 
Wales, economic attributes of agricultural production remained the most powerful predictors of the 
Country Party’s electoral support. In states other than New South Wales the Grain Acreage and 
Mechanisation variables yield smaller coefficients — and hence uncover weaker relationships to the 
Country Party vote -  than does the Farmer variable. In these states, therefore, occupational status as a 
farmer remained a more powerful predictor of the Country Party vote at this election than the economic 
measures of agricultural production.
(3) In Senate elections (New South Wales), rural businessmen continued to support the Country Party.
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Variable
T able 6-11: Country Party Electoral Support, Senate, 
Com m onwealth Election, 1925
Voter Turnout Vote
Aust NS W  O t her Aust NS W Other
R elig ion
Anglican - . 0 6 * . 0 3 - . 1 2 * * . 0 6  - . 2 5 . 4 0 * *
O ccupation
Farmer . 0 2 . 2 3 - . 0 4 . 2 0 * * *  . 1 6 * * . 3 0 * * *
Grazier — 4 6 * * * - .  9 5 * * * - . 4 4 * * * - . 0 3  - . 1 1 . 0 2
Labour - . 0 3 - . 0 3 - . 0 2 - . 4 0 * * *  - . 2 0 - . 4 2 * *
Business . 1 3 * * - . 0 5 . 1 6 * . 1 1  . 6 3 * * * - . 1 8
L and U tilisation
Grain Ac - . 0 1 * * * -  . 0 1 * * * - . 0 1 * . 1 6 * * *  . 2 0 * * * . 0 9 * *
Fruit . 0 1 * . 0 1 . 0 1 - . 0 4  - . 2 2 * * - . 0 2
Sheep - . 0 1 * * * - . 0 1 * * * - . 0 1 - . 0 1  - . 0 2 - . 0 3
Cattle - . 0 1 * - . 0 1 * - . 0 1 . 2 8 * * *  . 3 6 * * * .1 1 *
Dairy .0 1 - . 0 4
M e c h ' i s ' n . 0 2 * * * . 0 1 . 0 1 * - . 2 5 * * *  - . 3 0 * * * - . 1 7 * *
Turnout - 1 . 6 0 * *  - 1 . 5 2 * *  - 1 . 4 2
State - . 0 1 . 0 3
(Constant) -.41*** . 8 3 * * * . 8 6 * * * - 2 . 7 9 * * * - l . 8 9 * *  - 2 . 2 6 * * *
E s timator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1) (1) (2)  (2) (2)
N 348 2 5 4 94 348  2 5 4 94
N.B.: The dependent v ariables are CSPC25 and TOUT25. The
coefficients of M o del (1) are u n s t a n d a r d i s e d  b' s .
The coefficients of M o d e l  (2) are both constant
elasticities and u n s t a n d a r d i s e d  b ' s .
★ indicates that t < 1 . 9 6
★  * indicates that 2. 32 < t < 2 . 5 8
★  * ★ indicates that t > 2 . 5 8
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(4) The negative relationship between electoral participation and Country Party support obtained in 1922 
re-appears in 1925. The Country Party’s Senate candidates, in other words, continued to draw dispropor­
tionate support from districts with low levels of voter turnout The coefficient of the Turnout variable, for 
example, remained the largest in each equation. As well, this relationship continues to emerge in other 
coefficients. Farm mechanisation encouraged voter turnout and reduced Country Party support, whilst 
more extensive production of grain and beef cattle reduced voter turnout and encouraged Country Party 
support. The coefficients of the Farmer variable, however, do not reflect this relationship: farm owners, 
whilst supporting the agrarian party, no longer eschewed electoral participation.
The electoral support of the Nationalist Party and of the Australian Labor Party changed little between 
1922 and 1925. Occupational and religious (not economic) variables continued to underlay these parties’ 
electoral support. Table 6-12 reports estimates of the parameters of the Nationalist Party’s electoral 
support at this election.49 Four of the table’s relationships are particularly noteworthy. (1) Compared to 
the Country Party, the Nationalist Party possesses a relatively strong religious base of support. Across 
Australia, the coefficient of Anglican increases from .10 (1922) to .17 (1925), and in New South Wales 
from .05 (1922) to .53 (1925). In each instance, the standard error of the coefficient decreases markedly. 
(2) At neither election does the Grazier variable predict Nationalist Party support The Cattle and Sheep 
variables, however, structure the party’s vote. (3) Occupational status as a farmer continued to be as­
sociated with electoral support for the Nationalist Party: the coefficient of the Farmer variable remains 
the largest and most efficient coefficient in each equation. Conversely, the party continued to possess 
little or no agricultural economic base of support. The coefficients of these variables (with the exception 
of Mechanisation) are negative, and their impact (relative to that exerted upon the Country Party vote) is 
small. A change in the value of these variables, in other words, had less impact on the Nationalist Party’s 
electoral support than on the Country Party’s electoral support. This result indicates that agricultural and 
pastoral economic variables remained less important determinants of the Nationalist Party’s electoral 
support than of the Country Party’s electoral support.
(4) The relationship between electoral participation and the Nationalist Party’s electoral support is 
positive or non-existent (the coefficients of the Anglican variable are the sole exception). The coefficient 
of the Turnout variable, for example, gives inconclusive results. Graziers eschewed electoral participation 
but did not lend disproportionate support to the Nationalist Party. Farm mechanisation engendered both 
electoral participation and Nationalist Party support, and increases in the value of the Grain Acreage, 
Cattle and Sheep variables attenuated both voter turnout and Nationalist Party support
Table 6-13 reports estimates of the parameters of the electoral support (in electoral subdivisions con­
tested by the Country Party and the Australian Labor Party) of the Australian Labor Party’s candidates in 
House of Representatives and Senate elections.50 Again, four relationships are particularly noteworthy. 
(1) In all states and in both House of Representatives and Senate elections, the ALP continued to possess 
a very strong religious base of support. Together with the Labour variable, the Roman Catholic variable is 
the most powerful predictor of ALP support in these subdivisions. (2) Similarly, farm owners continued 
to reject the ALP. As in 1922, the coefficient of the Farmer variable is the largest in each equation. In 
states other than New South Wales, this coefficient increases in strength at this election. In New South 
Wales, however, it decreases in magnitude (from -1.73 to -.42), and its standard error grows markedly. 
Within New South Wales, in other words, farm owners no longer shunned the ALP in House of Represen­
tatives elections. (3) The coefficient of the Business variable (House of Representatives) decreases 
markedly in size. (4) In both House of Representatives and Senate elections the coefficients of the Grain 
Acreage and Cattle variables decrease in size and efficiency (relative to 1922).
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Variable
T a b le  6 -1 2 : N ationalist Party  E lectoral Support, Senate, 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1925
Voter Turnout Vote
Aust NSW Other Aust NSW Other
R e lig io n
Anglican -.06* .03 -.12** .17* . 53*** -.11
O c c u p a t io n
Farmer .02 .23 -.04 .55*** . 95** .54***
Grazier -.46*** -. 95*** -.44*** .36 -.20 .30
Labour -.03 -.03 -.02 -.39* -.19 - .89**
Business . 13** -.05 .16* -.11 -.11 .23
L a n d  U tilisa t io n
Grain Ac -.01*** -.01*** -.01* - . 02** - .03*** - .01**
Fruit .01* .01 . 01 -.00 -.00 -.01**
Sheep - . 01*** -.01*** -.01 -.01* -.01 -.01*
Cattle -.01* -.01* -.01 -.04*** -.08*** -.01
Dairy .01 . 07***
Mech'is'n .02*** .01 .01* .03** -.02 .04**
Turnout .01 -.41* .16
State -.01 . 10**
(Constant) -.41*** .83*** .86*** .26 .56** .16
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
N 348 254 94 348 254 94
N.B.: The dependent variables are NSPC25 and TOUT25. The
coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b' s .
★ indicates that t < 1.96
* ★ indicates that 2. 32 < t < 2 .58
* * * indicates that t > 2.58
I l l
Table 6-13: Australian Labor Party Electoral Support,
House of Representatives and Senate, All States, 
Commonwealth Election, 1925
House of Representatives Senate
Aust NSW Other Aust NSW Other
Variable
Religion
Catholic .36** _ 42 * * * .06 .34*** 47 * * * .22***
Occupation
Farmer -1 .25*** -.42 -1.10*** -.13*** -.li*** -. 15***
Grazier . 43* .26 .46 -.01 -.01 -.01
Labour .27 .54 . 12 . 22*** .06 .35***
Business .01 -.03 .30 -. 17*** -. 20** -.17*
Land Utilisation
Grain Ac .01 -.01 -.02* -.02 -.01 .00
Fruit .01 . 01 -.05* .03 .05* .03*
Sheep .01* .01 .01 .01 -.01 .01
Cattle
Dairy
.02* -.01
-.03*
.01 -.01 -.02 
-.11***
.03
Mech'is'n .01 -.02 .03 .01 _17*** -.03
Turnout
State
.05
_ 14 * * * .19
-.07 .38
-.06
_ 87*** .76
(Constant) . 40** .16 .59 -. 82*** -.95*** -. 52***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2)
N 168 103 65 348 254 94
N.B.: The dependent variables are ALPHRPC25 and ALPSPC25.
The coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b's. 
The coefficients of Model (2) are unstandardised b's 
and constant elasticities.
* indicates that t < 1.96
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58
*** indicates that t < 2.58
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Summary of Findings --1925
An important conclusion emerges from the analysis undertaken in this section. Results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that an abatement in both voter dissatisfaction with the major parties and the salience 
of commodity price as a political issue weakens the agrarian party’s base of electoral support (see Figure 
3-3). This result was most apparent in House of Representatives elections. At this election, few 
Nationalist Party candidates stood in constituencies that were contested by the Country Party’s House of 
Representatives candidates. The Country Party was thus the only alternative (apart from the occasional 
independent candidate) to the Australian Labor Party in these constituencies. Supporters of one of the 
non-Labor parties in these constituencies thus had no choice other than to vote for the Country Party 
(since, under the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1924, they could not abstain from voting). Because the 
electoral influence of voters who would have (given the presence of a Nationalist Party candidate) 
supported the Nationalist Party was therefore appreciable in these constituencies, the Country Party 
received the support of many voters who were not dissatisfied with the Nationalist Party. Accordingly, at 
this election the Country Party’s pastoral and agricultural base weakened and it acquired attributes 
characteristic of a "major" conservative party in rural districts: its base of support was occupational 
(Farmer) and, in New South Wales religious (Anglican).
Results are also consistent with the hypothesis that an abatement in the salience of commodity price as a 
political issue — but not in voter dissatisfaction with the major parties -  does not reduce the agrarian 
party’s electoral support (see Figure 3-2). This result was most apparent in Senate elections. In these 
elections all three parties competed for votes. Because Nationalist Party candidates were present in all 
upper house subdivisions contested by the Country Party, voters were able to choose between the non- 
Labor parties. For this reason the Country Party did not receive electoral support from voters who 
remained satisfied with the Nationalist Party. This is reflected in the parameters of the Country Party’s 
upper house vote. Diagnostic statistics, as well as the coefficients of the Grain Acreage, Cattle, Business 
and Voter Turnout variables, indicate that voters dissatisfied with the major parties continued to underlie 
Country Party support at this election. Voters who were dissatisfied with the Nationalist Party voted for 
the Country Party; voters who remained satisfied with the Nationalist Party continued to support the 
Nationalist Party.
6.3. The 1928 Commonwealth Election
Graham contends that, in Parliament and at elections, the years 1925-1928 were difficult years for the 
Country Party. It share of cabinet posts, for example, fell from five out of twelve to four out of twelve in 
1926 and to four out of thirteen in 1928 (Graham, 1966p.287). At elections, "much of the movement’s 
early vitality had by this time drained away, and had the party dared to wage an independent campaign it 
would probably have lost about five seats. The electoral pact undoubtedly assisted it in maintaining its 
previous strength" (Graham, 1966p.288).
Table 6-14 sets out summary measures of party support at the 1928 election. It indicates that in House 
of Representatives elections the Country Party’s percentage share of the vote decreased in New South 
Wales and increased in states other than New South Wales (except Western Australia). Table 5-7 in­
dicated that the number of electoral subdivisions in which the party’s House of Representatives can­
didates were present at this election decreased by 21.1 percent in New South Wales and increased by 17.1 
percent in states other than New South Wales. For these reasons, parameters of the Country Party’s 
electoral support should indicate, relative to 1925, that the party’s electoral base weakened in New South
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Table 6-14: Electoral Support, 
Commonwealth Election, 1928*
(Summary Statistics)
Mean Vote (Percent) 
Cou n t r y  Nationalist Labor
Party Party Party
(1928) (1925) (1928) (1925) (1928) (1925)
N e w  South Wales
House o f Representatives
40.7 44.9 3.6 13.3 27.3 39.7
Q u e e n s l a n d 50.2 47.5 0.0 0.0 36.8 49.4
South A u s t r a l i a 46.3 0.0 44.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
We s t e r n  A u s t r a l i a 55.2 60.1 0.0 0.0 26.6 36.9
Aust r a l i a 44.8 46.9 8.9 8.9 25.3 41.8
New South Wales
Senate
27.4 20.6 20.2 30.7 43.8 41.3
South A u s t r a l i a 27.4 7.5 39.1 32.3 34.8 33.5
W e s t e r n  A u s t r a l i a 11.5 20.8 31.5 28.2 47.2 41.6
A u s t r a l i a 23.1 18.5 24.6 30.7 42.7 40.1
* Figure refer to the percentage of the total vote
in subdivisions with a Cou n t r y P arty candidate.
Wales and strengthened in states other than New South Wales. Table 6-14 also indicates that in Senate 
elections the Country Party’s percentage share of the vote increased substantially in all states. Similarly, 
Table 5-7 indicated that the number of electoral subdivisions in which the party’s Senate candidates were 
present remained unchanged at this election. For this reason, parameters of the Country Party’s electoral 
support in Senate elections should indicate that the party’s electoral base remained unchanged or 
strengthened between 1925 and 1928.
Table 6-15 summarises the results of model specification tests. It indicates that the Country Party’s 
electoral base in House of Representatives elections remained unchanged between 1925 and 1928 (i.e., 
that Model (1) continued to provide a better representation than Model (2) of the Country Party’s 
electoral base in House of Representatives elections). Table 6-15 also indicates that the Country Party’s 
electoral base in Senate and House of Representatives elections continued to differ: as in 1922 and 1925, 
Model (2) provided a more adequate representation than Model (1) of the Country Party’s electoral base 
in Senate elections. A comparison of Tables 6-9 and 6-15 thus indicates that the Country Party’s base of 
support remained unchanged between 1925 and 1928.
Table 6-16 reports estimates of the parameters of voter turnout and Country Party electoral support in 
subdivisions contested by the Country Party’s candidates in House of Representatives elections.51 As in 
1925, many variables fail to structure the party’s electoral support. At the same time, however, a sig­
nificant (New South Wales versus non-New South Wales) pattern of results emerges. Four sets of 
relationships illustrate this divergence. (1) As in 1925, the Country Party in New South Wales has a very 
strong religious base of support. Conversely, in states other than New South Wales, the Anglican variable 
has no significant effect on the Country Party vote. (2) Only in New South Wales is the coefficient of the
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Table 6-15: Preferred Models of Electoral Support,
Commonwealth Election, 1928
House of
Representatives Senate
Turnout Vote Turnout Vote
Country Party
A u s t r a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (1) (2)
N e w  South Wales (1) (1) (1) (2)
O ther States (1) (1) (1) (2)
Australian Labor Party*
A u s t r a l i a  (All States) (1) (1) (1) (1)
N e w  South Wales (1) (1) (1) (1)
O t h e r  States (1) (1) (1) (1)
N ationalist Party**
A u s t r a l i a  (All States) *** *** (1) (1)
N e w  South Wales ★  ★  ★ *  ★  * (1) (1)
O t h e r  States * * * * * * (1) (1)
* In subelectorates c o n t e s t e d  by the Co u n t r y Party and
the Aust r a l i a n  Labor Party
** In subelectorates conte s t e d by the Co u n t r y Party and
the Natio n a l  Party
*** Indicates that there too few observations for an
analysis
Labour variable very strongly negative. In the other states, workers in secondary industry did not shun 
the Country Party. (3) The previously-observed (negative) relationship between electoral participation 
and the Country Party vote disappeared at this election. Indeed, in New South Wales the Country Party 
drew disproportionate support from districts with high levels of voter turnout. By contrast, its effect is 
insignificant in other states.
(4) Occupational status as a farmer in New South Wales was not, for the first time, associated with 
electoral support for the Country Party. Nor did the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables structure the 
party’s vote. In other states, however, the Farmer variable -  whose coefficient increases in magnitude 
between 1925 and 1928 -  is the strongest predictor of the party’s vote. Moreover, in these states the 
Grain Acreage and Cattle variables re-emerge as significant bases of Country Party support (although 
their magnitude is small in relation to the Farmer variable). In House of Representatives elections in New 
South Wales, therefore, the Country Party had no agricultural base of support (occupational or economic). 
In states other than New South Wales, however, both occupational status as a farmer and the economic 
attributes of commodity production engendered Country Party support. The 1928 election therefore con­
firmed the Country Party’s transformation into a surrogate for the Nationalist Party in House of Represen­
tatives elections in New South Wales. In the other states, the party retained the agricultural economic 
attributes of electoral support which were observed at earlier elections.
As in 1925, a different pattern of results appears in the Senate. Table 6-17 sets out parameters of the 
Country Party’s electoral support in subdivisions contested by Country Party candidates in Senate 
elections.52 Four results are particularly noteworthy. (1) In all states the Country Party remained without
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T able 6-16: C ountry  P arty  E lectoral Support 
(H ouse o f  R epresen tatives), 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1928
Voter Turnout Vote
Aust NSW Other Aust NSW Other
Variable
R elig ion
Anglican - . 1 0 . 1 0 -.1 1 ** _ 9 7 *** i . 5 4 *** .18
O ccu pation
Farmer - . 0 1 . 0 1 - . 0 1 .17 -.60 .65***
Grazier -.18* -.39 - . 1 0 -.10 4.11 -.31
Labour .24* - . 0 1 .51*** -1.61***-3.81*** -.54
Business - . 0 2 .03 -.17* .38 .36 . 1 1
L an d  U tilisation
Grain Ac - . 0 1 . 0 1 - . 0 1 .05*** .04 0 4 * * *
Fruit . 0 1 . 0 1 .1 0 * -.02 -.04 . 1 0
Sheep - .0 1 *** - . 0 1 - . 0 1 -.01 -.07** . 0 1
Cattle -.0 1 * . 0 1 -.0 1 * .01 .03 .05***
Dairy . 0 1 -.15**
Mech'is'n . 0 1 -. 04** . 0 1 . 0 1 .16 -.07**
Turnout 1.50*** 2.48** .32
State -.0 1 * -.14***
(Constant) .90*** .81*** .87*** -1.08** - 1 .8 8 ** .06
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
N 161 85 76 161 85 76
N .B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC28 and TOUT28. The
coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b' s .
* indicates that t < 1.96
* * indicates that 2 .32 < 2.58
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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Table 6-17: Country Party Electoral Support,
Senate, Commonwealth Election, 1928
Voter Turnout Vote
Variable
Aust N SW Other Aust N S W Other
Religion
Anglican — 1 4 *** .04 -.18*** -.23 -.60* .16
Occupation
Farmer -.01 .15 .01 .17 * * * -.01 .38***
Grazier - .56*** -.68*** -. 57*** -.01 -.01 .05
Labour .08 -.05 .39** - . 45*** -.25 -. 64**
Business  ^4 ★ ★ ★ .03 .02 .11 64*** - . 0 2
Land Utilisation
Grain Ac -.01* - . 0 1 - .0 1 ** .2 0 *** .2 0 *** .25***
Fruit .01 .01 - . 0 1 -.06 -.14** . 12
Sheep -.0 1 *** -.0 1 ** -.0 1 ** - . 0 2 -.07** .06
Cattle - . 0 1 - . 0 1 -.0 1 * .26*** 48*** .2 0 *
Dairy 
Mech'is'n - . 0 1
.0 1 **
.01 .02 -.31***
-.19**
-.25*** -.43*
Turnout
State
(Constant)
- . 0 1  
. 92*** 8 4 * * * _93 * * *
-.91 
1.05*** 
-3.32***-
-.96 
1.95**
. 42
-2.99***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2)
N 348 254 94 348 254 94
N.B.: The dependent variables are CSPC28 and TOUT28. The
coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b's. 
The coefficients of Model (2) are unstandardised 
b's and constant elasticities .
* indicates that t < 1.96 
** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58 
*** indicates that t > 2.58
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a religious base of support. (2) The coefficients of the Farmer, Grain Acreage and Cattle variables 
changed significantly between 1925 and 1928. In New South Wales, occupational status as a farmer 
ceased to be associated with electoral support for the Country Party. In states other than New South 
Wales, however, the Farmer variable remains an important (indeed, the most important) base of the 
party’s support. (3) In all states, economic measures of agricultural and pastoral production became, 
relative to 1925, more powerful predictors of the Country' Party’s electoral support: in particular the 
magnitude of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables increased markedly between 1925 and 1928 (the 
coefficient of the Grain Acreage variable, for example, increased from .09 to .25; the coefficient of the 
Cattle variable increases from .11 to .20).
(4) The negative relationship between electoral participation and Country Party support that was ob­
served at the 1922 and 1925 elections disappears in 1928. The standard error of Voter Turnout is large; 
farmers (except in New South Wales) vote disproportionately for the Country Party but do not eschew 
electoral participation, whilst graziers show the opposite tendency. Only the Grain Acreage and Cattle 
variables continue to show (weak) evidence of this relationship.
Table 6-18 reports estimates of the parameters of electoral support for Nationalist Party and Australian 
Labor Party Senate candidates.53 Its figures indicate that these parties’ electoral base changed little 
between 1925 and 1928. Compared to the Country Party, the Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party 
possessed a strong religious base of support. In New South Wales, the Nationalist Party drew dispropor­
tionate support from Anglicans. In all states, the ALP received very strong support from Roman 
Catholics. In each case, these religious variables are among the most important predictors of the party 
vote.
As in 1922 and 1925, graziers did not lend disproportionate support to either party, farm owners 
continued to support the Nationalist Party and to reject the ALP, the Cattle and Sheep variables continued 
to relate to the vote of both parties, the coefficient of the Farmer variable remained the largest in all six 
equations and these parties continued to possess little or no agricultural economic base of support. The 
coefficients of these variables (with the exception of Dairy for the Nationalists and Mechanisation and 
Fruit for the ALP) are uniformly negative. Moreover, their impact (relative to that on the Country Party 
vote) is modest. Agricultural and pastoral economic variables, in other words, remained more important 
determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support (Senate) than of the major parties’ electoral support.
Summary of Findings -  1928
Tables 6-16, 6-17 and 6-18 corroborate the results observed at the 1922 and the 1925 election. Voters 
who were dissatisfied with the major parties continued to comprise a greater proportion of Country Party 
supporters in Senate elections than in House of Representatives elections. The coefficients of the Grain 
Acreage and Cattle variables, together with the results of model specification tests, indicate that at this 
election economic dissatisfaction continued to be the most important determinant of the Country Party’s 
electoral support. As in 1925, because Nationalist Party candidates are present in all subdivisions con­
tested by Country Party (Senate) candidates, voters had a choice between non-Labor parties. Voters who 
were dissatisfied with the Nationalist Party supported the Country Party alternative, and voters who were 
satisfied with the Nationalist Party remained loyal to the Nationalist Party. Even in Senate elections, 
however, voter dissatisfaction was less prevalent in 1928 election than in 1925. The large standard error 
of Voter Turnout indicates that dissatisfaction was no longer a general phenomenon, and the direction and 
standard error of the Farmer variable (Turnout equation) indicates that it no longer extended to all 
farmers.
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Table 6-18: Australian Labor Party 
and Nationalist Party Electoral Support, Senate, 
Commonwealth Election, 1925
N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y L ab o r  P a r t y
A us t NSW O t h e r A us t NSW O t h e r
V a r i a b l e
Religion
C a t h o l i c
A n g l i c a n .13 . 6 6 *** - . 1 2
,70*** .75*** .51** *
Occupation
F a r m e r .46** 1 .1 8 * * * ,47** * - .  9 3 ***- 1 . 5 4 * * *  - . 95***
G r a z i e r .32 - . 7 4 .23 .32 .78 .39
L a b o u r - . 0 2 - . 1 5 - . 0 4 - . 0 3 - . 4 2 , 9 0 * * *
B u s i n e s s - . 2 4 * - . 2 3 - . 1 4 - . 1 7 - . 1 7 .34*
Land Utilisation
G r a i n  Ac -  . 0 2 *** -  . 0 1 *** - .  03*** - . 0 3 * * * -  .03*** . 0 1
F r u i t . 0 1 - . 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 2 * .03* .03
S heep - . 0 1 * - . 0 1 ** - . 0 1 . 0 1 * . 0 1 . 0 1
C a t t l e - .  03*** - . 0 7  *** - .  05*** -  .06*** -  .06*** . 0 1
D a i r y Q  ^ * - . 0 2
M e c h ' i s ' n - . 0 2 - .  05*** ,09*** .09*** , 1 1 *** - . 0 2
T u r n o u t - . 1 1 - .  60** - . 3 3 .29* .56** .15
S t a t e - . 0 6 * - . 0 4
( C o n s t a n t )  .44** .56** .5 1** .09 - . 0 9 .39*
E s t i m a t o r GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
Model (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
N 348 254 94 348 254 94
N . B . :  The d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s  a r e  NSPC28 an d ALPSPC28. The
c o e f f i c i e n t s o f  Model  (1) a r e u n s t a n d a r d i s e d  b ' s •
* i n d i c a t e s t h a t  t < 1 . 9 6
★  ★ i n d i c a t e s t h a t  2 . 32 < t  < 2 . 5 8
★  ★  "k t  > 2 . 5 8
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6.4. Summary and Conclusion
No study can provide a theoretically "complete" account of a problem for political science research: 
limitations of data, theory and research technique preclude such an ambitious endeavour, and the "pre- 
paradigmatic" status of political science (Ostrom, 1982pp. 11-29); (Nicholson, 1983) ensures that 
shortcomings of some sort will accompany all analyses. For this reason, theories of political phenomena 
necessarily provide partial and incomplete explanations; the findings reported in this chapter should be 
assessed with this caveat in mind.
This caveat notwithstanding, it is not sufficient that formal theories of political phenomena be internally 
consistent and elegant, or that, a priori, their propositions be interesting and insightful: above all else, 
their propositions must be empirically valid (Friedman, 1953). The results reported in this and the 
preceding chapter indicate that this study’s theoretical propositions are, on the whole, empirically valid. 
One basic conclusion underlies these findings: empirical propositions premised upon the notion that rural 
voters and parties are rational actors provide a plausible resolution for the problem for research set out in 
Chapter 1. The formation, electoral support and (partial) dissolution of the Australian Country Party, in 
other words, can be subsumed under a "covering law" of voter and party rationality. Recourse to class, 
ideological and institutional interpretations of agrarian parties (which, as Chapter 2 demonstrated, suffer 
from a variety of conceptual, logical and empirical shortcomings) is un-necessary.
In particular, the results reported in this and the preceding chapter are consistent with the contention that 
agrarian party formation and dissolution is a function of rural voter dissatisfaction with major parties and 
an economic issue whose salience in rural areas attains crisis proportions. These two stimuli precipitate 
agrarian party formation and augment agrarian party electoral support (as was the case at the 1922 
election). A decrease in their combined impact weakens agrarian party support and promotes agrarian 
party dissolution (as was the case at the 1925 House of Representatives election).
Initially, voter disaffection produces voter abstention. Given an abrupt and calamitous decline in com­
modity prices (such as the price collapse of 1921-1922) passive disaffection is transformed into active 
electoral protest. Accordingly, not only did the Australian Country Party draw general support from 
districts with low levels of voter turnout; it drew its most consistent electoral support from the segments 
of the rural electorate least likely to cast ballots.
The greater the extent to which a primary producer’s total revenue falls in response to a decline in 
commodity price (i.e., the greater the production of price- and income-inelastic commodities), the greater 
the producer’s economic dissatisfaction. Given parties’ inability to alter the parameters of demand for 
agricultural commodities, primary producer’s economic dissatisfaction engenders rural voter dissatis­
faction with the major parties. This study’s results are consistent with the hypothesis that this dissatis­
faction underlays agrarian party formation and electoral support. Conversely, the revenue of producers of 
price- and income-elastic commodities (most notably fruit and vegetable growers and dairy farmers) 
increases in response to a decrease in commodity price; for this reason, these strata of the rural electorate 
do not become dissatisfied with their most-favoured pre-existing party -  and hence eschew the agrarian 
party.
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Part III
Part I identified the formation, electoral support and dissolution, in the years immediately following the 
First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as a relevant and unresolved 
problem for political science research. It also argued that an econometric analysis might resolve this 
problem Part II undertook such an analysis (with particular reference to the Australian Country Party at 
the Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928). The results of that analysis are consistent with 
theoretical expectations.
Part III assesses these results in light of current knowledge of major and non-major parties, party 
systems and voter alignments and the relationship between economic conditions and electoral behaviour. 
It concludes that extant interpretations of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution in 
these countries (as well as the role of the Country Party in the Australian party system) requires revision.
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Chapter 7 
Discussion
7.1. Agrarian Party Formation, Electoral Support and Dissolution
This study hypothesises that non-major party formation, electoral support and dissolution is a con­
sequence of voter dissatisfaction with the two major parties and an economic issue whose salience to 
voters attains crisis proportions: the presence of these conditions causes agrarian party formation and 
agrarian party electoral support; the disappearance of these conditions decreases agrarian party electoral 
support and causes agrarian party dissolution (see, however, Appendix C).
This hypothesis closely resembles other hypotheses of non-major party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution. Mazmanian, for example, argues that non-major party formation and electoral support 
"occurs in a normally two-party system during a period of national political crisis, that is, when a few 
issues become highly controversial; when one or more of the issues engenders an intense minority, when 
the major parties ignore or attack -  in either case alienate -  the minority; and when an individual or 
group of political entrepreneurs then mobilises the minority behind a [new] party" (Mazmanian, 
1974p.26); see also (Hauss and Rayside, 1978); (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984pp. 132-133); 
(Pinard, 1975); (Studlarand McAllister, 1987).
In important respects, however, this study’s hypothesis differs from these other hypotheses. (1) It is 
derived from a formal theory of non-major party formation, electoral support and dissolution. This theory 
specifies the causes of rural voter dissatisfaction with the major parties (and hence the determinants of 
agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution) in greater detail than do previous works. It 
assesses the relative impact of economic and non-economic (e.g., occupational and religious) influences 
upon rural voter and party behaviour more explicitly than previous works, and it confronts its empirical 
propositions with quantitative data in a more rigorous manner than do these works. As a result, this study 
places non-major party party formation, electoral support and dissolution on a firmer theoretical basis 
than do previous studies.
(2) This study operationalises rural voter dissatisfaction with major parties and the economic issue 
whose salience among rural voters attains crisis proportions in a novel manner. Psephologists have long 
recognised that a relationship exists between rural voter behaviour and different forms of land tenure, 
different sizes of holdings and the production of different agricultural and pastoral commodities (see in 
particular Siegfried, 1913:34-35, 277-79). They have not, however, analysed this relationship in detail. 
Nor have they explained why such a relationship should exist (Campbell et al, 1960:434).
This study remedies this omission. It hypothesis that a decrease in primary producers’ total revenue 
which results from a decline in the price of agricultural commodities engenders rural voter dissatisfaction 
with the major parties. The price of agricultural commodities attains crisis proportions as a political issue
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when it declines below the average variable cost of commodity production. This study therefore 
hypothesises that the formation and electoral support, in the years immediately following the First World 
War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand was a consequence of (1) maladjustments 
in primary producers’ output of agricultural and pastoral commodities and (2) the world-wide collapse, 
between 1921 and 1922, in the prices of agricultural and pastoral commodities below the average variable 
cost of production. It hypothesises that these factors’ combined impact divided the rural electorate into a 
relatively advantaged or unaffected group (composed of the producers of price- and income-elastic 
commodities and mechanised producers) whose income remained unchanged or increased as a result of 
this decline in commodity price, and a disadvantaged group (composed of the producers of price- and 
income-inelastic commodities and less mechanised producers) whose income decreased as a result of this 
decline in commodity price. It also hypothesises that agrarian parties responded to the dissatisfaction of 
the latter (and not the former) group, and that they received electoral support from the latter (and not the 
former) group of voters. Finally, it hypothesises that the recovery of commodity prices after 1922, 
together with producers’ adjustment of the average variable cost of production (through an adjustment of 
inputs, the process of production and the composition of output) reduced the combined impact of these 
two variables, decreased the agrarian party’s electoral support and thereby engendered agrarian party 
dissolution.
The results reported in Chapter 5 are consistent with these hypotheses. The economic attributes of 
agricultural and pastoral production, together with the number of businessmen and professionals in an 
electoral subdivision, were the most important determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution 
(i.e., of the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision) at the 1922, 
1925 and 1928 Australian (Commonwealth) elections. Moreover, the production of price- and income- 
inelastic commodities (particularly grain and beef cattle) was the most important determinant of Country 
Party formation and the production of price- and income-elastic commodities (such as fruits and 
vegetables, sheep and dairy products), together with farm mechanisation, was the most important deter­
minant of Country Party dissolution. Occupational and religious variables were only weakly (and 
inconsistently) related to Country Party formation and dissolution.
Conversely, at these elections the production of price- and income-inelastic commodities was associated 
with (but was not the most important determinant of) Nationalist Party dissolution, and the production of 
price- and income-elastic commodities was associated with (but was not the most important determinant 
of) Nationalist Party formation. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that agrarian party 
formation (and major party dissolution) is a consequence of voter dissatisfaction with one or both of the 
major parties, and that agrarian party dissolution is a consequence of increased voter satisfaction with one 
or both of the major parties.
Finally, the results reported in Chapter 5 indicate that the greater the extent to which agrarian party 
formation responds to rural voter dissatisfaction with the major parties the more long-lived is the agrarian 
party. It is at least in part for this reason that the Country Party proved to be a relatively durable entity in 
New South Wales (and, by implication, in Victoria) and a relatively ephemeral entity in Tasmania (and, in 
Senate elections, in Queensland and South Australia).
The results reported in Chapter 6 are also consistent with these hypotheses. Particularly in New South 
Wales, where the Country Party proved most durable, and in Senate elections, where a clear choice 
existed between Country Party, Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party candidates, a multiplicative- 
exponential model provides a belter representation of Country Party support than an additive-linear
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specification. Conversely, an additive-linear model represents the major parties’ support better than a 
multiplicative-exponential model. This result closely resembles the pattern of results observed by 
Burnham and Sprague at the American Presidential election of 1968 (at which a non-major party can­
didate received thirteen per cent of the votes cast) (Burnham and Sprague, 1970). Given that a 
multiplicative-exponential function captures the general form of the relationship between voter dissatis­
faction and voter behaviour (Soares and Hamblin, 1967), these results corroborate the hypothesis that 
non-major parties (including agrarian parties) form in response to voters’ "aggressive hostility towards 
the leaders, parties and policies of the existing political order" (Burnham and Sprague, 1970p.l050).
The results set out in Chapter 6 also indicate that at these elections the economic attributes of agricul­
tural and pastoral production — not occupational status or religious denomination — were the most 
important determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support. Moreover, producers of price- and 
income-inelastic commodities were the most important bulwarks of the Country Party’s electoral base and 
producers of price- and income-elastic commodities, together with mechanised producers, eschewed the 
Country Party. Conversely, at these elections occupational and religious variables were the most impor­
tant determinants of the electoral support of the Nationalist Party and the Australian Labor Party. These 
results are also consistent with the hypothesis that agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli underlie 
voter dissatisfaction with major parties, and that this dissatisfaction engenders agrarian party formation 
and electoral support.
The results reported in Chapters 5 and 6 corroborate the results of many previous studies. Economic 
conditions have long been identified as catalysts of non-major party formation, electoral support and 
dissolution. In the United States, for example, the American Liberty Party grew dramatically in response 
to the depression of 1837 and receded in the wake of economic recovery after 1844 (Hesseltine, 
1962p.l3); electoral support for the American Communist Party grew markedly during the depression of 
the early 1920s (Greer, 1949p.l87) and the prosperity which prevailed in 1948 dimmed the electoral 
fortunes of Henry Wallace’s Dixiecrat Movement (Schmidt, 1960p.242). In the United Kingdom, the 
Liberal Party (and to some extent Plaid Cymru) was composed of "a constantly shifting group of in­
dividuals who were temporarily disaffected with their former party" (Studlar and McAllister, 1987p.43); 
see also (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt, 1977); (Lemieux, 1977). Similarly, "distrust towards established politi­
cal parties and towards the political system itself', which was engendered by "the repeated failure of 
governments of both colours to do anything about the economic situation," underlay the electoral support 
of the Scottish National Party (Brand, 1978p.22); (Miller, 1981pp. 153-174). The major parties’ "failure 
to halt economic decline", together with the salience of particular economic issues (inflation, 
unemployment) precipitated the formation of the Social Democratic Party (Bradley, 1981pp.28-33). In 
Canada, "the postwar depression precipitated the tremendous sweep of the Progressive Party in 1921" 
(Lipset, 1950p.84); the Great Depression prompted the formation and the electoral support of the Co­
operative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit movement (Lipset, 1950pp.204-205) and the 
recession of the early 1960s prompted the formation and the electoral support for the Ralliement des 
Creditistes (Pinard, 1975).
In Germany, several studies cite agricultural depression as one cause of the rapid increase in the 
electoral support of a new party, the Nazi Party, in the early 1930s [see in particular (Heberle, 1970)]. 
Indeed, "the manner in which the Nazis swept the farmer-peasant organisations of pre-Hitler Germany 
into the Nazi movement has parallels in the Greenback, Farmer’s Alliance, Populist and similar move­
ments [of nineteenth century America]" (Loomis and Beegle, 1946p.734).54
124
This study’s results are thus consistent with the argument that "economic conditions are a paramount 
factor in determining [non-major] party success. In periods of expanding economic activity, parties may, 
without immediate economic penalty, ignore pressing problems. But when the economic tempo declines, 
these social problems are magnified. Hence, [non-major] parties of significant dimensions have 
developed during periods when economic tensions and frustrations have been unusually high (Fisher, 
1974p.27); see also (Mazmanian, 1974pp. 143-144); Rosenstone84 "pp. 134-138"); (Bone, 1965p.l42); 
(Downs, 1957p.l30f); (Chambers, 1967p.32).
This study’s results are also consistent with the results of several other analyses of agrarian parties. 
Economic historians have suggested that economic [price] instability in American agriculture was a 
primary cause of agrarian discontent during the late nineteenth century (Higgs, 1971pp. 102-103); (North, 
1974pp. 134-136); (Parker, 1972p.407). Empirical analyses find that late nineteenth century agrarian 
unrest within a particular state was directly related to the degree of economic instability within that state 
(McGuire, 1981p.835); see also (Dahl, 1966p.52); (Lewis, 1982pp.688-699); (Mazmanian, 1974p.53 and 
137).
Finally, this study anticipates the results of analyses of more recent agrarian political behaviour. 
Generally speaking, "contemporary farmers no longer Fit the characterisation provided by The American 
Voter" (Lewis-Beck, 1977p.545). In the absence of an economic issue whose salience attains crisis 
proportions, "few economic variables were related to agrarian political behaviour after 1960" (Knoke and 
Long, 1975p.7); (Sigelman, 1983). This is in part because government programmes (such as price 
supports and subsidies, crop insurance and marketing boards) established at the behest of primary 
producers have attenuated violent fluctuations in agricultural markets and have thereby rendered agrarian 
political behaviour less responsive to economic stimuli.
This study, in short, formulates a set of novel hypotheses with respect to agrarian party formation, 
electoral support and dissolution; it also evaluates these hypotheses with previously untapped sources of 
data. Its Findings are consistent with the expectations of this hypothesis and with the results of many other 
studies. This study’s findings have three implications. (1) They provide an empirically-valid response to 
the questions for empirical research formulated in Chapter 1. (2) They challenge the assertions of 
analyses of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand agrarian parties [e.g., (Aitkin, 1972); (Aitkin, 1980); 
(Ellis, 1958); (Ellis, 1963); (Graham, 1963); (Graham, 1966); (Lipset, 1950); (Morton, 1950); 
(Macpherson, 1953)]. (3) They contribute to a more complete understanding of the economic antecedents 
voter and party behaviour, of major parties and non-major parties. Section 2 discusses these implications 
in comparative perspective. Section 3 discusses them with particular reference to Australia.
7.2. Implications
7.2.1. Agrarian Parties in the British Dominions
This study provides an empirically-valid response to the two questions for empirical research which 
were formulated in Chapter 1. Its results are consistent with the contention that the Australian Country 
Party arose in the years immediately following the First World War because rural voter dissatisfaction 
(engendered by maladjustments in the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production) with 
the Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party, together with the salience to voters of the collapse in 
agricultural commodity prices between 1921 and 1922, discouraged voting for one of the major parties or 
abstaining from electoral participation. The theory set out in Chapter 3 suggests that the Canadian
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Progressive Parly and the New Zealand Country Party arose in these years at least in part for these same 
reasons.
This study demonstrates that the Australian Country Party fielded candidates (and, by implication, 
concentrated organisational and electoral resources) in states in which the combined magnitude of voter 
dissatisfaction with major parties and issue salience was most marked (i.e., in states such as New South 
Wales), and that it withdrew these resources from other states in which the combined magnitude of these 
variables was least marked (i.e., from states such as Tasmania). The theory set out in Chapter 3 suggests 
that, for these same reasons, agrarian party formation has been most prevalent in Canada’s Prairie 
Provinces (particularly Alberta and Saskatchewan) and least prevalent in Canada’s Maritime Provinces, 
Quebec and British Columbia.
This study indicates that the Australian Country Party continued to exist (particularly in New South 
Wales and at least until 1928) because (1) it fielded candidates in constituencies in which voter dissatis­
faction with the major parties was most prevalent, because (2) voter dissatisfaction with the major parties 
and issue salience remained appreciable and because (3) the Nationalist Party (consciously or as a result 
of tactical error) granted the Country Party electoral preserves within which it was the sole non-Labor 
party. This study thus suggests that the Canadian Progressive Party and the New Zealand Country Party 
disintegrated because (1) they did not field candidates in constituencies in which voter dissatisfaction 
with the major parties was most prevalent (i.e., because these parties’ elites committed tactical or strategic 
errors in decision-making) and/or because (2) both rural voter dissatisfaction with the major parties and 
the salience of agricultural commodity prices as a political issue disappeared. An econometric analysis of 
these parties should find, in other words, that unlike their Australian counterparts, Canadian and New 
Zealand primary producers adjusted the inputs into agricultural production and the composition of com­
modity output, and improved the efficiency of agricultural production.
Finally, this study indicates that economic variables were more powerful determinants than non­
economic (occupational and religious) variables of the formation, electoral support and dissolution of the 
Australian Country Party. It suggests that an econometric analysis of agrarian party and voter behaviour 
in Canada and New Zealand would obtain similar results. Such an analysis would find that a 
multiplicative-exponential function provides a better representation of the Progressive Party’s electoral 
support than of the Liberal Party’s or the Conservative Party’s electoral support (Canada), and of the 
Country Party’s electoral support than of the Reform Party’s or the Labour Party’s electoral support (New 
Zealand).
In consequence, this study’s results re-inforce the doubt, expressed in Chapter 2, cast upon Australian, 
Canadian and New Zealand studies with non-economic (class, ideological, regional and organisational) 
interpretations of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. These studies consider the 
primary producer to be (in one limited sense at least) economically independent. Each farm is considered 
to be a self-contained production unit whose exposure to market forces is direct and unimpeded (see in 
particular Macpherson, 1953:11-20). At the same time, they assert that the primary producer is a depend­
ent and subordinate (and hence "exploited") actor in the market economy. Although they acknowledge 
gradations (and even conflicts) of interest among primary producers, these studies contend that farming 
is, in general, an internally homogenous occupation (Macpherson, 1953pp. 19-20). Accordingly, these 
studies analyse the political consequences — in terms of class consciousness, ideological coherence and 
organisational cohesiveness — of this group’s "relatively homogenous class composition" (Macpherson, 
1953pp.215-250); (Morton, 1950); (Aitkin, 1972); (Ellis, 1958): (Ellis, 1963); (Graham, 1963); (Graham, 
1966).
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This study confirms the benefits of utilising a different set of initial conditions. Like these studies, it 
accepts that farmers are economically independent and directly exposed to economic stimuli. At the same 
time, however, it rejects both the logic and the evidence offered to support the contention that primary 
producers were an "exploited" group. It thus substitutes a well-understood (and diametrically-opposed) 
concept -  the primary producer as a rational actor in a perfectly competitive market -  for the vague and 
largely undefined notion of "exploitation." Its results are consistent with these initial conditions: primary 
producers are not an economically homogenous group; they are directly exposed to (and therefore ex­
tremely sensitive to) economic stimuli; and as a result of their heterogeneity economic stimuli influence 
their electoral behaviour in different -  indeed, opposite -  ways.
At the Commonwealth elections of 1922, 1925 and 1928 rural Australian voters (indeed, Australian 
primary producers) did not vote en masse for the Country Party. An experience common to all primary 
producers thus cannot account for this study’s pattern of results. If all Australian primary producers 
possessed an agrarian "class consciousness", were "country-minded" or were "exploited" by urban or 
other interests (Graham, 1966); (Aitkin, 1972); (Ellis, 1958); (Ellis, 1963) and if these attitudes engen­
dered support for agrarian parties, why did Australian primary producers not vote as an homogenous 
bloc? Why did the majority of Australian primary producers in districts with Country Party candidates 
fail to support the Country Party? Most incongruously, why did most Australian primary producers 
support "urban" parties ostensibly controlled by the "corrupt" and "exploitative" cities?
This study’s results thus highlight -  and subsume within a formal theory -  the atomised nature of 
agrarian political behaviour. In so doing, they substantiate an alternate (and empirically-valid) inter­
pretation of agrarian political behaviour: "the total farm community in the national population is severely 
fragmented into interests that are independent or even at times in conflict. Numerous investigations 
(Lipset, 1950pp.5-7); (Hicks, 1933); (Key, 1964) have documented the degree to which shifts in farm 
sentiment remain within bounds defined by crop area" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960p.404). Further, "the farmer appears to respond to his own economic situation, with little reference to 
the manner in which others in the same occupational category are faring. Since price and hence economic 
situation are tied to specific crops, economic winds frequently blow in several directions, leading to a 
variegated [electoral] response [from farmers]" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.419).
This study’s results, in other words, are inconsistent with the assertions of major studies of agrarian 
parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. They are, however, consistent with the hypothesis that the 
formation, electoral support and partial dissolution of the Australian Country Party (and, by implication, 
of the Canadian Progressive Party and the New Zealand Country Party) were consequences of a micro- 
economic stimulus and rational behaviour in political and economic markets. This study therefore rejects 
the assertion that agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were the consequences of a 
class, agrarian or regional consciousness and tentatively accepts the hypotheses set out in Chapter 3. It 
places the study of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution on a more empirically- and 
methodologically sound basis and thereby advances knowledge of agrarian parties in these three 
countries.
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7.2.2. Econometric Analyses of Voter Behaviour
This study demonstrates that the concepts and methodology of micro-economic analysis can success­
fully analyse political phenomena. It therefore re-inforces the utility of broadly similar studies (Breton, 
1974); (Downs, 1957); (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962); (Buchanan, 1978). It also demonstrates that 
studies premised upon notions of voter and party rationality can successfully illuminate aspects of party 
and voter behaviour (Robertson, 1976); (Meier, 1980); (Fröhlich, Oppenheimer, Smith and Young, 1978). 
This study thus has implications for an understanding of the relationship between economic stimuli and 
electoral behaviour. Its conclusion that personal economic self-interest was the most important deter­
minant of electoral behaviour in rural Australia between 1922 and 1928 is consistent with a large number 
of econometric analyses of electoral behaviour.55
Unlike these econometric analyses, however, this study demonstrates that personal economic well-being 
need not be influenced solely (or even primarily) by the incumbent party’s macro-economic policies. It is 
also profoundly influenced by micro-economic conditions that are beyond the control of political parties. 
Further, it demonstrates that economic conditions do not affect parties equally. Its results suggest that 
non-major parties in general and agrarian parties in particular are more directly influenced by economic 
stimuli than are major parties. This study also demonstrates that there are sub-national differences in the 
extent to which parties and voters respond to economic conditions, that the influence of economic 
conditions upon electoral behaviour is not constant or continual over time, and that its magnitude is not 
felt equally by all voters.
A more complete understanding of the relationship between economic stimuli and electoral behaviour 
requires that econometric analyses of electoral behaviour assess the applicability of this study’s results 
across time and space. Analyses such as Radcliff (which demonstrates that this relationship varies over 
time) and Owens and Wade (which demonstrate that it varies between regions) exemplify two of the 
concerns which econometric analyses of voter and party behaviour must address (Radcliff, 1988); (Owens 
and Wade, 1988).
7.2.3. Major Parties
Chapter 1 emphasised that political parties are a sine qua non of liberal representative democracy. 
Parties solicit and articulate the electorate’s concerns, aggregate its preferences into policy proposals and, 
if elected, attempt to transform these proposals into legislation (Sartori, 1976pp.65-66); (Key, 
1964p.433); (Dahl, 1967p.243); (Neumann, 1956p.397); (Ranney and Kendall, 1956p.85); 
(Schattschneider, 1942p.35). At the same time, Chapter 1 observed that studies of political parties have 
often lacked an explicitly theoretical base, have not often collected data amenable to cross-national 
comparative analysis and have not often contributed to a more profound understanding of parties and the 
party system.
This study (at least to some extent) overcomes these shortcomings. It constructs a formal theory which 
is based upon a useful set of initial conditions; its methodology, data and research techniques lend 
themselves to cross-national comparative analysis and its findings extend knowledge of agrarian party 
formation, electoral support and dissolution. This study’s initial conditions assert that voters change their 
party preference in any way consistent with the principles of utility maximisation and that major parties 
change their programmes in any way necessary to maximise their electoral appeal. It follows from these 
initial conditions that the party whose programmes are congruent with the preferences of the greatest
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number of voters will win any given election. It also follows that the major parties’ policies with respect 
to any issue that is favoured by a majority of voters will converge. With respect to this issue, in other 
words, both parties will offer similar (and vague) policies [see, for example, (Downs, 1957); (Enelow and 
Hinich, 1984); (Davis, 1969); (Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970); (Hartley and Tisdell, 
1981pp.50-55)].
These initial conditions imply that a "catch-all" or "brokerage" pattern of politics exists (Clarke, 1984); 
(Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984pp.3-25); (Kirchheimer, 1966). Brokerage parties have Five principal 
characteristics. (1) Brokerage parties are loosely-structured coalitions of groups and interests whose 
composition constantly changes (Mazmanian, 1974p.20). They do not possess well-defined bases of 
electoral support; rather, they re-create coalitions at each election. The more a party’s electoral support 
unites disparate groups and ideas, and avoids identification with any particular stratum of interest, the 
more the party resembles a brokerage party.
(2) Brokerage parties do not emphasise (indeed, in many instances, do not possess) ideological prin­
ciples, are not endowed with policy-related images and do not encourage voters to characterise them in 
policy- or ideology-related terms. (3) Brokerage parties’ limited ability to differentiate themselves on the 
basis of policy, programme or ideology engenders a strong emphasis on leadership. Leaders create and 
sustain brokerage parties and represent them to the electorate.
(4) Because they rarely present a clear choice between programmes, provide only a limited possibility 
of making policy-oriented choices and must eventually replace leaders, brokerage parties elicit only weak 
(and hence unstable) partisan loyalties. When circumstances change, partisan ties to brokerage parties are 
tenuous enough to permit changes in party preference. (5) Most importantly, brokerage parties do not 
meaningfully discuss or debate policy. Their short-term concern with the formation of a winning coali­
tion sharply circumscribes the range of viable policy positions and provides little incentive for sustained 
attention to long-term policy problems. Brokerage parties, in short, do not identify (or propose solutions 
to) long-term policy problems (Crewe and Denver, 1985pp.l-16).
A brokerage party must be supported by a great variety of interests. It must be held together by 
compromise and concession, and must discover and articulate common interests. It cannot meet every 
demand advocated by every interest (Schattschneider, 1942p.35). Accordingly, the brokerage party is 
ill-equipped to manage or to contain an intensely salient issue which arises suddenly and without warn­
ing. The brokerage party, in other words, does not perfectly ascertain or represent political preferences or 
translate these preferences into Government and Opposition policy (Blondel, 1978); (Harrop and Miller, 
1987); (Pickles, 1970pp.ll5 and 122). Herein lies a "problem of party government" (Rose, 1974): the 
Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party were unable to incorporate dissatisfied primary producers 
into their ranks (although they successfully aggregated occupational and religious interests into their 
ranks). For this reason,
some parly systems, particularly those with broad, amorphous [catch-all] parties, are especially prone to 
the rapid emergence and equally rapid decline of significant [non-major] parties (Studlar and McAllister, 
1987p.41); (Pinard, 1975pp.280-290).
Like Rosenstone et al, therefore, this analysis
identifies an important deficiency [in major parties]. Although the major parties are relatively good at 
managing conflicts, building major coalitions and holding voter loyalty, this success has its costs. While 
consensus over a broad range of policies is likely to ensue, the major parties tend to ignore issues that 
concern only a minority of citizens and threaten the interests of the majority. Moments of [non-major party] 
strength indicate that the major parties have failed to harmonise the different political interests in society 
and have failed to adjust to the economic and social demands that citizens have placed on the political 
system (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984p.221).
129
7.2.4. Party Systems and Voter Alignments
Section 2.2 discussed this study’s relevance for econometric analyses of voter behaviour. Section 2.3 
discussed its relevance for analyses of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan is one of the best-known 
analyses of the relationship between party systems and voter alignments (party support) (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967). Lipset and Rokkan hypothesise that Western party systems and voter alignments reflect 
social cleavages. Cleavages are "the criteria which divide members of a community into groups. Relevant 
cleavages divide members into groups with important political differences" (Rae and Taylor, 1970p.23); 
(Eckstein, 1966p.34); (Daalder, 1966pp.67-68); (Zuckerman, 1977pp.233-234); (Zuckerman, 1982).
Specifically, Lipset and Rokkan hypothesise that party systems and voter alignments in Western 
democracies are the result of a National Revolution and an Industrial Revolution. Each revolution created 
two cleavages. The National Revolution created a centre-periphery (regional) and a Church-state 
(religious) cleavage. The Industrial Revolution produced an agriculture-industry (rural-urban) and an 
owner-worker (class) cleavage. Cleavage theory expects that during the course of industrialisation the 
class cleavage will supercede traditional (regional, religious and rural-urban) cleavages (Rokkan, 1970).
Empirical research confirms that these four types of cleavage account for patterns of party and voter 
alignments in Western democracies after 1945 (Alford, 1963); (Rose and Urwin, 1969); (Lijphart, 1968); 
(Lijphart, 1979). Other studies analyse the extent to which this hypothesis applies to politics after 1960. 
These studies argue that advanced industrialism may be creating a new ("postmaterialist") cleavage and 
changing party and voter alignments. Unparalleled prosperity has significantly altered the social structure 
of Western democracies (Bell, 1973); (Dahl and Tufte, 1973); (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). At the same 
time, a new ("postmaterialist") set of issue concerns, which cut across traditional (religious, occupational) 
alignments of parties and voters, has arisen in these countries (Barnes and Kaase, 1979); (Inglehart, 
1977); (Inglehart, 1981).
The eclipse of one cleavage by another cleavage, as well as the existence of orthogonal cleavages, poses 
problems for political parties. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the postmaterialist cleavage has introduced 
tensions into Western democratic party systems. As a result, many parties were initially unable or 
unwilling to respond fully to the "postmaterialist" demands placed upon them (Baker, Dalton and Hil­
debrandt, 1981); (Berger, 1979). Further, some studies find that the social and psychological bonds that 
heretofore bound voters to parties have fragmented, thereby throwing these party systems into a state of 
flux (Daalder, 1983) (Mayer, 1980). Other studies note signs of a re-alignment of voters and parties along 
post-materialist lines (Ladd with Hadley, 1975); (Miller and Levitin, 1976); (Kemp, 1978). Most sig­
nificantly, a third set of studies relates the increased salience of the postmaterialist cleavage to the 
formation of new political parties (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984pp.463-467); (Mair, 1983).
Generally speaking, this study’s results are consistent with the expectations of the cleavage hypothesis. 
They suggest that, in the years immediately following the First World War, an agricultural economic 
cleavage became a salient aspect of electoral politics in Australia, and that this cleavage cross-cut the 
prevailing (religious and occupational) alignment of voters and parties. This cross-cutting cleavage posed 
formidable problems for the Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party. These parties were unable to 
aggregate the demands engendered by this cleavage into their ranks. Accordingly, this cleavage formed 
the basis of a new party. A decrease in the salience of this cleavage in particular states at particular 
elections precipitated the dissolution of the Country Party.
At the same lime, these results disagree in one important respect with the expectations of the Lipset and
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Rokkan model. The Country Party did not owe its existence to a centre-periphery (regional) cleavage. At 
elections, voters in rural Australia did not vote as a monolithic bloc: indeed, in 1922, 1925 and 1928, 
partisan support in subdivisions with Country Party candidates was relatively evenly divided between the 
three parties — with a majority of voters thus continuing to support one of the major parties. Nor was the 
formation of the Country Party a consequence of a religious cleavage: only in subdivisions without a 
Nationalist Party candidate in House of Representatives elections did the Country Party receive dis­
proportionate electoral support from a particular religious denomination (the Church of England). Nor 
was it the consequence of an agriculture-industry (urban-rural) or an owner-worker (class) cleavage: 
whilst drawing its most consistent support from primary producers, and whilst being firmly and consis­
tently rejected by employees in secondary industry, the Country Party failed to win the allegiance of all 
primary producers. The Country Party, in short, was not a product of a cleavage between agriculture and 
industry or between the urban centre and the rural hinterland: it was a consequence of an agricultural 
economic cleavage among primary producers within rural Australia.
None of the commonly-cited cleavages, in other words, adequately characterises the alignment of 
parties and voters which was observed in rural Australia between 1922 and 1928. This result is not 
surprising: consensus with respect to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of a 
cleavage, or with respect to a typology of cleavages, does not exist (Lane and Ersson, 1987p.45). This 
study may thus identify a shortcoming in the manner in which this concept is currently operationalised. It 
suggests that the term "cleavage" need not refer exclusively to voters’ ascriptive characteristics (i.e., to 
race, religion, language, ethnicity, occupation, rural or urban residence); it may also encompass their 
economic characteristics (such as the agricultural commodities they produce and the means by which they 
produce these commodities). Cleavages not be exclusively sociological phenomena.
7.23 . Elite Mobilisation
This study successfully predicts the source of the Country Party’s electoral support and the timing of its 
formation and partial dissolution. It demonstrates that rural voter dissatisfaction with the major parties 
provided the base upon which its formation and mass support was built. At the same time, however, it 
finds that Country Party formation and electoral was associated with the actions of an elite stratum of 
voters: the Business variable was among the most important determinants of Country Party formation and 
electoral support at the 1922,1925 and 1928 Commonwealth elections.
For two reasons, few citizens participate actively in politics: apart from voting, "homo civicus is not a 
political animal" (Dahl, 1966p.225); (Verba and Nie, 1972); (Verba and Nie, 1972); (Nie and Verba, 
1975). First, acts of political participation vary considerably in intensity (i.e., the level of initiative 
required of citizens and the level of political conflict to which it exposes citizens) and thus demand 
different levels of emotional commitment. Low-intensity ("spectator") activities, such as voting, require 
little initiative and make few demands upon participants. Medium-intensity ("transitional") activities, 
such as volunteer work in political campaigns, require greater initiative and impose greater demands upon 
participants. High-intensity ("gladiator") activities, such as standing as a candidate for public office, 
require great initiative and make very great demands upon participants. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
extent of any political activity varies inversely with its intensity (Milbrath and Goel, 1977).
Secondly, spectator, transitional and gladiator activities differ in kind as well as in intensity. They 
require participants to possess progressively greater physical, cognitive and psychological resources 
(Mishler, 1979p.21); (Verba and Nie, 1972). Citizens with higher-status occupations possess these
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resources in greatest abundance: they are more highly educated, are exposed to more political stimuli and 
thus have greater political skills. Similarly, better-educated citizens are more interested in politics and are 
more knowledgeable about politics: the more one understands about politics the better-equipped one is to 
participate in politics (Milbrath and Goel, 1977). For these reasons, gladiators are composed dispropor­
tionately of better-educated individuals in higher-status occupations.
This study’s results seem to corroborate these findings. The Country Party’s formation and electoral 
support, in other words, was associated with the actions of rural elites: these elites focussed rural voters’ 
dissatisfaction against the major parties, proposed remedies to rural economic difficulties and mobilised 
mass dissatisfaction against the major parties [see also (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984pp. 188-214)].
7.3. The Country Party, Australian Politics and the Australian Party System
Sections 1 and 2 discussed the relevance of this study’s results for non-Australian political studies. This 
section discusses their relevance for Australian political studies. It concludes that this study provides a 
modest antidote to the atheoretical and non-quantitative emphases of Australian political studies, and that 
in two respects this study’s results necessitate a re-interpretation of the Country Party’s place in 
Australian politics and in the Australian party system.
Studies of Australian party and voter behaviour and the Australian party system do not, generally 
speaking, address in an explicit manner questions whose theoretical relevance extends to other political 
systems [important exceptions include (Aitkin, 1977); (Kemp, 1978); (Jaensch, 1983)]. One study of the 
Australian Country Party, for example,
suffers from a certain parochialism. Australia may be at the other end of the world, but it is hardly so far 
removed that it is impossible to relate the findings derived from the Australian setting to other research and 
to examine whether the Australian experience bears any points of comparability [to other systems]. For 
these reasons, one somehow doubts whether this scholarly and competent study will receive much attention 
outside Australia (Castles, 1973pp.550-2).
Nor have these studies taken advantage of advances in the collection and analysis of quantitative data 
(Aitkin, 1985); (Epstein, 1977); (Brugger and Jaensch, 1985p.ix); (Mayer, 1956p.253); (Head, 1985). 
Aitkin concludes that "the concentration of contemporary Australian political science is firmly on its part 
of the world. Moreover, it is neither theoretical nor quantitative in its attack: apart from an interest in the 
statistics appropriate to election studies, Australian political science has avoided mathematical approaches 
almost completely" (Aitkin, 1982pp.l0-ll).
This study differs in important respects from other studies of Australian political parties and agrarian 
voter behaviour. (1) It attempts to resolve a specific research problem whose relevance extends to Canada 
and New Zealand. (2) In order to resolve this research problem, it constructs a formal (mathematical) 
theory of non-major and agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. (3) It assesses this 
theory’s propositions with an appropriate set of quantitative data and research techniques. (4) Because its 
results are consistent with theoretical expectations (and are inconsistent with the expectations of compet­
ing interpretations) this study challenges a conventional wisdom that has long remained unquestioned. If 
it is true that "the 1980s may be the decade in which Australian political scientists become adept in 
linking their empirical research to [positive] political theory" (Aitkin, 1982pp.71-72) then this study may 
contribute to an increase in the emphasis accorded to theoretical, mathematical and quantitative rigour by 
Australian political scientists.
This study not only corroborates hypothesised relationships; it also uncovers new relationships. These 
new findings require that in important respects the Country Party’s place in Australian politics and the
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Australian party system be re-assessed. Non-major parties such as the Australian Country Party have 
frequently been considered to be dysfunctional or otherwise undesirable entities (Fisher, 1974pp.2-4); 
(Janda, 1970p.84). Indeed, the Australian Country Party "has probably been the most criticised of the 
major (sic) Australian parties" (Rawson, 1961p.49); (Costar and Woodward, 1985p.l); (Davis and 
Hughes, 1958p.ll9). Aitkin, for example, observes that
it has been the most severely treated by academics, many of whom have called it "selfish", "reactionary" 
or "naive". Its leaders have been found "dull" or "plodding", and more than one modern-day Procrustes, 
holding that Australia has a two-party system, has denied the party a separate existence at all (Aitkin, 
1980p.415).
The existence of the Country Party necessitates, from the point of view of the major non-Labor party, 
co-operation with the Country Party in the parliament. Only if such co-operation is obtained can the 
major non-Labor party command majority support in the parliament and form a government. In practice, 
the co-operation between these two parties in parliament and at elections is "not merely a coalition but a 
coalescence" (Sartori, 1976p.l88). The deleterious consequences of this permanent coalition-coalescence 
for responsible and responsive government underlie (to some extent at least) Australian political 
scientists’ hostility towards the Country Party.
In a two-party system, political competition is a zero-sum game. A clear winner commanding a majority 
in parliament emerges at elections, and the government (composed of a single party) cannot evade 
responsibility for its actions. Conversely, when power is dispersed among coalition(s) of parties, stable 
government becomes problematic (Riker, 1962) and responsibility for government policy becomes more 
difficult to assign (Key, 1964p.334); (Epstein, 1983pp. 139-140):
at least as far as traditional British theories go, governing in coalition blunts the edge of responsibility and 
confuses voters. It makes responsibility for particular actions difficult to pin down and [encourages] 
politicians to blame others within the coalition for failures. Perhaps more importantly, coalition leads to the 
compromise of principles for expediency [and] to the subordination of principles [in order to] accommodate 
partners in government (Maddox, 1985p.225).
With respect to its activities in Parliament, Australian political scientists’ hostility towards the Country 
Party has four elements. (1) Australian political scientists frequently disparage the inconsistencies be­
tween the party’s rhetoric and its actions. Miller, for example, observes that the Country Party "is against 
the idea of socialism. But it is in favour of the fact of socialism, insofar as it desires the provision by 
governments of social capital in rural areas which could not pay for it themselves" (Miller, 1966ap.66). 
Similarly, Crisp observes that
ironically, though it has constantly attacked Labour’s (sic) socialism, the Country Party has sought office 
to advance policies of public provision of utilities, amenities, social services, development and conservation 
works for the benefit of country-dwellers. The listener to Country Party parliamentarians on the subject 
would be forgiven for concluding that they were socialists of the countryside, whose socialism-cum- 
syndicalism stops just short of each farmer’s boundary fence. Theirs is a "trade cycle" socialism, happy to 
"socialise" the losses of hard times than the premium prices or premium incomes of good times (Crisp, 
1978pp.252-253); (Jaensch, 1983p. 177); (Overacker, 1952p.228); (Woodward, 1985pp.61-62).
(2) The relative difficulty of assigning responsibility for specific actions to specific parties within a 
coalition permits and encourages the Country Party to pursue narrow and sectional aims. These actions 
have provoked much criticism. Summarising this criticism, Costar and Woodward conclude that the 
Country Party "has been seen as parasitic -  as a selfish, self-interested, sectional party which displays 
scant regard for broader national interests" (Costar and Woodward, 1985p.2); (Aitkin, 1972p.3); 
(Eggleston, 1953p. 120); (Overacker, 1952pp.228-230); (McFarlane, 1968p.8); (Davis and Hughes, 
1958p. 119). The Country Party’s influence upon the coalition’s policy is pervasive, and has directed its 
coalition partner in a more conservative direction than might otherwise have been the case (Barbalet, 
1975); (Woodward, 1985pp.64-67). This influence is exerted most strongly in rural and economic policy 
(Costar and Woodward, 1985p.l). Hence, "the fact that the Country Party has generally been only a junior
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partner in conservative governing alliances has not prevented it from being the most successful pressure 
group in Australia" (Buckley, 1972pp.71-72).
(3) Conversely, as the junior partner in a permanent coalition, the Country Party’s independence in 
Parliament is severely constrained. For this reason, the party’s relevance in terms of "coalition potential" 
has been questioned: (Jaensch, 1983p.20); (Maddox, 1985p.257); (Sartori, 1976pp. 186-187).
(4) The relative difficulty of assigning responsibility for specific actions to particular parties within a 
coalition encourages the Country Party, on occasion, to flout the conventions of individual and collective 
ministerial responsibility. For this fourth reason, the Country Party has been criticised:
It claims credit for all the Government’s measures which commend themselves to rural interests and 
washes its hands of those which do not. A sectional party, playing purely on the country-mindedness of its 
supporters, can with profit act thus, whereas a party like the Liberals, compelled to appear as most things to 
most men in its endeavour to project a national image, cannot utilise such tactics without alienating 
potential supporters (Crisp, 1978p.262).
Similarly, the Country Party-in-the-electorate has not escaped criticism. Australian political scientists 
often argue that the Country Party is, in terms of electoral support, indistinguishable from its coalition 
partner. Graham, for example, contends that "for all significant electoral purposes, they constitute a single 
unit, the conservative bloc in a two-party system" (Graham, 1966p.l96); (Buckley, 1972p.72); (Crisp, 
1965pp.224-227); (Webb, 1954pp. 103-104). Similarly, Aitkin asserts that
there can be little doubt that Liberal country Members of Parliament receive support from the same kinds 
of people who in other electorates vote Country Party, and at about the same level. For the great majority of 
country electors, the Liberal and Country Parties are seen as to all intents and purposes identical (Aitkin, 
1980p.422).
Verrall, Ward and Hay re-inforce this conclusion. They analyse the coalition parties electoral support 
and conclude that their electoral support does not differ. In particular, "there appears to be no specific 
agricultural sector which provides a basis for [Country] Party allegiance, nor which distinguishes 
[Country Party] heartlands from Liberal-held regions" (Verrall, Ward and Hay, 1985p.l6). As a result, 
"the Country Party is sometimes regarded as little more than the rural wing of the Liberal Party" (Lucy, 
1985p.65):
In Australia the two principal Anti-Labour parties in national politics, the Liberal and Country Parties, are 
first and foremost the political instruments of the owners and controllers of private, productive and 
commercial capital, urban and rural. At their core they are the parties of the successful, of the men and 
women of substance and "social" consequence, as a predominantly liberal capitalist society evaluates these 
things (Crisp, 1978p.227).
In short (and generally speaking) Australian political scientists do not believe that the Country Party has 
contributed in a positive manner to representative government in Australia. Nor do they believe that the 
Country Party is electorally relevant (since the coalition parties’ electoral support is considered to be 
indistinguishable). For these reasons, Australian political scientists do not believe that the Country Party 
influences the behaviour of voters and major parties (i.e., that it is a significant actor in the Australian 
party system).
This study disagrees in two respects with these assessments. (1) Between 1922 and 1928 the Country 
Party made at least one positive (and hitherto unrecognised) contribution to representative government in 
Australia. The Country Party drew disproportionate support from areas with low levels of voter turnout -  
indeed, a disproportionate amount of the Country Party’s electoral support was drawn from the segments 
of the rural electorate that were least likely to vote. Only the Country Party possessed this attribute. The 
Nationalist Party and the Australian Labor Party drew disproportionate support from rural areas with high 
levels of voter turnout.
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This finding has an important implication. If, as this study finds, dissatisfaction with major parties’ 
agricultural economic policies discourages electoral participation, then the rural voters most deleteriously 
affected by a decline in commodity prices have the least influence upon government policy, and the 
collective decision expressed at elections will not reflect the preferences of the entire electorate [see, for 
example, (Garvey, 1966); (Key, 1964)]. The greater the abstention at elections, in other words, the greater 
the asymmetry between the preferences of voters and the preferences of the entire electorate (voters and 
abstainers). In the years immediately following the First World War, the Australian Country Party 
redressed this asymmetry. It responded to hitherto unrepresented preferences and thereby re-integrated 
dissatisfied non-voters in rural districts into the active electorate. In this one sense at least (and not­
withstanding the contentions of most Australian political scientists), the Country Party was a democratic 
agent par excellence. This study thus corroborates the principal conclusions of Rosenstone et al and 
Mazmanian:
[Non-major] parties crystallize issues that otherwise might go unheeded or receive little attention during a 
campaign (Mazmanian, 1974pp.148-149). [They] provide a voice for a minority that would otherwise go 
unheeded in the most democratic of arenas, elections. They are the primary means in the electoral system 
for dissatisfied citizens to challenge the reigning major parties (Mazmanian, 1974p.l50); (Rosenstone, Behr 
and Lazarus, 1984pp.221-222).
A more complete assessment of the Country Party’s role in Australian politics demands cognizance of 
this result.
(2) Between 1922 and 1928 the Country Party was (in terms of electoral support and the presence or 
absence of its candidates in electoral subdivisions) a distinctive entity at elections. Country Party for­
mation and Nationalist Party dissolution were consequences of voter dissatisfaction with one or both of 
the major parties, and that Nationalist Party formation and Country Party dissolution were consequences 
of voter satisfaction with the major parties. Economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production 
underlay the Country Party’s formation, electoral support and dissolution. Occupational and religious 
variables underlay the major parties’ formation, electoral support and dissolution.
Clearly, therefore, the Country Party’s presence influenced the behaviour of voters and major parties. 
For these reasons, the Country Party was (at least between 1922 and 1928) a significant non-major party 
(i.e., a third party), not an insignificant non-major party (i.e., a minor party) in the Australian party 
system. During these years, in other words, the Australian party system was a three-party system. A more 
complete understanding of the Australian party system demands cognizance of this result.
Appendix A
Religious, Socialist and 
Ethnic Minority Party Formation
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T a b le  A - l : R e lig io u s  (C hristian D em ocratic) Party Form ation
Date of
C o u n t r y Party Name Forma t i o n
Aus t r i a C h r i s t i an-Social Party 1889
Austrian People's P a r t y 1945
B e l g i u m Parti social chretien/
Catholic People's P a r t y 1884
Christian People's P a r t y 1945
D e n m a r k Christian People's P a r t y 1970
E s tonia Christian Demo c r a t i c  P a rty 1919
F R  Ge r m a n y Christian Social P a rty 1868
Centre Party 1870
Christian Demo c r a t i c  Union/
Christian Social U n i o n 1945
F i n l a n d Christian Workers' P a r t y 1907
Finnish C h ristian League 1958
France Popular D e m ocratic P a r t y 1924
Popular R e p ublican M o v e m e n t 1944
D e m ocratic Centre 1966
I r eland Fine Gael 1933
Italy Italian P o pular Party 1919
Christian D e m ocratic P a r t y 1943
N e t h e r l a n d s Staatkundig ge r e f o r m e e r d e
partij 1918
G e r e f o r m e e r d  po l i t i e k  v e r b o n d 1948
Katholieke volkspartij 1896
A n t i - r e v o l u t i o n a i r e  partij 1879
C h r i s t e l i j k - h i s t o r i s c h e  unie 1908
Christen de m o k r a t i s c h  appel 1972
Politieke partij radik a l e n 1968
N o r w a y C h ristian People's P a rty 1933
Sweden C h ristian D e m ocratic U n i o n 1964
S w i t z e r l a n d Swiss Catholic A s s o c i a t i o n 1905
* * N .B .: "Date of Formation" refers to the year in w h ich
the p a rty first p r e s e n t e d  c a n didates at elections.
S o u r c e : Lane and Ersson (1987:98), M c H a l e  and S k o wronski
(1983 : 1224-1225) .
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T a b le  A -2 : S o c ia lis t Party F o n n a tio n
Date of
Co u n t r y Party Name F ormation
Austr a l i a A u s t r a l i a n  Labor P a rty 1891
Austria Social D e m o cratic P a r t y 1889
R e v o l u t i o n a r y  Socialists 1934
Socialist Party 1945
B e l g i u m Workers' Party 1885
Socialist Party (Flemish) 1978
Socialist Party (Francophone) 1978
Canada C o - O p e r a t i v e  C o m m o n w e a l t h
F e d e ration 1933
Czechosl o v a k i a C zech Social Demo c r a t i c  Party 1878
Slovak Social D e m o c r a t i c  P arty 1905
Den m a r k D a n i s h  International Labo u r
A s s o c i a t i o n 1871
Estonia Social D e m o cratic P a r t y 1917
F R Ger m a n y Social Demo c r a t i c  P a r t y 1975
F i n l a n d Social D e m o cratic P a r t y 1903
France French Labour Party 1879
U n i f i e d  Socialist P a rty 1958
Iceland Social Democratic P a rty 1916
Socialist Party 1938
Ireland Labour Party 1912
N a t i o n a l  Labour P a rty 1944
Italy Italian Socialist P a r t y 1892
Latvia Social Demo c r a t i c  P a rty 1918
L i thuania Social D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y 1896
Nether l a n d s Sicial D e m o cratic Workers' Party 1894
N e w  Zealand Labo u r  P a rty 1916
N o r w a y Labour Party 1887
P o l a n d Socialist Party 1892
Rumania Social D e m o cratic P a rty 1893
Sweden Social D e m o cratic Lab o u r  P a rty 1889
S w i t z e r l a n d Social D e m o cratic P a r t y 1880
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m Labour Party 1906
Social D e m o cratic P a r t y 1981
* * N .B .: "Date of Formation" refers to the year in
which the p a r t y  first p r e s e n t e d  c a n didates
at elections.
Source: Lane and Ersson (1987:99), M c H a l e  a n d  Skowronski
(1983:1227-1230).
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T able A -3: N ational M inority  (E thnic)
Party  Form ation
Date of
C o u n t r y Party Name F o r m a t i o n
B e l g i u m People's Union 1954
Wallon Rally 1967
Demo c r a t i c  Front of Francophones 1964
G e r m a n-Speakers Party 1972
Flemish Bloc 1978
Canada Parti Quebecois 1968
C z e c h o s l o v a k i a German League of Farmers 1920
Sudeten German Party 1933
D e n m a r k Schleswig Party 1920
Self-Government Party 1979
F i n l a n d Swedish People's Party 1906
France Occitanian Nationalist P arty 1959
Breton D e m o cratic Union 1964
U nion of Corsican People 1977
F R G e r m a n y Als a c e - L o r r a i n e  Party 1874
Bavarian People's Party 1920
Dani s h  Party 1871
Polish Party 1871
Italy South Tyrol People's Party 1948
V al'Aosta Union 1958
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m Scottish National Party 1928
Welsh N a tionalist Party 1925
-."Date of Formation" refers to the year in w h i c h
the party first p r e s e n t e d  candidates at e l e c t i o n s .
S o u r c e : Lane and Ersson (1987:98), McHale and S k o wronski
(1983:1235-1236) .
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Appendix B
Intentionalist and Theoretical Explanations 
B .l. Intentionalist Explanations
Studies which utilise intentionalist explanations account for an event(s) by setting out the process of 
reasoning that underlay this event(s) (Sowell, 1980p.97). Collingwood exemplifies this methodology:
For historians, the object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thoughts [e.g., the goals and 
motives! expressed in it. To discover the thought is to understand [the event]. After the historian has 
ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiry into the causes. When he knows what happened, 
he already knows why it happened (Collingwood, 1961p.214).
Intentionalist explanations contain an evaluative (interpretive or judgemental) component. They are ex­
ercises in "empathy” and "understanding." They attempt to re-create the past and to evoke a conscious­
ness of actors’ motives and feelings (Carr, 1961); (Nicholson, 1983p.l83).
For four reasons, intentionalist explanations are incomplete explanations. (1) Most importantly, em- 
pathetic identification with the motives of agents sets the intentionalist explanation beyond the reach of 
empirical appraisal and criticism (Gardiner, 1952). In consequence, "there’s something visciously subjec­
tive or projective about [intentionalist] explanations" (Flew, 1985p.26); (Hempel, 1965p.233); (Nagel, 
1961pp.463f); (Popper, 1957p.l77). Czudnowski, for example, observes that
if we cannot assume reference to a general law, or at least to a number of recurring instances of the same 
relationship, then the "explanatory status" of the relationship can be ascribed only to the investigator’s 
special insights, understanding or wisdom; alternatively, the relationship has no "explanatory status" at all 
(Czudnowski, 1976p.l9).
The subjectivity of the intentionalist explanation has several manifestations. If the objectivity of an 
inquiry depends upon deduction of its content (i.e., the Cartesian or mathematico-deductive criterion of 
objectivity) intentionalist explanations must abandon all claims to objectivity (Passmore, 
1974pp. 146-147). Direct, unimpeded access to facts and careful observation is a hallmark of objective 
analysis. Intentionalist explanations, however, must rely upon mediated evidence (observations mediated 
by the testimony of actors indirectly involved in events). Thus, if the objectivity of an inquiry is defined 
as a function of the data upon which it is based, intentionalist explanations cannot hope to attain objec­
tivity (Passmore, 1974pp. 148-150); (Clubb, 1977). Finally, the empirical propositions of objective studies 
are refutable and their results are replicable. Intentionalist explanations, however, are neither refutable nor 
replicable. For this reason, too, they must abandon their claims to objectivity (Passmore, 1974p.l50).
(2) The range of instances (across space and time) to which a particular intentionalist explanation may 
be applied is severely limited. Because actors’ specific objectives vary from place to place and from time 
to time, and depend upon institutional arrangements and cultural norms, intentionalist statements are 
typically so detailed that they apply only to single events. Moreover, their explanatory power rests upon 
the manner in which they arrange the details of each event: intentionalist explanations possess 
verisimilitude only if they amass a large number of details about a particular event and are able to arrange
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these details in a coherent manner. As a result, the burden of explanation is carried by the details of each 
event (Moon, 1982pp. 153-156).
(3) Another difficulty concerns the postulation that observed behaviour is the result of intended 
(deliberate) action. In many instances, this position is untenable, since many of the consequences of 
human action were not intended (Flew, 1985p.21). For example, it has long been recognised that the 
pursuit of economic self-interest has unintended consequences. Adam Smith drew attention to a 
mechanism by which something strongly suggesting design derives quite spontaneously and without 
direction:
But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in support of industry . . . every 
individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can . . .  to employ his capital. . .  that its produce may be of 
the greatest value. By directing . . . industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, 
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this as in many other causes, led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intentions (Smith, 1979); (Skinner and Wilson, 1976).
Clearly, therefore, individuals’ intentions produce both intended and unintended results. Accordingly, 
research must be directed at the unintended as well as the intended consequences of individuals’ 
deliberate actions (Flew, 1985p.77); (Hayek, 1978pp.41f). In particular, the mechanism by which par­
ticular intentions produce unintended results (i.e., the hidden and transcendent causes of events) requires 
investigation (Dürkheim, 1964p.76). The intentionalist model of explanation precludes such investigation.
(4) The presumption that observed behaviour is the outcome of intended (deliberate) action imposes a 
fourth (and closely related) set of constraints upon intentionalist explanations. Agents cannot act in a 
conscious or deliberate manner for reasons they do not understand; intentionalist explanations, in con­
sequence, cannot (and do not) make use of concepts and information not available to (or understood by) 
the agents themselves (Gardiner, 1974p. 11); (Winch, 1958); (Flew, 1985p.22). Moreover, adoption (by 
analysts) of the reasons and concepts actors use to explain their actions often engenders uncritical 
acceptance of the reasons and concepts actors use to explain their actions. As a result,
whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is well able to distinguish between what somebody professes and 
what he is, historians take an epoch at its word and believe that everything that it says and imagines about 
itself is true (Flew, 1985p.29); (O’Neill, 1973p.95).
This tendency makes intentionalist explanations inherently ambiguous, since people are not always 
clear about their intentions and actions. Moon, for example, finds that people "may be deeply ambivalent 
about some of these objectives and they may be unable to acknowledge some of their own needs and 
values. Moreover, even if a person’s behaviour is intelligible, his goals and beliefs may be less than fully 
coherent. In all these cases we can suggest that the situation is "opaque" to the actors involved, or even 
that they are "opaque" to themselves" (Moon, 1982p. 174). As a result, the language of intentionalist 
explanations is typically discursive, intuitive -  and often imprecise. Hexter observes that these studies 
"choose — often unself-consciously, but sometimes well-aware of what they are doing -  to write in a way 
that the rhetoric of science proscribes. They deliberately choose a word or phrase that is imprecise and 
may turn out to be ambiguous, because of its rich aura of connotation. Without compunction they 
sacrifice exactness for evocative form" (Hexter, 1968p.369).
(5) Finally, intentionalist explanations are incomplete explanations because they are often factually 
incorrect explanations. Nicholson finds that "very frequently the statements made on the basis of a 
supposed empathy will not match up with any careful (or even cursory) examination of the facts. The 
supposed goals do not yield the predictions which conform to the actual state of the world" (Nicholson, 
1983p.60). Intentionalist explanations, in short, are subjective, ambiguous and unfalsifiable explanations:
general obscurity in assertion and, in particular, evasiveness about what would or would not constitute
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falsifications of assertions made, are clear signs of insincerity in the search for scientific truth. Popper has 
famously insisted that the proper criterion for distinguishing scientific from non-scientific utterance is 
falsifiability. Any kind of indeterminateness is meaning is always bound, and often intended, to disable 
potential critics (Flew, 1985p.l98).
B.2. Theoretical Explanations
Theoretical explanations adopt very different premises (Moon, 1982); (Hempel, 1965); (Nagel, 1961). 
Theoretical explanations relate an event(s) to a generalisation or set of generalisations of which it is an 
instance. They set out initial conditions, deduce empirical propositions from these initial conditions and 
compare these propositions with observed behaviour. The weight of empirical evidence supports or 
disconfirms theories. Theoretical explanations truly explain events. When correctly formulated, they 
demonstrate that (given a set of initial conditions) no event other than that which is under examination is 
logically possible. If an explanation is cast in the form of a valid deductive argument, acceptance of its 
premises (prior to the inspection of data) necessitates acceptance of its propositions. Conversely, rejection 
of one or more of the theory’s initial conditions necessitates rejection of its empirical propositions (Ryan, 
1970pp.56-60); (Popper, 1963pp.l22f). Any supposed explanation which cannot be phrased and tested in 
this manner is not a proper explanation, but merely a "story" (Hempel, 1965).
It is possible (given an appropriate set of initial conditions) to develop theoretical explanations of 
political phenomena (Boynton, 1982pp.31-34). Economic (particularly micro-economic) reasoning 
provides a compelling analogy. By focussing attention upon a well-defined and narrowly-circumscribed 
phenomenon (the interaction consumers and firms in the market) whose behaviour is tightly structured by 
institutional arrangements, a large number of empirical propositions can be deduced from a few initial 
conditions (Barry, 1970); (Barry, 1982).
Electoral competition is closely analogous to market competition (Hartley and Tisdell, 198 lpp.45-67); 
(Buchanan, 1978); (Seldon, 1978), and the economic theory which illuminates the behaviour of con­
sumers and firms can also illuminate the behaviour of voters and parties (Brittan, 1977a); (Brittan, 
1977b); (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977); (Lindbeck, 1966); (MacRae, 1977); (Nordhaus, 1975); (Parkin, 
1975); (Wagner, 1977). Indeed, the application of deductive logic and the insights of standard micro- 
economic theory to the study of electoral politics represents the most successful effort yet made to 
analyse political phenomena in a systematic manner (Budge and Farlie, 1977p.l02). At least one study 
applies such a methodology to the study of an election in rural constituencies in the years before the First 
World War (Percy, Nome and Johnston, 1982). Clearly, therefore, an analysis of agrarian party for­
mation, electoral support and dissolution might benefit greatly from a theoretical methodology in general 
and an economic methodology in particular.
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Appendix C
"Instrumentalist” Methodology
Some knowledge of the nature and form of scientific explanation, of the meaning and use of scientific 
methods, techniques, and constructions, and of the various other aspects of scientific inquiry, is already an 
essential part of the intellectual equipment of any adequately-trained political scientist and the need for 
this training seems very likely to increase rapidly in the near future (Meehan, 1965p.v).
The term "methodology" does not refer, despite frequent usage to the contrary, to techniques of empiri­
cal research (i.e., to the techniques by which data ~  quantitative and non-quantitative are analysed). 
Rather, it refers to the "requirements for good science" (Papineau, 1978p.21), i.e., the rules and conven­
tions that are invoked in order to ascertain "whether a suggested hypothesis or theory should be ten­
tatively accepted as part of a body of systematised knowledge" (Friedman, 1953p.3);see also (Agassi, 
1969); (Blaug, 1980pp.27-28); (Boland, 1982pp.l-9). The methodology which is appropriate for a par­
ticular research project depends upon its objectives (Boland, 1982pp.l88-196). This study’s raison d’etre 
is practical, not theoretical; it constructs a formal theory not for its own sake, but in order to resolve a 
relevant problem for comparative political science research (i.e., the formation, electoral support and 
dissolution, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand). An "Instrumentalist" methodology is an appropriate methodology for the 
analysis of immediate and practical problems (Boland, 1979); (Boland, 1980); (Boland, 1981); (Boland, 
1982pp. 141-152, 174-175,193-195). This study therefore adopts an Instrumentalist methodology.
Recognition of two modes of reasoning is essential for an understanding of this methodological doctrine 
[see in particular (Boland, 1979p.505)]. (a) To argue from the truth of a set of premises to the truth of a 
set of conclusions is to argue in modus ponens. If an argument conforms to the formal rules of logic, in 
other words, then whenever all of its premises are true then all of its conclusions will also be true, (b) 
However, if an argument is logical then any time that one of its conclusions is false then not all of its 
premises can be true. To argue against the truth of one or more of a theory’s premises by demonstrating 
that one or more of its conclusions is false is to argue in modus tollens. If an argument can be successfully 
criticised by modus tollens then one or more of its premises is false or it is not logical (or both).
Heuristically, modus ponens "passes" the assumed truth of a theory’s premises forward to its conclu­
sions; modus tollens "passes" the falsity of a theory’s conclusions backward to its premises. The truth of a 
theory, however, cannot be "passed" backward; nor can its falsity be "passed" forward. Any use of modus 
ponens in reverse ("the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent") or of modus tollens in reverse ("the Fallacy 
of Denying the Antecedent") violates the canons of logic and is therefore invalid (Boland, 1979p.508).
Three characteristics distinguish Instrumentalism. (1) Given the "problem of induction" (i.e., the impos­
sibility of inferring true universal statements from singular statements or individual observations), the 
"truth" of theories can be neither established nor rejected with complete certainly (Papineau, 1978:26). 
Instrumentalism therefore considers theories to be no more than contingent instruments for making
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successful predictions (i.e., predictions which are consistent with observations).56 Theories organise, 
summarise and impose order upon hitherto incommensurable observations, but do not represent "truth" or 
"reality" (Boland, 1982pp. 16-17); (Davis, 1969pp.25-33); (Friedman, 1953p.9).
(2) An hypothesis or theory can be accepted as part of a body of systematised knowledge only to the 
extent that it makes successful predictions. Instrumentalism rejects any attempt to immunise an 
hypothesis against falsification; rather, it advocates the formulation of falsifiable predictions and a will­
ingness to abandon hypothesis that have been refuted. Blaug, for example, argues that "theories must 
stand or fall on the basis of the predictions that they yield. Empirical testing of hypotheses constitutes the 
Mecca of modem economics" (Blaug, 1986p.270). Similarly, Friedman argues that "the only relevant test 
of the validity of an hypothesis is a comparison of its predictions with experience" (Friedman, 
1953pp.8-9); see also (Davis, 1969pp.22-25); (Popper, 1963pp.33-41); (Lipsey, 1966pp.l-21).
(3) Given (1) and (2), as long as its conclusions are derived in a logical manner and are successful (i.e., 
are consistent with experience) the "truth" and "realism" of a theory’s premises are, for all practical 
purposes, irrelevant. By modus tollens, one or more of a theory’s premises must be false whenever one or 
more of its conclusions are false. It does not, however, follow that a theory’s premises are true because its 
conclusions are consistent with observations (this would constitute an invalid, reverse modus tollens 
argument). Provided that its conclusions are consistent with observations, therefore, criticism of a 
theory’s premises is meaningless because it relies upon an invalid (reverse modus tollens) form of 
reasoning. (Similarly, nothing is gained by applying modus ponens: this line of reasoning requires ab­
solute certainty that a theory’s premises are true; the "problem of induction," however, precludes such 
certainty).
An hypothesis or theory, in short, cannot be judged on the basis of the "truth" or "realism" of its initial 
conditions (which are frequently but erroneously labelled "assumptions"). The demand that the theory’s 
initial conditions be "realistic" belies "a lack of understanding of theoretical knowledge. All theories 
abstract from reality. They are approximations and not reality. They are by definition unrealistic" (Davis, 
1969p.26). Accordingly, "the relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory is not whether 
they are descriptively realistic (for they never are), but whether they are sufficiently good approximations 
for the purpose in hand" (Friedman, 1953p.l5). This question can be answered only by ascertaining 
whether the theory yields accurate predictions.
A theory’s initial conditions help to present the theory succintly and to specify the conditions under 
which the theory is expected to be valid. A theory’s initial conditions are frequently "unrealistic" because 
they are abstract, because they idealise actors’ behaviour and because they simplify the theory’s ex­
planatory variables. Indeed, "any theory which is not an exact replica of reality abstracts, idealises and 
oversimplifies outrageously. If good theories are to explain much with little, they must be descriptively 
inaccurate or unrealistic" (Blaug, 1986). Friedman expresses this methodological point most forcefully:
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have "assumptions" that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality; the more significant the theory the more "unrealistic" the assump­
tions. An hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and 
crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomenon to be 
explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of these alone (Friedman, 1953p. 14).
To be important, therefore, an hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account 
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to 
be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained (Friedman, 1953pp. 14-15); see also (Davis, 1969p.26); 
(Robertson, 1976p.23).
Three conclusions follow from these methodological points. (1) The theory set out in Chapter 3 is no
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more than an engine for generating refutable empirical propositions. It does not attempt (or claim) to 
provide an exhaustive explanation of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. It ac­
cepts that it may omit relevant factors from consideration. Nor does it claim that its empirical proposi­
tions uncover ultimate or transcendent truths. It says only "look at the phenomenon of agrarian party 
formation, electoral support and dissolution in this way; when you do you will see the order which has 
been eluding you" [paraphrased from (Boynton, 1982p.38)]. (2) At the same time, however, to the extent 
that its empirical propositions are consistent with factual observations, this study claims to produce 
systematised knowledge. (3) This study’s theory and empirical propositions cannot be judged on the basis 
of the "realism" of its initial conditions; rather, they can only be judged on the basis of its empirical 
proposition’s conformity with factual observations. As Boland observes, "any valid or fair criticism of an 
instrumentalist [theory] can only be about the sufficiency of its argument. The only direct refutation is 
one that shows that the theory is inapplicable. Failing that, the critic must alternatively provide his own 
sufficient argument, which does the same job" (Boland, 1979p.509).
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Appendix D
Mathematical Derivations
Chapter 3 constructed a formal theory (in the form of a linear, first-order system of difference 
equations) of non-major and agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. In particular, 
Equation (3.15) specified the manner in which the system’s inputs (voter dissatisfaction with the major 
parties and an issue whose salience attains crisis proportions) are transformed into an output (non­
major/agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution): 
zY(z)
z2-(\+a-y+K)z+
X(l-KX)
[ f /1(z )+ f /2(z)].
(3.15)
Equation (3.15) can be solved (i.e., its response characteristics can be determined) when numeric values 
are assigned to its constants and its input sequences are specified. Equations (3.18-3.19), (3.22-3.23) and 
(3.26-3.27) describe the response characteristics of Equation (3.15). This Appendix derives these equa­
tions.
Following Equation (3.16), for example, let 
a=.l 
Y=.2 
h =.2
Substituting these values into Equation (3.15) gives
T(z)
z2-(1+.1-.2+.2)z+
.2(1+.1)
[ t / 1(z )+ t /2(z)]
T(z)
T(z)
z2- l . l z + . 2 2
[ f / 1(z)+C/2(z)]
( z - .8 4 ) (z - .2 7 )
[ f / 1(z )+ f/2(z)].
(D.l)
If the characteristics of the input sequences are known, the z-transform of the input sequences can be 
substituted for the term [Ul(z)+U2(z)] in Equation (D.l). Following Equation (3.16), each input sequence 
is a unit step input. The z-transform of the unit step input is —— (Boynton, 1980pp.61-65). The z-
( z - l )
transform of the sum of two input sequences is equal to the sum of the z-transform of each sequence; for
2 2
this reason, —— can be substituted for [UAz)+U0(z)] in Equation (D.l):
( z - l )  1 ^
y(z) (z - .2 )z  /  2z \
( z - .8 4 ) ( z - .2 7 )y (z ^ T )  J
(D.2)
Combining terms gives
2z2
(z-.84)(z-.27)(z-l)
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y(z) =
(D.3)
Equation (D.3) is the z-transform of the linear discrete time system represented by Equation (3.15). The 
solution to this equation is obtained by means of an inverse z-transform (i.e., by finding the sequences 
which produce Equation (D.3)); specifically, the solution is obtained through a partial fraction expansion, 
which decomposes this complex z-transform into additively-related (and simpler) z-transforms whose 
sequences are known (Boynton, 1980pp.72-80).
A partial fraction expansion of Equation (D.3) yields four linearly-related components: 
2z2
(z-.84)(z-.27)(z-l)
A + B
( ( z - ,8 4 ) )  + C( ( z - .2 7 ) )  + ° ( ( z - l ) )
(D.4)
The value of the four coefficients A, B, C and D can be found by evaluating Equation (D.4) 
appropriately chosen values of z. For example, it can be easily shown that A = 0:
2(0)2
(0-.84)(0-.27)(0-l)
A + *(<fW)+ c(ra )  + <<&)
0 = A + 0 + 0 + 0.
for
(D.5)
B can be determined by multiplying Equation (D.4) through by X ~84'):
z
'(z -.84 )\ /  2z2
(z-.84)(z-.27)(z-l))
e ^ )  + B + c( ( ^ ) X ^ ) + Dfa)(r?)(z-.84)' '(z-.84)'
(D.6)
Equation (D.6) can be evaluated by choosing a value for z that will simplify the task of finding B. Setting 
z equal to .84 facilitates this process:
(.7056)
(.57X-.16)
- H i  = 5
-.091
-18.42 = B.
0 + B + 0 + 0
(D.7)
Similarly, C can be determined by multiplying Equation (D.4) through by ^ ,27-:
(^x 2 z2(z-.84)(z-.27)(z-l) )
( f c ? )  *  c
' ( z - 2 1 ) (Z-.27)'
(D.8)
Equation (D.8) can be evaluated by choosing a value for z which will simplify the task of finding 
C. Setting z equal to .27 facilitates this process:
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(.146)
(-.57X-.73)
.146 _—  = c
.416
1.29 = C.
0 + 0 + C + 0
(D.9)
Finally, D can be determined by multiplying Equation (D.4) through by
'( z - l ) \  /  2zl
k (z-.84)(z-.27)(z-1) )
■ X s ? )  * » ( Ä X “ )  * “
(D.10)
Equation (D.10) can be evaluated by choosing a value for z that will simplify the task of finding 
D. Setting z equal to 1 facilitates this process:
2
(.16)073)
Ti  = d
16.70 = D.
0 + 0 + 0 + D
(D .ll)
Having completed the partial fraction expansion, it is possible to find the inverse z-transform of Equa­
tion (D.3). Inserting the values of A, B, C and D into Equation (D.3) gives
T(z) = 0 -  18.42/"—i — ^  + 1.29/"— z— \  + 1 6 .7 0 /" - i - \  
y(z-.84) J  \(z-.X J ))  \ ( z_1) /
(D.12)
Boynton lists the sequences which correspond to these simplified z-transforms: z^ - is the z-transform
of the sequence (.84)k;  ^ 2 is the z-transform of the sequence (.27)k; and —L. is the z-transform of the
sequence (l)k (Boynton, 1980pp.61-65). Accordingly, the solution to Equation (3.15), given these values 
for the constants and these input characteristics, is
y(k) = -18.42(.84)* + 1.29(.27)* + 16.70(1)*
k=0,l,2,...(D.13)
Equation (D.13) is equal to Equation (3.18). The same procedure is used to derive Equation (3.19) 
(Equations (3.18) and (3.19) differ only with respect to the values of a , y and X). This procedure is also 
used to derive Equations (3.22), (3.23), (3.26) and (3.27). For these equations, however, different terms 
are subsituted for [Ul(z)+U2(z)]: for Equations (3.22) and (3.23), which have one unit step input and one 
Kronecker Delta input, — ■—  is substituted for U,(z)+UJz)]\ for Equations (3.26) and (3.27), which have
( z - l )  1 z
two Kronecker Delta inputs, 2 is substituted for [Ul(z)+U2(z)].
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Appendix E
A Generalised Least Squares Estimator
Chapter 4 argued that the Ordinary Least Squares estimator is not (given that this analysis must use 
aggregate data) an appropriate estimator of voter behaviour in rural constituencies. A priori, the number 
of eligible voters within each aggregate unit (in this case Australian electoral subdivisions) can be 
expected to vary substantially; as a result, the variance of the OLS estimator’s residual (disturbance) term 
will not be constant (i.e., will be heteroskedastic) and will thereby violate one of the conditions of the 
Classical Linear Model. This Appendix demonstrates this result mathematically. It also describes a more 
appropriate estimating procedure which closely approximates the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) es­
timator and which can be assessed with standard OLS diagnostic statistics.
Equation (1) is a linear model which is similar in form to Model (1) and Model (2) (these models were 
described in Chapter 4). Yi is a dependent variable which represents a party’s percentage share of the total 
vote in the ith electoral subdivision, Xi is a matrix of independent variables which represents, in the ith 
electoral subdivision, the variables described in Table 4-2 and Lf is a vector of normally-distributed 
residual (disturbance) terms whose expected value is zero.
[see, for example, (Kelejian and Oates, 1981p.219)]. However, because the number of voters in each 
electoral subdivision varies, Equation (1) must be re-written
(where Nj represents the number of voters in the ith electoral subdivision and the summations are across 
all voters in each subdivision). The variance of Equation (3)’s residual term is thus
Yi = ßXi + Ui ( 1)
The variance of Equation ( l) ’s residual term may be written
a u2 = E(Ui)2 = E(Yi -ßX i)2 (2)
(3)
N. N. N.
(4)
This residual term may also be written
N.
(5)
Because Nj is a constant -  and therefore because E(N^ = -  Equation (5) may be re-written
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(6)
a u2 must be constant (homoskedastic) in order to generate a best (minimum variance) estimate of ß. 
Equation (6), however, indicates that the variance of the residual term of Equation (3) is heteroskedastic 
(since Equation (6) differs from Equation (3) by the factor i.). In particular, the extent to which the model
I
accurately predicts the actual value of the dependent variable will be a function of the number of eligible 
voters in each electoral subdivision. Equation (6) indicates that observations for more populous electoral 
subdivisions will be more accurate and will exhibit less variation about the true value of Yi than obser­
vations from less populous subdivisions (since, as Nj —» °° i- —> 0 and Equation (6) = Equation (2)).
Equation (6), in other words, indicates that the value of LT for smaller electoral subdivisions will exceed 
the value of Uj for larger subdivisions and therefore that Lf is heteroskedastic. In consequence, the 
Ordinary Least Squares estimator remains unbiased but is no longer the Best (i.e., minimum variance) 
Linear Unbiased Estimator and standard statistical tests (F, t, et al) will be invalid.
Equation (6) indicates that a correction for this form of heteroskedasticity must give more weight to 
observations which have the least error (i.e., electoral subdivisions with larger numbers of voters) and 
give less weight to observations which have the most error (i.e., electoral subdivisions with fewer voters). 
Hanushek and Jackson find that assigning a weight that is inversely proportional to the variance of the 
disturbance terms associated with each observation and applying OLS to these transformed observations 
yields homoskedastic residuals (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp. 150-163). These residuals’ coefficients 
closely resemble those obtained with the Generalised Least Squares estimator (White, 1988). Weighting 
each observation in the data set by >lN i yields such residuals. Multiplying Equation (3) through by aIjV,- 
gives
Ni NiIn In In
w / i=l  \ + < W / i=l\  n ) v n ) v n ,
Re-arranging terms gives
N. N. NiIn In In
‘=1 -  ß(^,=1 \ i=l-f.
The variance of the disturbance term of Equation (8) is
(7)
(8)
(9)
Re-arranging terms gives
N. N.
k p u>2) = (hp{Y‘ ~ px‘)2I / = !  i i = l
The sums on both sides of Equation (10) are equal to Nit yielding
(10)
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This result confirms that the variance of the disturbance term of Equation (7) is homoskedastic (since 
Equation (11) = Equation (7)). All model coefficients set out in Chapter 6 use this Weighted 
(Generalised) Least Squares technique.
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Appendix F
Agrarian Party Formation and Dissolution 
(Diagnostic Statistics)
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Table F-l: Country Party
Formation and Dissolution,
Commonwealth Election, 1922
(Summary Statistics for Alternative
Estimators and Specifications)
Australia
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M odel (1) (2) (1) (2)
L - R  Test 6 8 . 0 9 6 6 . 8 0 6 7 . 2 4 6 5 . 8 9
M a d d a l a  R - s q . 1 2 9 2 . 1270 . 1 2 7 7 . 1 2 5 3
C - U  R-sq . 1779 . 1 7 4 8 . 1 7 5 8 . 1 7 2 5
M c F  R-sq . 1 0 6 8 . 1047 . 1054 . 1 0 3 3
C h o w  R - s q . 1 4 1 5 . 1 4 0 7 . 1 3 9 4 . 1 3 8 3
Ne w  South Wales
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o del (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 1 5 2 . 7 6 1 5 2 . 4 4 1 5 5 . 1 8 1 5 4 . 4 0
M a d d a l a  R-sq . 4 5 2 0 . 4 5 1 3 . 4 5 7 2 . 4 5 5 5
C - U  R-sq . 6 2 2 0 . 6211 . 6292 . 6 2 6 9
M c F  R-sq . 4 6 3 7 . 4 6 2 8 . 4711 . 4 6 8 7
C h o w  R-sq . 4 9 4 2 . 5 0 1 0 . 4 9 7 3 . 5 0 2 0
OtherStates
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 2 5 . 2 7 2 5 . 4 0 2 4 . 7 0 2 4 . 6 0
M a d d a l a  R-sq . 1 0 0 7 . 1012 . 0 9 8 6 . 0 9 8 2
C- U  R-sq . 1 3 8 7 . 1 3 9 4 . 1 3 5 7 . 1 3 5 2
M cF R-sq . 0 8 1 9 . 0 8 2 4 . 0 8 0 1 . 0 7 9 8
Ch o w  R-sq . 1 0 8 2 . 1 1 1 1 . 1 0 4 2 . 1 0 5 7
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T able F-2: National Party
Formation and D issolution,
Com m onwealth Election, 1922
(Summary Statistics for Alternative
Estimators and Specifications)
Australia
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) (2 )
L- R  Test 1 1 7 . 6 9 1 3 2 . 3 3 1 1 9 . 8 6 1 3 3 . 8 7
M a d d a l a  R-sq . 2 1 2 8 . 2 3 5 6 . 2 1 6 2 . 2 3 8 2
C - U  R-sq . 3 2 6 8 . 3 6 2 3 . 3 3 2 2 . 3 6 6 0
M c F  R-sq . 2 2 7 3 . 2 5 5 6 . 2 3 1 5 . 2 5 8 5
C h o w  R-sq . 2 4 0 1 . 2 7 6 9 . 2 3 8 1 . 2 7 5 2
New South Wales
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l ( 1 ) ( 2) ( 1) ( 2 )
L - R  Test 5 2 . 2 1 5 3 . 5 4 5 3 . 2 0 5 4 . 5 7
M a d d a l a  R-sq . 1 8 5 6 . 1 9 0 1 . 1 8 9 0 . 1 9 3 3
C - U  R-sq . 3 6 6 9 . 3 7 5 3 . 3 7 3 1 . 3 8 1 7
M c F  R-sq . 2 9 1 1 . 2 9 8 6 . 2 9 6 6 . 3 0 4 3
C h o w  R-sq . 2 4 1 4 . 2 4 7 2 . 2 3 3 0 . 2 3 9 2
OtherStates
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
L- R  Test 7 7 . 6 1 8 5 . 9 7 7 6 . 3 3 8 4 . 6 3
M a d d a l a  R-sq . 2 7 8 3 . 3 0 3 2 . 2 7 4 4 . 2 9 9 2
C - U  R-sq . 3 8 7 9 . 4 2 2 6 . 3 8 2 5 . 4 1 7 2
M c F  R-sq . 2 5 8 1 . 2 8 5 9 . 2 5 3 8 . 2 8 1 4
C h o w  R-sq . 3 2 5 1 . 3 6 0 3 . 3 1 6 2 . 3 5 2 6
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T a b le  F -3: Country Party
Form ation and D isso lu tio n ,
C om m on w ealth  E lec tio n , 1925
(Sum m ary S tatistics for A lternative
E stim ators and S p ec ifica tio n s)
A u stralia
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 139.45 132.17 139.32 133.06
M a d d a l a  R-sq .2468 .2356 .2466 .2370
C- U  R-sq .3395 .3241 .3393 .3260
M c F  R-sq .2184 .2070 .2182 .2084
C h o w  R-sq .2493 .2299 .2451 .2274
N ew South Wales
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M odel (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 155.71 156.31 153.28 155.56
M a d d a l a  R-sq .4583 .4596 .4531 .4580
C - U  R-sq . 6194 . 6211 .6123 . 6190
M c F  R-sq .4552 .4569 .4481 .4548
C h o w  R-sq .5198 . 5093 .4997 .5044
OtherStates
Estim a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
L -R Test 96.99 98.52 97.41 99.02
M a d d a l a  R-sq .3347 .3390 .3359 .3403
C - U  R-sq .4752 .4812 .4769 .4832
M c F  R-sq .3343 .3397 .3359 .3414
C h o w  R-sq .3490 .3526 .3470 .3512
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T able F-4: National Party
Formation and D issolution,
Comm onwealth Election, 1925
(Summary Statistics for Alternative
Estimators and Specifications)
Australia
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) (2 )
L - R  Test 7 3 . 2 7 6 9 . 9 3 7 1 . 7 1 7 2 . 0 5
M a d d a l a  R- s q . 1 3 8 4 . 1 3 2 5 . 1 3 5 6 . 1 3 6 2
C - U  R-sq . 2 1 0 9 . 2 0 2 0 . 2 0 6 7 . 2 0 7 7
M c F  R-sq . 1 3 9 5 . 1 3 3 2 . 1 3 6 6 . 1 3 7 2
C h o w  R-sq . 1 2 2 6 . 1 1 4 2 . 1 2 4 0 . 1 1 3 9
New South Wales
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l ( 1) ( 2 ) ( 1) ( 2 )
L- R  Test 4 5 . 4 8 4 4 . 5 6 4 7 . 2 2 4 6 . 3 7
M a d d a l a  R - s q . 1 6 3 9 . 1 6 0 9 . 1 6 9 7 . 1 6 6 9
C - U  R-sq . 2 6 0 3 . 2 5 5 5 . 2 6 9 4 . 2 6 4 9
M c F  R-sq . 1 8 0 2 . 1 7 6 6 . 1 8 7 1 . 1 8 3 7
C h o w  R-sq . 1 2 8 1 . 1 2 7 2 . 1 3 2 3 . 1 3 0 3
O t herStates
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
L - R  Test 1 1 3 . 5 1 1 1 5 . 0 8 1 1 4 . 5 4 1 1 6 . 2 1
M a d d a l a  R - s q . 3 7 9 3 . 3 8 3 4 . 3 8 2 0 . 3 8 6 3
C - U  R-sq . 5 5 7 9 . 5 6 3 9 . 5 6 1 8 . 5 6 8 2
M c F  R-sq . 4 1 8 7 . 4 2 4 5 . 4 2 2 5 . 4 2 8 6
C h o w  R-sq . 4 0 8 4 . 4 1 2 5 . 4 0 9 8 . 4 1 4 1
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Table F-5: Country Parly 
Formation and Dissolution, 
Commonwealth Election, 1928 
(Summary Statistics for Alternative 
Estimators and Specifications)
Australia
Estimator logit logit probit probit
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
L-R Test 79.09 92.22 80.62 93.70
Maddala R-sq .1485 .1709 . 1511 .1734
C-U R-sq .1997 .2299 .2033 .2332
McF R-sq .1181 . 1377 .1204 .1399
Chow R-sq .1343 .1565 .1340 .1566
New South Wales
Estimator logit logit probit probit
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
L-R Test 147.34 151.61 145.90 151.09
Maddala R-sq .4402 .4495 . 4370 .4483
C-U R-sq .5960 .6086 .5917 . 6071
McF R-sq .4325 .4450 .4282 .4435
Chow R-sq .4942 .4938 .4839 .4933
OtherStates
Estimator logit logit probit probit
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
L-R Test 12.84 16.04 12.53 15.78
Maddala R-sq .0525 .0652 .0513 .0642
C-U R-sq . 0703 .0872 .0686 .0858
McF R-sq .0392 .0490 .0382 .0482
Chow R-sq .0584 .0702 .0565 .0685
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T a b le  F -6: N ational Party
Form ation and D isso lu tio n ,
C om m on w ealth  E lec tio n , 1928
(Sum m ary S tatistics for A lternative
E stim ators and S p ecifica tio n s)
Australia
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o del (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 84.76 87.15 84.47 87.52
M a d d a l a  R - s q .1583 .1623 .1578 .1631
C - U  R- s q .2171 .2226 .2164 .2237
M c F  R-sq .1319 .1356 .1315 .1364
C h o w  R - s q .1631 .1606 .1608 .1594
New South Wales
Esti m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 75.86 76.95 75.83 76.71
M a d d a l a  R-sq .2582 .2614 .2581 .2607
C - U  R-sq .3530 .3573 .3529 .3564
M c F  R-sq .2272 .2304 .2271 .2297
C h o w  R - s q .2633 .2666 .2630 .2665
OtherStates
E s t i m a t o r logit logit probit probit
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
L- R  Test 62.28 62.41 62.05 62.95
M a d d a l a  R- s q .2303 .2307 .2295 .2324
C- U  R-sq .3170 .3176 .3160 .3200
M c F  R-sq .2020 .2024 .2012 .2041
C h o w  R - s q .2381 .2245 .2297 .2203
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Appendix G
Agrarian Voter Behaviour 
(Diagnostic Statistics)
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Table G -l: Country Party Electoral Support, 
All States, Commonwealth Election, 1922 
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate 
Model Specifications)
House of Representatives
Turnout Vote
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
Summary Statistics 
F 32.94 29.65 18.44 29.66
Std Err .0897 .1659 . 1218 .1659
R-sq (Adj) .5196 .4925 .3907 .4925
Diagnostic Statistics -- Normality of Residuals
Chi-sq (N) 44.35 44.51 104.50 44.50
Chi-sq (JB) 48.69 31.96 234.72 31.96
Skewness . 6347 .3511 1.311 .3511
Kurtosis 1.879 1.651 3.604 1.651
Diagnostic Statistics -- Heteroskedasticity
Y-Hat 12.45 0.342 18.77 0.342
Y-Hat**2 13.37 0.179 22.63 0.179
In(Y-Hat**2) 11.36 1.965 12.74 1.065
B-P-G Test 65.18 46.64 40.92 46.64
Harvey Test 41.87 37.95 38.33 37.95
Senate
Summary Statistics 
F 39.84 41.06 22.07 33.93
Std Err . 0985 .5843 .1147 . 6532
R-sq (Adj) .4889 .4905 .3608 .4688
Diagnostic Statistics — Normality of Residuals
Chi-Sq (N) 40.24 28.66 159.27 94.49
Chi-Sq (JB) 17.40 12.43 507.99 162.97
Skewness .0446 .0289 1.486 0.552
Kurtosis 1.049 .8728 4.626 2.798
Diagnostic Statistics — Heteroskedasticity
Y-Hat 17.92 0.686 32.41 5.802
Y-Hat**2 19.14 0.261 37.54 5.552
In(Y-Hat**2) 16.21 1.257 18.32 5.556
B-P-G Test 85.50 41.74 49.55 42.28
Harvey Test 58.93 32.88 58.79 49.40
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Table G-2: Country Party Electoral Support, 
New South Wales, Commonwealth Election, 1922 
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate 
Model Specifications)
House of Representatives
Turnout Vote
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
Summary Statistics 
F 5.74 5.77 15.38 17.46
Std Err .0497 .0949 .1230 .5151
R-sq (Adj) .2339 .2350 .5035 .5374
Diagnostic Statistics — Normality of Residuals
Chi-sq (N) 11.50 24.79 39.33 22.78
Chi-sq (JB) 1.48 0.17 25.58 3.823
Skewness .2300 .0869 0.709 .0855
Kurtosis 0.012 0.021 1.587 .8025
Diagnostic Statistics — Heteroskedasticity
Y-Hat 1.69 4.163 8 . 659 0.446
Y-Hat**2 1.65 4.168 10.59 2.102
In(Y-Hat**2) 1.54 4.128 2.555 8.812
B-P-G Test 20.57 19.05 19.87 13.82
Harvey Test 5.70 8.40 15.68 13.52
Senate
Summary Statistics 
F 6.11 5.98 23.95 45.93
Std Err .0711 .1519 .1088 .4822
R-sq (Adj) .1731 .1695 .5075 .6688
Diagnostic Statistics — Normality of Residuals
Chi-Sq (N) 27.54 .34.38 58.77 32.79
Chi-Sq (JB) 85.87 493.25 157.74 16.87
Skewness . 1371 1.099 1.162 0.448
Kurtosis 2.910 6.346 3.416 1.306
Diagnostic Statistics — Heteroskedasticity
Y-Hat 2.528 1.395 37.89 12.57
Y-Hat**2 2.358 1.255 68.69 0.180
In(Y-Hat**2) 2.555 1.506 13.16 0.038
B-P-G Test 13.19 18.71 150.61 113.74
Harvey Test 22.20 28.91 27.02 17.31
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T ab le G -3 : C ountry  Party E lectoral Support, 
Q ueensland , South  A ustralia, W estern  A ustralia  and
T asm an ia , C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1922
(D iagnostic S tatistics fo r A lternate
M odel Specifications)
H ou se o f R ep resen tatives
Turnout Vote
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
S u mmary Statistics
F 38.39 38.04 6.88 15.21
Std Err .0916 .1680 .1763 . 6836
R - s q  (Adj) .6898 . 6879 .2741 . 4791
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics — N ormality of Residuals
C h i - s q  (N) 17.46 16.72 23.87 23.57
C h i - s q  (JB) 2.70 3.76 21.86 643.77
Skewness .2812 .0936 .4153 1.419
Kurtosis .5249 .7776 1.754 9.625
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics -- Hete r o s k e d a s t i c i t y
Y-Hat 8.806 2.764 1.472 0.405
Y-Hat**2 10.66 1.587 2.849 0.846
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 7.361 18.05 4.329 0.017
B - P - G  Test 41.63 39.35 31.29 7.883
H a r v e y  Test 19.93 35.13 13.67 15.26
S en ate
S ummary Statistics
F 33.97 36.66 9.34 10.67
Std Err .0967 .1733 .0887 . 6941
R - s q  (Adj) . 6319 . 6500 .3206 .3540
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics -- Normality of Residuals
C h i - S q  (N) 19.62 13.89 92.20 22.66
C h i - S q  (JB) 3.127 10.06 110.96 44.18
Skewness .3014 .0580 1.337 0.302
Kurtosis .4834 1.229 3.133 2.399
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics -- Heter o s k e d a s t i c i t y
Y-Hat 8.156 7.697 34.48 4.230
Y-Hat**2 10.54 2.868 41.19 5.570
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 6.197 29.55 25.67 2.810
B - P-G Test 38.84 24.24 44.92 19.28
H a r v e y  Test 21.60 22.72 31.72 12.65
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T ab le G-4: A ustralian  L abo r Party  E lectoral Support, 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1922 
(D iagnostic  S tatistics for A lternate 
M odel Specifications)
H ou se o f R epresen tatives
Australia NewSouthWales OtherS t a t e s
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
S u mmary Statistics «
F 14.52 12.26 9.56 9.59 11.77 9.72
Std Err .1003 .2866 .0816 .2169 .1023 .3021
R - s q  (Adj) .3764 .3344 .4228 .4235 . 4524 .4002
Diag n o s t i c Statistics (Normality of Residuals)
C h i - s q  (N) 11.83 38.24 21.08 27.76 17.28 17.86
C h i - s q  (JB) 19.02 19.37 5.27 7.23 5.05 4.03
Skewness .0428 .3321 .3369 .4820 .0980 .2557
Kurtosis 1.394 1.182 .7787 .6945 1.027 .7561
Dia g n o s t i c Statistics (Heteroskedasticity)
Y-Hat 0.147 12.74 1.164 4.075 0.626 11.39
Y-Hat**2 0.464 12.31 1.435 1.668 0.435 11.83
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 0.000 11.99 1.051 1.773 1.056 10.50
B - P - G  Test 13.55 31.61 8.730 27.70 9.404 25.72
H a r v e y  Test 16.37 30.77 6.627 17.18 9.844 19.59
S enate
Sum m a r y  Statistics
F 23.78 23.06 21.42 19.08 16.09 15.69
Std Err .1028 .3082 .0977 .3072 .0872 .2497
R - s q  (Adj) .3790 .3715 .4782 .4479 .4614 .4548
Diag n o s t i c Statistics -- N o r m a l i t y  of Residuals
C h i - S q  (N) 81.41 98.53 34.27 53.61 17.81 16.05
C h i - S q  (JB) 162.4 502.5 109.4 211.9 7.40 11.04
Skewness .3726 .8376 .2821 .5121 .1342 . 4004
Kurtosis 2.941 5.073 3.282 4.423 1.021 . 9952
Dia g n o s t i c Statistics — Hete r o s k e d a s t i c i t y
Y-Hat 1.200 18.33 0.279 4.020 10.92 4.364
Y-Hat**2 0.554 20.34 0.818 4.032 13.44 6.662
I n (Y - H a t * * 2 ) 2.078 14.20 1.175 3.396 8.81 1.841
B -P-G Test 49.03 44.93 53.08 40.93 49.97 44.11
H a r v e y  Test 25.82 46.07 23.87 30.26 17.66 36.03
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T ab le G -5: N ational P arty  E lectoral Support, 
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1922 
(D iagnostic S tatistics fo r A lternate 
M odel S pecifications)
H ou se o f R epresen tatives
Australia N e wSouthWales OtherStates
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Su m m a r y  Statistics
F 9.22 9.40 13.22 11.39 3.29 4.66
St d  Err .1039 .3727 .0909 .3444 .0939 .3044
R - s q  (Adj) .3006 .3051 .4886 .4478 .2064 .2999
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics (Normality of Residuals)
C h i - s q  (N) 15.78 77.43 35.08 36.67 14.64 11.23
C h i - s q  (JB) 7.30 29.42 3.21 22.49 7.45 0.24
Skewness .2598 .7153 .3212 .8633 .7603 .1395
Kurtosis 0.767 1.224 .5192 1.185 .3342 .0732
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics (Hetero s k e d a s t i c i t y )
Y-Hat 9.280 0.182 1.124 4.072 0.367 2.109
Y-Hat**2 8.064 0.095 0.408 3.431 0.527 1.500
In(Y-Hat**2) 10.16 0.307 1.865 4.205 0.210 2.746
B - P - G  Test 28.90 23.82 14.94 16.06 13.13 14.83
H a r v e y  Test 24.76 21.18 11.79 17.64 23.77 23.05
S en ate
S u mmary Statistics
F 13.12 10.38 16.93 12.16 4.16 4.93
St d  Err .1101 .4232 .1045 .4346 .0933 .2895
R - s q  (Adj) .2449 .2005 .4168 .3332 .1500 .1804
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics — N o r m a l i t y  of Residuals
C h i - S q  (N) 57.17 103.9 60.01 113.6 20.94 14.91
C h i - S q  (JB) 37.79 687.4 83.43 212.1 2.15 25.78
Skewness .1854 1.557 .7411 1.534 .2552 .5121
Kurtosis 1.457 5.568 2.768 3.937 .1759 1.659
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics — H e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y
Y-Hat 9.318 2.066 1.932 35.99 1.001 3.245
Y-Hat**2 7.320 1.266 2.310 62.95 0.793 2.826
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 10.75 3.068 1.411 19.23 1.139 3.651
B - P-G Test 48.08 39.14 37.67 131.5 35.40 37.19
H a r v e y  Test 19.62 40.91 25.11 44.35 17.30 24.30
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T ab le G -6: Country Party Electoral Support,
H ouse o f  Representatives,
Comm onwealth Election, 1925
(D iagnostic Statistics for Alternate
M odel Specifications)
Turnout Vote
A u stralia
M o d e l (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) (2 )
F 5 . 6 6 5 . 3 6 6 . 0 9 4 . 9 1
Std Err . 0 4 1 7 . 0 5 6 8 . 1 5 1 2 . 4 6 5 4
R - s q  (Adj) . 2 3 2 9 . 2 2 1 0 . 2 6 2 9 . 2 1 4 1
C h i - s q  (N) 2 7 . 1 1 2 7 . 8 9 1 9 . 1 4 5 1 . 3 3
C h i - s q  (JB) 0 . 7 4 3 . 2 4 1 . 1 1 4 9 . 0 6
Skewness . 0 9 5 8 . 2 1 7 4 . 2 0 0 0 . 8 7 3 2
Kurtosis . 2 8 1 5 . 4 9 9 9 . 0 6 3 9 1 . 9 5 7
Y-Hat 2 1 . 1 8 2 1 . 4 0 6 . 6 8 5 1 6 . 5 8
Y-Hat**2 2 0 . 2 7 2 6 . 7 1 6 . 1 8 7 1 7 . 6 6
In(Y-Hat**2) 2 2 . 0 6 1 6 . 1 2 5 . 2 9 9 1 2 . 5 0
B - P - G  Test 5 2 . 2 2 5 4 . 3 3 3 2 . 8 8 2 6 . 0 6
H a r v e y  Test 2 4 . 9 4 3 0 . 1 7 2 4 . 2 7 3 8 . 6 2
New South Wales
F 3 . 6 8 3 . 3 7 4 . 9 4 4 . 2 6
Std Err . 0 3 8 9 . 0 5 1 7 . 1 5 1 7 . 5 0 2 0
R - s q  (Adj) . 2 0 6 6 . 1 8 6 2 . 2 9 3 8 . 2 5 4 6
C h i - S q  (N) 1 4 . 0 0 1 1 . 6 5 1 4 . 0 9 2 7 . 2 4
C h i - S q  (JB) . 2 6 9 3 . 4 8 8 8 1 . 1 1 0 1 4 . 7 6
Skewness . 0 9 3 5 . 0 1 0 7 . 0 0 8 6 . 5 5 5 1
Kurtosis . 2 8 3 2 . 4 2 8 2 . 4 7 5 0 1 . 5 6 3
Y-Hat 0 . 1 3 9 0 . 2 9 6 9 . 1 3 6 1 1 . 0 2
Y-Hat**2 0 . 1 0 2 0 . 7 3 6 8 . 1 7 7 1 2 . 6 4
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 0 . 1 8 3 0 . 0 4 1 9 . 6 7 5 8 . 5 7
B - P - G  Test 4 0 . 8 5 3 3 . 4 3 1 7 . 1 5 1 9 . 1 6
H a r v e y  Test 2 7 . 0 8 2 7 . 9 8 1 3 . 0 7 1 9 . 6 5
Other States
F 3 . 4 6 3 . 4 2 3 . 3 6 2 . 1 1
Std Err . 0 4 2 4 . 0 5 9 2 . 1 2 8 2 . 1 0 5 0
R - s q  (Adj) . 2 3 8 6 . 2 3 5 5 . 2 4 1 0 . 1 1 4 0
C h i - S q  (N) 4 . 9 6 6 . 5 0 2 5 . 7 2 2 7 . 1 6
C h i - S q  (JB) 1 . 0 1 0 . 7 1 4 . 0 7 8 . 4 8
Skewness . 3 1 5 3 . 2 6 3 0 . 6 2 2 8 . 8 3 6 1
Kurtosis . 0 1 7 7 . 1 7 3 5 . 2 3 5 7 . 6 5 9 1
Y-Hat 1 6 . 3 2 1 4 . 4 3 0 . 5 5 8 1 . 6 5 7
Y-Hat**2 1 5 . 8 7 1 5 . 8 9 0 . 5 0 9 2 . 2 0 3
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 1 6 . 7 7 1 2 . 6 4 0 . 5 4 9 1 . 1 4 1
B - P - G  Test 2 6 . 3 4 2 4 . 7 5 1 0 . 5 6 1 1 . 8 4
H a r v e y  Test 3 0 . 2 9 2 2 . 6 5 1 5 . 6 5 9 . 3 5
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T a b le  G -7 : C ountry Party E lectora l Support,
Senate, C om m on w ealth  E lec tio n , 1925
(D ia g n o stic  S tatistics for A lternate
M od el S p ec ifica tio n s)
Turnout Vote
Australia
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
F 18.20 15.24 19.62 31.99
S t d  Err .0417 .0577 .1165 . 6435
R - s q  (Adj) .3636 .3216 . 4005 .5274
C h i - s q  (N) 58.45 81.49 91.82 61.27
C h i - s q  (JB) 10.85 47.33 281.8 130.7
Skewness .3025 .5986 1.301 .0886
Ku r t o s i s .5363 1.160 3.784 3.061
Y - Hat 3.07 25.26 24.46 0.000
Y - H at**2 3.05 28.69 25.23 0.192
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 3.07 21.20 22.66 0.612
B - P - G  Test 24.18 79.52 51.03 13.24
H a r v e y  Test 61.05 77.44 52.62 21.99
New South Wales
F 14.46 13.47 12.57 20.92
St d  Err .0412 .0563 .1254 . 6523
R - s q  (Adj) .3762 .3584 .3585 .4909
C h i - S q  (N) 39.79 51.62 63.52 45.35
C h i - S q  (JB) 11.60 29.47 165.4 95.35
Skewness .1903 .3787 1.287 . 1445
Ku r t o s i s . 9601 1.402 3.296 3.078
Y-Hat 0.245 29.80 39.38 1.401
Y - H a t * *2 0.091 35.23 69.82 3.627
In (Y-Hat**2) 0.485 22.74 17.70 0.036
B - P - G  Test 19.97 52.98 1 1 1 . 9 22.59
H a r v e y  Test 33.98 36.92 40.46 12.42
Other States
F 9.66 6.48 23.48 26.52
St d  Err .0341 . 0499 .0631 .4610
R - s q  (Adj) .4675 .3548 .7127 .7382
C h i - S q  (N) 12.47 12.33 33.93 19.82
C h i - S q  (JB) 0.73 6.54 44.38 0.22
Skewness .2031 .4415 .7458 .1201
K u r tosis .1917 .9223 3.467 .1017
Y-Hat 14.71 12.46 0.543 2.464
Y-Hat * * 2 14.63 14.12 6.893 1.146
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 14.67 10.45 6.871 7.86
B - P - G  Test 42.44 40.11 21.22 35.16
H a r v e y  Test 29.56 50.90 24.22 15.86
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Table G-8: Australian Labor Party Electoral Support, 
Commonwealth Election, 1925 
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate 
Model Specifications)
House of Representatives
Australia NewSouthWales OtherStates
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Summary Statistics
F 17.08 14.83 18.82 18.53 8.01 7.38
Std Err .0771 .2058 .0529 .1447 .0898 .2273
R-sq (Adj) .5330 .4950 .6605 . 6567 .5035 . 4790
Diagnostic Statistics (Normality of Residuals)
Chi-sq (N) 24.37 27.04 13.07 22.68 29.44 19.66
Chi-sq (JB) 69.31 34.57 7.95 24.55 2.73 45.67
Skewness .2707 .3900 . 0714 . 1488 .3778 1.082
Kurtosis 3.242 2.190 1.483 2.544 .8968 3.950
Diagnostic Statistics (Heteroskedasticity)
Y-Hat 7.543 3.405 0.104 2.205 7.065 1.559
Y-Hat**2 9.140 4.648 0.049 2.246 7.576 1.738
In(Y-Hat**2) 5.796 1.535 0.175 2.165 6.259 1.336
B-P-G Test 32.27 16.49 31.08 27.79 23.75 15.33
Harvey Test 20.79 19.87 18.50 21.06 13.80 16.30
Senate
Summary Statistics
F 17.97 21.85 17.03 17.85 13.18 9.07
Std Err .1108 .2646 .1017 .2375 .0854 .2604
R-sq (Adj) .3784 .4280 .4367 .4492 .5720 .4678
Diagnostic Statistics — Normality of Residuals
Chi-Sq (N) 95.11 78.47 52.70 52.50 27.41 21.11
Chi-Sq (JB) 804.6 443.0 298.8 216.1 6.08 11.94
Skewness 1.763 . 9551 1.215 . 6974 .3961 .4144
Kurtosis 8.406 5.528 5.155 4.611 1.150 1.764
Diagnostic Statistics — Heteroskedasticity
Y-Hat 3.428 2.548 49.78 1.357 7.985 0.110
Y-Hat**2 3.819 3.197 2.385 1.206 8.576 0.162
In(Y-Hat**2) 2.438 1.651 2.312 1.404 5.790 0.014
B-P-G Test 60.07 39.96 224.0 41.15 39.11 31.37
Harvey Test 19.06 16.13 32.17 38.66 18.26 41.65
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T ab le G-9: National Party Electoral Support, Senate 
Commonwealth Election, 1925 
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate 
Model Specifications)
Australia NewSouthWales OtherStates
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Sum m a r y  Statistics
F 6 . 3 9  5 . 0 2 1 0 . 5 0  6 . 5 3 5 . 9 3 4 . 8 7
S td Err . 1 2 4 7  . 5 0 4 6 . 1 2 3 6  . 5 2 8 3 . 0 6 7 8 . 2 6 7 4
R - s q  (Adj) .1 6 1 2  . 1 2 5 2 . 3 1 4 2  . 2 0 9 8 . 3 4 6 5 . 2 9 1 9
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics (Normality of Residuals)
C h i - s q  (N) 5 9 . 4 9  1 1 9 . 6 2 5 . 5 2  8 1 . 2 7 1 2 . 4 1 2 3 . 5 0
C h i - s q  (JB) 3 9 . 4 9  3 2 2 . 1 1 3 . 0 0  2 0 7 . 5 2 . 3 8 1 6 . 2 0
Skewness . 4 4 1 5  1 . 4 6 0 . 4 6 9 2  1 . 4 6 8 . 3 3 9 8 . 8 6 4 5
Kurtosis 1 . 5 8 1  4 . 0 9 0 . 7 9 1 3  3 . 8 2 6 . 5 9 5 9 1 . 5 3 4
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics (Heteroskedasticity)
Y-Hat 2 4 . 2 7  0 . 0 4 2 1 7 . 9 2  0 . 0 4 5 0 . 9 6 0 6 . 3 0 5
Y-Hat**2 2 6 . 6 2  0 . 0 3 8 3 4 . 4 2  0 . 0 6 0 1 . 2 5 2 7 . 3 0 4
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 1 9 . 5 3  0 . 0 3 6 8 . 3 3  0 . 0 3 8 0 . 7 0 4 5 . 1 2 7
B - P - G  Test 5 6 . 2 3  2 1 . 7 6 8 3 . 9 9  1 7 . 8 5 1 9 . 3 1 2 8 . 5 5
H a r v e y  Test 3 8 . 1 2  3 0 . 9 7 2 3 . 3 2  3 0 . 6 0 6 . 7 4 1 4 . 0 6
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Table G-10: Country Party Electoral Support, 
House of Representatives,
Commonwealth Election, 1928 
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate 
Model Specifications)
Turnout Vote
Australia
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
F 12.63 12.57 5.60 7.05
Std Err .0314 .0384 . 1777 1.677
R-sq (Adj) .4431 .4419 .2504 .3064
Chi-sq (N) 12.86 14.08 23.80 64.58
Chi-sq (JB) 0.13 0.50 15.84 575.4
Skewness .0652 .1479 .3011 1.737
Kurtosis .0341 .0773 1.525 9.171
Y-Hat 7.96 9.703 11.77 52.89
Y-Hat**2 7.55 12.26 8.26 62.59
In(Y-Hat**2) 8.38 7.33 14.69 34.06
B-P-G Test 34.02 36.60 58.74 62.46
Harvey Test 13.86 26.15 38.59 64.03
New South Wales
F 6.14 6.11 7.00 9.88
Std Err .0267 .0324 .1862 1.754
R-sq (Adj) .3749 .3788 .4131 .5128
Chi-Sq (N) 12.97 13.36 17.98 19.31
Chi-Sq (JB) 1.89 0.53 0.34 15.75
Skewness .3511 .0651 .0709 . 6948
Kurtosis .0767 .2947 .3599 1.870
Y-Hat 0.356 0.489 0.027 1.253
Y-Hat**2 0.425 0.075 0.032 5.463
In(Y-Hat**2) 0.293 1.416 0.092 15.92
B-P-G Test 34.19 23.17 29.24 16.41
Harvey Test 25.15 21.94 16.65 14.29
Other States
F 9.63 8.39 4.29 3.36
Std Err .0302 . 0385 .0952 .2082
R-sq (Adj) .5105 .4706 .2772 .2117
Chi-Sq (N) 16.06 19.66 7.46 17.08
Chi-Sq (JB) 1.66 2.67 0.29 2.42
Skewness .3671 . 4728 .1426 .4086
Kurtosis .1068 .0102 .0119 .3962
Y-Hat 7.418 9.026 0.435 2.187
Y-Hat**2 7.047 11.39 0.437 2.868
In(Y-Hat**2) 7.795 6.69 0.409 1.500
B-P-G Test 18.11 18.98 17.73 19.48
Harvey Test 23.26 20.27 17.61 16.94
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T a b le  G - l l :  Country Party Electoral Support, Senate,
Commonwealth Election, 1928
(Diagnostic Statistics for Alternate
Model Specifications)
T u r n o u t V o t e
A u s t r a l i a
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2)
F 1 9 . 1 8 1 4 . 9 8 2 4 . 4 9 3 1 . 2 4
S t d  E r r . 0 3 6 8 .0 4 9 7 . 1 2 2 3 . 6236
R - s q  (Adj ) . 3 7 6 6 .3 1 7 0 . 4 5 7 4 . 5 2 0 5
C h i - s q  (N) 3 4 . 5 0 4 8 . 0 6 8 8 . 3 8 6 8 . 5 2
C h i - s q  (JB) 0 . 1 7 1 7 . 4 1 1 4 1 . 2 1 0 0 . 1
S k e w n e s s . 0 4 4 7 . 4 0 6 6 . 8 4 3 4 . 1 1 0 6
K u r t o s i s . 0 7 2 5 .6 0 3 8 2 . 7 1 2 4 . 6 2 9
Y - H a t 1 . 4 6 3 3 2 . 9 9 4 1 . 8 7 8 . 5 5 8
Y - H a t * * 2 1 . 6 3 8 3 8 . 4 0 5 8 . 2 4 7 . 8 2 1
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 1 . 2 7 9 2 6 . 7 6 2 7 . 4 2 8 . 8 0 6
B - P - G  T e s t 1 0 . 0 9 7 8 . 8 9 1 5 0 . 6 4 4 . 5 7
H a r v e y  T e s t 6 7 . 8 6 6 7 . 1 3 6 4 . 0 1 3 2 . 4 0
New S o u t h  W a le s
F 1 2 . 1 7 1 0 . 9 6 2 0 . 4 3 3 0 . 0 8
S t d  E r r . 0 3 2 8 . 0 4 2 5 . 1 2 0 6 . 5 0 7 2
R - s q  (Adj ) . 3 3 3 5 . 3 0 8 3 . 4 8 4 7 . 5 8 4 9
C h i - S q  (N) 3 6 . 5 2 2 6 . 4 8 4 9 . 0 6 4 9 . 7 1
C h i - S q  (JB) 0 . 2 4 7 . 4 0 1 9 . 7 1 9 0 . 2 8
S k e w n e s s . 0 8 0 7 . 3 0 9 3 . 4760 . 2 2 9 9
K u r t o s i s . 0344 . 4747 1 . 0 4 8 2 . 9 5 7
Y - H a t 0 . 3 7 5 2 0 . 6 2 4 1 . 6 8 4 . 4 2 0
Y - H a t * * 2 0 . 4 4 9 2 2 . 8 0 6 9 . 0 4 6 . 5 8 5
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 0 . 2 9 9 1 7 . 8 0 1 6 . 7 1 0 . 4 5 0
B - P - G  T e s t 7 . 6 7 9 5 4 . 7 6 1 4 7 . 5 4 5 . 2 0
H a r v e y  T e s t 5 8 . 3 6 6 6 . 3 9 4 3 . 4 7 1 7 . 0 5
O t h e r S t a t e s
F 1 5 . 7 3 9 . 5 3 7 . 4 7 1 2 . 0 2
S t d  E r r . 0 3 5 7 . 0 5 4 5 . 0 9 6 4 . 6275
R - s q  (Adj) . 6007 . 4 6 3 7 . 4 1 2 4 . 5 4 7 0
C h i - S q  (N) 1 1 . 4 9 1 8 . 9 9 3 0 . 2 6 1 5 . 3 9
C h i - S q  (JB) 1 . 5 0 5 . 9 8 6 6 1 . 7 3 . 5 1
S k e w n e s s . 3 1 6 8 . 4 4 0 3 2 . 4 7 4 . 2 2 1 9
K u r t o s i s . 0 1 9 8 . 8 4 9 8 1 3 . 3 3 . 9474
Y - H a t 6 . 9 6 7 1 4 . 0 2 0 . 0 6 5 0 . 9 7 4
Y - H a t * * 2 7 . 4 9 2 1 4 . 1 1 1 8 . 1 7 3 . 4 4 4
I n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 6 . 3 1 8 1 2 . 4 2 9 . 7 0 2 0 . 0 0 1
B - P - G  T e s t 2 7 . 3 6 3 3 . 4 1 2 2 . 8 3 2 0 . 6 7
H a r v e y  T e s t 2 0 . 1 3 4 6 . 3 1 1 6 . 9 5 1 1 . 5 4
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T able G -12 : N ational Party  and A ustralian
L abo r P arty  E lectoral Support, Senate
C om m onw ealth  E lection , 1928
(D iagnostic S tatistics fo r A lternate
M odel Specifications)
N ation a l P arty
A u stralia N e wSouthWales OtherStates
M o d e l (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
S u m m a r y  Statistics
F 19.77 17.67 16.39 13.44 6.12 6.00
S td Err .1049 .5716 .0955 .5725 .0721 .2340
R - s q  (Adj) .4024 .3741 .4267 .3754 .3556 .3498
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics (Normality of Residuals)
C h i - s q  (N) 41.65 39.31 22.34 20.81 25.60 25.89
C h i - s q  (JB) 5.63 40.87 0.91 7.47 8.69 42.33
Skewness .1276 .5180 .0709 .3858 .7160 1.227
Kurto s i s .5622 1.455 .3087 .4720 .9340 2.939
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics ( H e t e roskedasticity)
Y-Hat 2.857 49.98 133.1 27.86 1.252 7.638
Y-Hat**2 1.536 59.43 209.2 34.78 0.581 10.45
l n ( Y - H a t * * 2 ) 3.898 38.49 35.03 17.97 2.331 4.810
B - P - G  Test 99.89 110.1 219.8 90.22 10.78 26.44
H a r v e y  Test 37.75 86.77 68.84 58.69 6.986 14.22
A u stra lian  L ab or Party
S u m m a r y  Statistics
F 21.21 13.35 13.82 8.28 17.36 10.94
St d  Err .1182 .3184 .1224 .3216 .0770 .2407
R - s q  (Adj) .4203 .3068 .3825 .2597 .6430 .5209
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics -- N o r m a l i t y  of Residuals
C h i - S q  (N) 74.50 94.30 47.56 65.33 24.99 20.01
C h i - S q  (JB) 384.6 595.7 392.6 640.8 16.88 39.61
Skewness .7672 3.657 1.226 3.970 .1109 .2625
K u r t o s i s 16.40 44.86 17.16 46.11 2.276 3.360
D i a g n o s t i c Statistics — H e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y
Y-Hat 1.100 0.026 0.279 0.263 5.694 0.030
Y-Hat**2 1.376 0.028 0.818 0.108 4.693 0.080
ln(Y-Hat**2) 0.624 0.037 1.175 0.494 5.934 0.001
B - P - G  Test 77.24 27.92 53.08 46.21 44.34 25.56
H a r v e y  Test 41.94 31.25 23.87 33.20 28.47 17.46
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Notes
1 (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984); (Pinard, 1975); and (Mazmanian, 1974) are important excep­
tions to this observation. These studies, however, do not address this study’s concerns (which are set out 
fully in this chapter). Neither focusses attention upon agrarian parties and neither investigates in detail 
the economic antecedents of non-major party formation, electoral support and dissolution.
2These labels are adopted in order to attach a more precise definition to hitherto interchangable terms. 
This study therefore uses the term "non-major" party in order to refer to a party (other than a major party) 
whose significance to the party system and voters has not yet been ascertained. It reserves the use of the 
term "third party" to parties (other than major parties) which bear a significant impact upon major parties 
and voters (see in particular the discussion in Chapter 7).
3The most exhaustive analysis of Western Europe’s agrarian parties, by its own admission, is but "an 
exploratory study and broad synthesising overview of the political behaviour of agrarian groups in 
Western Europe" (Urwin, 1980p.20). Accordingly, it
[makes] no attempt to construct a theoretical edifice. Nor, strictly speaking, is the study a systematic 
empirical analysis of cross-national variations. The methodological orientation is relatively non-rigorous . .
. Moreover, the empirical basis is unsatisfactory. Much of the information is impressionistic and qualitative, 
while the origin and value of some of the quantitative data employed are open to criticism (Urwin, 
1980pp.20-21).
4The figures for agrarian parties are drawn from Tables 1-1,1-2 and 1-3; the figures for the other parties 
are drawn from data set out in Appendix A.
5Not even the most comprehensive examination of agrarian parties (Urwin, 1980), makes explicit the 
concurrent formation of many of these parties. Similarly, von Beyme devotes one sentence to this 
phenomenon (von Beyme, 1985p.ll2). Graham discusses the formation of farmers’ parties in North 
America and Australia in comparative perspective (Graham, 1966p.l-28), but makes no attempt to con­
struct a formal theory of non-major and agrarian party formation.
6Clearly, Sartori’s definition and use of the term "faction" (which is set out fully in the text) differs 
considerably from other studies’ definition of this term. According to Sartori, factions are historically- 
distinct entities: the factions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries evolved (concurrently with the 
democratisation of politics) into parties (Sartori, 1976p.72). Most analysts, however, define factions as 
subunits of political parties. Ranney and Kendall, for example, define a faction as "an element inside a 
party whose purpose is to control the personnel and the policies of the party"(Ranney56 "p.126"). 
Similarly, Rose asserts that "a political faction may be defined as a group of individuals based upon 
representatives in Parliament who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organised 
political activity" (Rose, 1964p.37); (Ranney, 1975); (Zariski, 1960pp.27-51); (Beller and Belloni, 
1978pp.3-4).
7Although he does not emphasise its significance, Urwin is not unaware of this distinction:
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At first glance it would seem that some of [Eastern Europe’s] agrarian parties were different from those 
established in Scandinavia (Urwin, 1980p.l64). [Specifically], the Scandinavian agrarian parties were less 
"peasantist" than "farmers" or interest-group parties (Urwin, 1980p.l92).
8Knoke and Long, for example, argue that "it seems reasonable to suppose that differences in types of 
farming and in the market for farm commodities may have important consequences upon [rural] political 
orientation" (Knoke and Long, 1975p.l7). Further, one major study of voter behaviour (Campbell, Con­
verse, Miller and Stokes, 1960) demonstrates that agrarian political behaviour responds to both short-term 
economic stimuli (i.e., to changes in the prices of agricultural commodities between elections) and to 
long-term economic stimuli (i.e., farm size).
9The Australian Country Party has maintained a continuous existence in the Commonwealth Parliament 
since its formation prior to the 1922 election. From 1975 to 1982 it was known as the National Country 
Party and since 1982 it has been known as the National Party.
10In particular, these studies do not take steps to ensure that their evidence is representative of the 
phenomena that they purport to describe. As a result, the evidence upon which these studies are based is 
not representative; rather, it is the record of a restricted (elite) segment of society. It most typically 
chronicles elites’ actions or interprets the actions of the masses through elites’ eyes. Elites’ attitudes and 
behaviour need show little resemblance to the attitudes and behaviour of other social groups. Research 
which draws upon such evidence in order to make assertions about the attitudes and behaviour of society 
at large is thus on uncertain methodological ground (Clubb, 1977).
1 ]So too is the principal analysis of farmers’ and peasants’ parties in Western Europe, which
explores the interconnections between agrarian [social] structure, socio-economic change and political 
activity. More particularly, the focus is upon the emergence of agrarian political organisations (or their 
absence) in the decades between the late nineteenth century and the Second World War, and upon how far 
this emergence was influenced by agricultural [social] structure, by the experience of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and political democratisation. In this sense the study specifically attempts to test and to expand 
upon the hypotheses advanced by Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) in their seminal study of 
the historical preconditions of social cleavages and party divisions in Western Europe (Urwin, 1980p.l2).
1 Consensus, however, exists with respect to its principal tenets. Agriculture is, in a Physiocratic sense, 
the "basic occupation" upon which all other economic pursuits depend; agricultural life is the natural and 
most fitting life for man; therefore, being natural, it is good, while city life is artificial and evil; rural 
autarchy is desirable; the farmer’s diligence demonstrates his virtue, and the family farm is the bulwark of 
democracy (Flinn and Johnson, 1974pp. 189-195); (Carlson and McLeod, 1978pp. 17-30).
13This result is consistent with the observation of Campbell et al:
most discussions share an underlying assumption that there need be some basic congruence between the 
ideology proposed by the [agrarian party’s] elite and the motivations of the mass base in flocking to its 
electoral support. To presume that the mass base is endorsing the ideology as the analyst conceives it is to 
presume that [it] is in some sense comprehended by more than a handful within the mass base. [Our 
findings] tend to call this assumption into question even for the moderately educated and moderately 
involved voter. It should be clear that no commonly recognized political actor would be less likely to fulfill 
this assumption than the farmer (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960p.436); see also (Converse, 
1964p.231)
14Lipset, for example, asserts that
the cleavage that developed early [in Saskatchewan’s political history] between the economically 
dominant urban world and insecure rural areas was sharpened by fluctuations in the business cycle and 
encouraged conflict between the urban middle classes and farmers (Lipset, 1950p.29); see also (Graham, 
1966p. 17).
15More generally, for discussions of economic conditions as catalysts of the formation of transient
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non-major parlies, see (Bone, 1965p. 142); (Ranney and Kendall, 1956p.458); (Downs, 1957p. 130); 
(Chambers, 1967p.32).
16See also (Hauss and Rayside, 1978); (Studlar and McAllister, 1987).
17The assertion that electoral laws facilitated non-major party (i.e., Country Party) formation in 
Australia is compelling (Webb, 1954). A priori, however, the effect of electoral laws would not appear to 
be decisive: despite different electoral laws (simple candidate ballot and plurality electoral formula in 
Canada; alternate candidate ballot and majority electoral formula [after 1918] and compulsory voting 
[after 1922] in Australia), both countries spawned agrarian parties in the years immediately after the First 
World War. Further, despite the fact that (within each country) all regions vote on the basis of identical 
electoral laws, only particular areas of each country spawned (and, in the case of Australia, sustained) 
agrarian parties.
18Equation (3.1) deliberately expresses A y(k) as a cumulative function of of the two inputs. It thereby 
captures an important characteristic of party behaviour: parties cannot possibly respond to the demands of 
all voters; rather, they must respond selectively (using some decision-rule or criterion) to the demands of 
particular voters. Equation (3.1) specifies one such criterion: parties respond only to demands which are 
sustained over time. As Figures 3-1 and 3-2 will make clear, inputs which occur only at a single point in 
time have much less influence upon A y(k) than inputs which are sustained over time.
19This analyses closely follows the analysis of (Boynton, 1980).
20New Zealand price indices for these commodities are not directly comparable to the Australian and 
Canadian indices.
2Econometric analyses of Australian electoral behaviour include (Douglas, 1975); (Schneider and 
Pommerehne, 1980); (Mughan, 1987). Econometric analyses of Canadian electoral behaviour include 
(Erickson, 1988).
22Kramer explicitly adopts the tenets of the rational choice model of voting (Kramer, 1971); subsequent 
works implicitly follow its lead (Monroe, 1979p. 143). Riker stresses the importance of this assumption:
Kramer’s [1971] essay is, in my opinion, mainly significant as an effort to sustain the tradition of rational 
choice [in voting]. He speaks of the vote as a rational choice between alternatives and says that his study is 
an attempt to put that interpretation to "a more direct test than is readily possible with survey data" (Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1973p.l78).
23At least one former chairman of the [American] Council of Economic Advisers accepts the view that 
the results of a government’s economic policy has an important influence on voting (Okun, 1973p.l76). 
So too did British Prime Minister Harold Wilson:
All political history shows that the standing of a Government and its ability to hold the confidence of the 
electorate at a General Election depend on the success of its economic policy [quoted in (Goodhart and 
Bhansali, 1970p.45)
Further, Paldham notes that
It is difficult for many reasons to treat the short- and the long-run in the same statistical analysis, and 
[therefore] it is a recognised tradition that [econometric analyses of electoral behaviour] concentrate on the 
short-run. Consequently, they deal with the swing voter only. In such short-run analyses the long-run 
element might often be regarded simply as a trend dependent only on time (Paldham, 198 lp. 183).
24Equation (4.1) serves a heuristic purpose only; it includes all variables normally incorporated into 
econometric studies of electoral behaviour. In practice, most studies omit one or more of its terms.
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25This omission appears to result from a lack of theoretical guidance:
Third party votes are not included since it is unclear whether they represent a vote against the incumbent 
party or a protest against the two party system (Bloom and Price, 1975p.l241).
Nonetheless, Kramer acknowledges that
we should try to incorporate the minor party vote into the analysis rather than lose information by simply 
ignoring it (Kramer, 1971p.l36).
26Studies using aggregate-level data often (but by no means always) find a relationship between macro- 
economic conditions and electoral behaviour. Studies using individual-level (sample survey) data, 
however, largely fail to uncover such a relationship. This study follows Kramer’s argument that (1) this 
discrepancy is a statistical artifact, that (2) individual-level estimates of the effects of macro-economic 
conditions on electoral behaviour are badly biased, and that (3) analyses using aggregate data yield more 
reliable estimates of this relationship. (Kramer, 1983). This chapter thus focusses largely upon 
econometric analyses of electoral behaviour which employ aggregate-level data.
27see also (Okun, 1973); (Lewis-Beck, 1984); (Feldman, 1984); (Weatherford, 1983); (Bloom and 
Price, 1975); (Tufte, 1975); (Tufte, 1978); (Paldham, 1981).
28See also (Stigler, 1973p. 160); (Fiorina, 1978); (Owens and Olson, 1980).
29The most notable exceptions are (Fair, 1978); (Fair, 1982); (Fair, 1988); (Meitzer and Vellrath, 1975); 
(Tufte, 1978).
30Such a situation is not infrequent: Kramer reports that it has occurred in eight of the thirty-five 
elections between 1896 and 1964 (Kramer, 1971p. 135).
31see, for example, (Bloom and Price, 1975p.l251); (Goodman and Kramer, 1975p.l264); (Kramer, 
1971p.l31)
32Social science research typically considers the agricultural sector to be an homogenous entity. For a 
variety of reasons (most notably variations in climatic, moisture and soil conditions that engender 
geographically distinct patterns of commodity production, together with diverse combinations of land, 
labour and capital in agriculture), however, it is very difficult to make generalisations about agricultural 
production or agricultural economic conditions which are valid nation-wide: agriculture is more ac­
curately viewed as a conglomeration of pursuits whose economic prospects vary greatly and whose 
interests diverge as often as they converge (Schultz, 1945); (Schultz, 1953). These factors (as well as the 
differential demand for agricultural commodities set out in Chapter 3), account for the substantial 
variability of the economic conditions and prospects faced by primary producers. Treatment of aggregate 
trends in production (or of the conditions faced by a particular region or group of commodity producers) 
as if they were representative of economic fortunes of agriculture in general leads almost inevitably to 
distorted or erroneous conclusions (Johnson, 1985p. 172).
33Specifically, these data are available from
• New South Wales Statistical Register: Crop and livestock statistics for the year ended 30th 
June 1922 (which record agricultural conditions closest to the 1922 Commonwealth 
elections) are available in the 1921-1922 edition at pp. 724-749; for the year ended 30th June 
1925 (which set out conditions closest to the 1925 elections), in the 1924-1925 edition at pp. 
678-693 and for the year ended 30th June 1928 (which set out conditions closest to the 1928 
elections) in the 1927-1928 edition at pp. 584-599.
• Statistics of the State o f Queensland: Crop and livestock statistics are for the years 1922,
1925 and 1928 are available in the 1921-1922, 1924-1925 and 1927-1928 editions at pp. 
7H-10H and 20H-45H.
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• Statistical Register o f the State of South Australia: the 1921-1922, 1924-1925 and 1927-1928 
editions set out local crop and livestock statistics in part V. pp. Iff.
• Statistical Register o f Western Australia: crop and livestock statistics for the period ended 28 
February 1922 appear in part V of the 1921-1922 edition at. pp. 12-27, 50-61; for the period 
ended 28 February 1925, in part V of the 1924-1925 edition at pp. 12-27 and 52-65, and for 
the period ended 28 February 1928, in part V of the 1927-1928 edition at pp. 12-27 and 
50-65.
• Statistics o f the State o f Tasmania: statistics for the year ended 1st March 1922 appear in part 
V of the 1921-1922 edition at pp. 30-42; for the year ended 1st March 1925, in the 1924-25 
edition at pp. 22-36, and for the year ended 1st March 1928 in the 1927-28 edition at pp. 
21-35.
34The boundaries of these agricultural economic, electoral and census data co-incide. For the census of 
1921 the Commonwealth Electoral Officer in each state became a Deputy Supervisor of Census, each 
electoral division became a census division and each census division was divided into census subdivisions 
whose boundaries corresponded with electoral subdivisions (Australia, 1940pp.8,17-18). Further, in all 
but a few instances the boundaries of these census-electoral subdivisions co-incide with the boundaries 
used by extension officers to collect agricultural and pastoral economic data.
35Suitable data are not available for the State of Victoria. Accordingly, in the analysis undertaken in 
Chapters 5 and 6 "Australia" refers to all states except Victoria and "other states" refers to Queensland, 
South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.
36The agricultural and pastoral economic variables (i.e., the count as opposed to the proportion 
variables) described in Table 4-2 are expressed in terms of their logarithmic equivalents. This logarithmic 
transformation serves an important purpose:
data that are counts [as opposed to proportions] of populations, vital statistics, census data and the like are 
almost always improved by taking logs. Charles Windsor frequently prescribed the taking of logs o f all 
naturally occurring counts (plus one to handle that embarrassing quantity zero) before analysing them — no 
matter what the sources [of the data] (Tufte, 1974p.l08).
The logarithmic transformation thus improves the inferences drawn from badly-skewed distributions 
(Tufte, 1974pp. 108-109).
37Linear models assume that for each independent variable X-, the amount of change in the expected 
value of the dependent variable associated with a unit increase in X-, holding constant the effects of all 
other independent variables, is the same regardless of the value of X^. Additive models assume that for 
each Xjj the amount of change in E(Yj) associated with a unit increase in X- (holding all other inde­
pendent variables constant) is the same regardless of the values of the other independent variables in the 
model. In contrast, non-linear models posit that this relationship varies according to context: for any 
independent variable X^, the change in E(Yi) associated with a unit increase in X^ varies according to the 
value of Xjj. Finally, if the relationship between X^ and E(Yi) is expected to vary with the values of other 
independent variables, a non-additive (interactive) specification is required (Berry and Feldman, 
1985p.59).
38The alternate estimators (probit and logit) and model specifications that are analysed in this chapter 
were selected on the basis of a set of diagnostic statistics. These statistics are listed in Appendix F. For 
example, the parameters of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales at the 1922 
Commonwealth election are best estimated by logit estimates of Model (1) because the value of the 
Likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square and associated test statistics (Maddala R2, Cragg-Uhler R2, McFadden R2 
and Chow R2) for this combination of estimator and model specification exceeds that of the three other 
combinations of estimators and model specifications. All other equations analysed in this chapter were 
selected in the same manner.
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-^Elasticities are included in the table because some means of comparing the effects of independent 
variables (both within and between equations) is desirable and because standardised coefficients ("beta 
weights") are unsuitable for this purpose (King, 1986:669-674). The independent variable’s elasticity 
(measured at its mean) is superior to the standardised coefficient: it is unit-free and is not sensitive to 
sample characteristics (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977p.79).
40This chapter analyses GLS coefficients estimated from Models (1) and (2). As in Chapter 5, model 
specifications were selected on the basis of the results of diagnostic tests. These diagnostic statistics 
(whose results are summarised in Tables 6-2, 6-9 and 6-15) are set out fully in Appendix G. See 
Appendix G and subsequent footnotes.
41The figures in Appendix G (Table G-l) indicate that Model 2 is a more appropriate specification of 
the Country Party’s electoral support (House of Representatives and Senate) than Model 1. The value 
Chi-square, skewness and kurtosis statistics is less for Model (2) than for Model (1), indicating that the 
former model’s residuals are more normally-distributed than Model l ’s residuals. Similarly, the value of 
the heteroskedasticity statistics is less for Model (2) than for Model (1), indicating that the variance of the 
former model’s residuals is more constant than the variance of Model l ’s residuals. With respect to the 
Country Party’s electoral support, Model 2 conforms better to the conditions of the Classical Linear 
Model than does Model 1; for these same reasons, Model (2) is also a more appropriate model of voter 
turnout in these electoral subdivisions than Model (1).
42In the years immediately following the First World War, nearly all Australians were affiliated, at least 
nominally, with either the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian or Methodist churches. Thus, the 
proportion of a subdivision’s population that is affiliated with any one of these denominations is a linear 
combination of the proportions affiliated with the other three denominations: for example, in each 
subdivision
p(Anglican) = f(p(Roman Catholic) + 
p(Presbyterian) + p(Methodist)).
This clearly violates the assumption that no independent variable be a perfect linear combination of one 
or more independent variables, and causes severe estimation problems. The surest way to rid an equation 
of severe imperfect collinearity is to drop all but one of the offending variables (Studenmund and 
Cassidy, 1987p.l92). Separate analysis of each religious variable reveals that Anglican best predicts the 
Country Party and Nationalist Party vote, and that Roman Catholic best predicts the ALP vote. For this 
reason, Anglican was retained as the religious predictor of the Country and Nationalist vote (and Roman 
Catholic was retained as a predictor of ALP vote choice) in all equations.
43In New South Wales, as across Australia, the residuals of Model (2) (Country Party electoral support) 
are more normally-distributed and homoskedastic than the residuals of Model (1). With respect to voter 
turnout, however, Model ( l ) ’s residuals are clearly more normally-distributed (Senate) and more homos­
kedastic (House of Representatives). Model (1) was therefore selected as a more appropriate model of 
voter turnout.
44The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-3 indicate that, with respect to voter turnout in these states, 
no model is clearly preferable to the other. Model (2) was therefore selected in order to facilitate 
comparison with Australia-wide coefficients (the coefficients of both models are very similar). With 
respect to the Country Party’s electoral support, Model (2) was selected on the basis of its more homos­
kedastic residuals.
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45The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-4 indicate that Model (1) is clearly preferable to Model (2) 
in all equations except Senate elections in states other than New South Wales. Because both models’ 
coefficients in this latter election are very similar, and in order to facilitate comparison of coefficients, 
Model (1) was selected for Senate elections in these states.
46The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-5 clearly indicate that Model (1) is a more appropriate 
model of the Nationalist Party’s electoral support in the Senate. In House of Representatives elections, 
Model (1) was selected as the default model because neither model is clearly superior to the other.
47The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-6 indicate clearly that with respect to the Country Party’s 
electoral support the residuals of Model (1) are more normally-distributed and homoskedastic than the 
residuals of Model (2). (Comparison of Tables G-l and G-6 thus provides strong evidence that the 
Country Party’s base of support in the House of Representatives changed significantly between 1922 and 
1925). This result also obtains with respect to voter turnout (particularly across Australia). Because no 
model is clearly preferable to the other in New South Wales and states other than New South Wales, and 
in order to facilitate comparison of coefficients, Model (1) was selected as the more appropriate model of 
voter turnout sub-nationally.
48The diagnostic statistics which indicate that that Model (1) is a more appropriate model of voter 
turnout and that Model (2) is a more appropriate model of the Country Party’s electoral support (Senate) 
are reported in Table G-7.
49The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-9 indicate that neither model is clearly superior to the other 
as a representative of the Nationalist Party’s electoral support. However, because Model ( l ) ’s residuals 
are clearly more normally-distributed, because its F statistic is larger, because its coefficients are com­
parable to those observed in 1922 and because the coefficients of both models are very similar, Model (1) 
was chosen as the more appropriate model of the Nationalists’ electoral support.
50The diagnostic statistics reported in Table G-8 indicate, in contrast to the result observed in 1922, that 
Model (2) is a more appropriate model of the Australian Labor Party’s electoral support (Senate) than 
Model (1). House of Representatives elections in New South Wales corroborate this result Given the 
context of labour unrest which surrounded this election, this result seems to corroborate Burnham and 
Sprague’s hypothesis (i.e., that a multiplicative and exponential model will best represent vote choice 
during a period of social or economic crisis) (Burnham and Sprague, 1970pp.471-490). This specification 
of the ALP’s electoral support is unanticipated and merits further investigation.
51The diagnostic statistics set out in Table G-10 indicate that Model (1) is a more appropriate represen­
tation of the Country Party’s electoral support (House of Representatives) than Model (2). With respect to 
voter participation at this election, however, neither model is clearly superior to the other. In order to 
facilitate comparability with other coefficients, therefore, the coefficients of Model (1) are set out in 
Table 6-16.
52The diagnostic statistics reported in Table G-l 1 closely resemble the statistics reported in Table G-7: 
each table indicates that Model (2) represents the Country Party’s electoral support in Senate elections 
more adequately than Model (1), and that Model (1) represents voter participation in these electoral 
subdivisions more adequately than Model (2).
53Table G -l2 indicates that Model (1) is a more adequate model than Model (2) of the Nationalist
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Party’s electoral support: across Australia and in the two sub-national groupings, Model ( l ) ’s F  statistics 
are greater, its normality-of-residuals statistics are smaller and (except in New South Wales) its heteros- 
kedasticity statistics are smaller. F and normality-of-residuals statistics also indicate that Model (1) is a 
more adequate model than Model (2) of the Australian Labor Party’s electoral support. Heteroskedasticity 
statistics, however, favour Model (2). Following Soares and Hamblin (1967), this result may reflect the 
crisis atmosphere created by the labour unrest most apparent at the 1925 election and still present at the 
1928 election.
54See also (Asher, 1980p.l89); (Chambers, 1971p.655); (Downs, 1957ch.8); (Sewell, 1976p.84); 
(Burnham, 1955p.l31); (Dinnerstein, 1971p.l506); (Rosebloom and Eckes, 1979p.l07); (Sundquist, 
1973p.94); (Key, 1964p.281); (Pinard, 1975pp.280-290); (Bone and Ranney, 1963p.l47); (Ranney and 
Kendall, 1956p.458).
55See, for example, (Bloom and Price, 1975); (Feldman, 1984); (Goodman and Kramer, 1975); (Kiewiet 
and Rivers, 1984); (Kinder and Mebane, 983a); (Kramer, 1971); (Lewis-Beck, 1984); (Okun, 1973); 
(Paldham, 1981); (Tufte, 1975); (Tufte, 1978).
56These predictions need not be forecasts of future events. They may be past events whose outcome is 
not known to the theorist
